Romana Büchel, Annuska Derks, Susanne Loosli, Sue Thüler (eds.)

Exploring Social (In-)Securities in Asia
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Introduction

Romana Büchel, Annuska Derks, Susanne Loosli, Sue Thüler

This working paper comprises a selection of revised papers originally presented at the International Workshop ‘Social Security in Southeast Asia’, held at the University of Berne in November 2004. The idea behind this workshop was twofold. Firstly, within the ‘Working Group Southeast Asia’, consisting of a group of students and assistants of the Institute of Social Anthropology, we realized that even though we had all been working on different themes and in different countries of Southeast Asia, issues of social security and livelihood figured as a common denominator. These pressing issues therefore became the thematic focus of our discussions. Secondly, in order to gain a broader understanding of the diverse ways in which people in Southeast Asia go about securing their livelihoods, we aimed at bringing together young scholars from various academic institutes, representatives of development organisations, and interested students working on related topics.

The response to our call for papers was overwhelmingly positive. After a selection of the proposed contributions, we divided the workshop into four panels in which a total of 12 participants presented their papers. The workshop lasted for two days and attracted between 40 and 50 persons from academia as well as development organizations. The various contributions and discussions showed not only the urgency of the topic of social security, but also the great variety of the practices and significances generated by actors in relation to their livelihood. The participants and organizers felt, therefore, that the papers warranted publication in order to exemplify the current directions in the research of social (in)securities.

In Western Europe social security is commonly associated with a state-based welfare system. Since the end of the 19th century industrializing countries developed a system to ensure people's basic needs for housing, health, education, and income support in case of, for example, unemployment and old age. These measures eventually evolved into what is often called a welfare state which takes care of its citizens ‘from the cradle to the grave’. Citizens of developing countries can rarely count on such elaborate state-based social security programs. Where these programs exist, they often have limited coverage, reaching only those working in the public sector. The majority of the population in developing countries, however, has no access to government support. They predominantly work in the rural or informal sector and are dependent on local self-help arrangements in case of need. For that reason, De Jong (this volume), instead of taking an institutional approach to security, proposes to start from a functional approach, taking into account the meanings and uses of the whole complex of social relationships. Most studies on social security in developing countries, also within this volume, focus on these local, informal or ‘traditional’ forms of social security. We will therefore refer to social security as “all ways in which individual people, households, and communities protect their livelihood and are protected socially against the shocks and stresses that threaten its continuity and stability” (Nooteboom 2003: 33).
The ‘shock and stresses’ caused by the financial crisis in Southeast Asia at the end of the 1990s brought issues of livelihood and social security into the spotlight of attention. The urgency of this topic is, however, not only related to economic uncertainties but also to a changing demographic situation (such as through migration and aging), and to political processes (such as the cutback of state-based social services, resource management, processes related to the transition from socialist systems to free market economies). We can observe how various changes in political systems have broadly influenced the outlook of individual countries in regions, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, China, and Cambodia. Although maybe less obvious, these political changes have a direct impact on the daily lives of the inhabitants of the respective countries.

As a result of such political, economic, and demographic processes, not only livelihood practices, but also the elasticity and resilience of local safety nets are under stress. Mutual support networks are often thought to be based on family solidarity. However, recent research – also presented in this volume – calls this idea of family solidarity into question. Can the family under all circumstances guarantee social support in case of need? How do various demographic changes influence the family support and intra-familial cooperation?

In this context, the household is often taken as the main unit of analysis. At first sight, analyzing the household seems to be the most suitable approach for comparing the different ways of securing a livelihood. Yet, on a closer look, concrete living arrangements may differ considerably and therefore the household may be hard to grasp. One has to be aware of the shortcomings of treating the household as an individual actor strategizing its resources to the benefit of all its members. This perspective is prone to overlook intra-household differences. As some contributions show, gender and age differences cannot be ignored when studying social security arrangements. In the case of dealing with, and taking risks it can be observed that households cannot be seen as homogeneous units. Different household members may actually pursue different goals, invest differently in social relations and use their resources differently.

This brings us to the question under what conditions and to what extent people can really rely on family-based networks for securing their daily needs? Are there people who cannot count on such safety nets? Are there people that can be considered to be more vulnerable than others? Although focusing on different countries, several authors within this volume reveal two identical categories of persons who are particularly vulnerable. The first group is the increasing percentage of persons of old age. How does the process of aging influence the ways in which people secure their livelihood? Examples from Indonesia, being the one Asian nation with the fastest growing elderly population, show that elderly people cannot necessarily count on support from their families. Especially aged persons without children are more dependent on intra-generational and non-kin support. The second group of vulnerable people, namely widows, is equally falling through the often romantized kin-based safety nets. Various case studies presented here – be it in urban or in rural regions, be it in India or in Indonesia – show that the importance of networks like those existing among peer groups or in neighbourhoods are often underestimated.
Non-kin networks are not only relevant for the way in which these two particularly vulnerable groups try to secure their livelihood. In the case of sudden loss of income, for example, flexible reaction and creative solutions are asked for. Those people who lost their jobs may rely more on work units or labour unions than on their family for social and economic support.

This means that the concept of ‘vulnerability’ – understood as the extent of exposure to crises and the capacity to cope with unforeseen events (Van Eeuwijk, this volume) – is related to the access to and embeddedness in efficacious social networks of various kinds. It seems evident that not everybody reacts to a difficult situation in the same way and to the same degree. Historical and structural inequalities as well as social capital determine the range and limits of individual strategies, or styles. In this context, one may ask to what extend individuals do have ‘room of manoeuvre’?

This was one of the crucial questions that was taken up at the roundtable at the end of the workshop. The different presentations made apparent that the view of society as a shared place of living does not adequately mirror reality. Departing from an image of society as harmonious and solidary – often described as characteristic for Asian societies –, the participants suggested to rather conceptualize society as a place of competition for resources. Instead of the common view of society as well functioning, harmonious, and occasionally in stress, we should better depart from a concept of society as normally characterized by conflict-laden situations, full of insecurities. Does it make sense at all then to speak of ‘social security’ in the Asian context? Would concepts such as ‘social insecurity’, ‘risk’, and ‘vulnerability’ not be a more appropriate point of departure for our research? Within this working paper new directions are explored through specific case studies focusing on various countries in Asia.

**Outline of the working paper**

Drawing upon recent social security studies in the field of anthropology of law, of kinship, and T.H. Marshall’s conceptualization of citizenship (1992), Willemijn de Jong proposes a functional approach to social security. In doing so, she departs from pre-existing perspectives focussing on the state or public organizations as the main agencies for providing support. She adopts, instead, an anthropological perspective that provides a more comprehensive or inclusive understanding of existing insecurities. In pursuing the proposed functional approach „all the social relationships of all kinds of socioeconomic groups that can be mobilized within the realm of both kinship and citizenship“ are considered. Extensive studies in India (urban and rural Kerala), Burkina Faso and Indonesia (Flores) conducted by de Jong and her research colleagues show that social security conditions and mechanisms vary between individuals, particularly with regard to gender. Therefore, on the actor, the structural and the historical level, gender specific differences have to be considered. The research group stresses, furthermore, that social and physical support presupposes a minimum of economic resources, a fact that is highlighted by other contributors as well.

One of them is Gerben Nooteboom. He finds that long-term social security depends on individual access to resources and investments in social networks. In order to bridge the gap between a structural (providing side) and an actor-oriented approach (achieving side), he introduces the
concept of social security style. Styles, according to Nooteboom, refer to “regular patterns of behaviour vis-à-vis adversities, threats, and insecurities which are not always necessarily the result of strategic action.” They differ from strategic action (clear strategic choices) in that they are usually the result of people’s acting according to “fixed customary, habitual everyday practices.” In the East Javanese village, where Nooteboom conducted field research, he discerned four different types of social security styles: orangduit (money people), orang lugu (traditional or village people), orang pelit (stingy people), and orangbisnis (entrepreneurial people). In addition to these four types, Nooteboom finds the orang nakal, individuals not oriented towards a sustainable livelihood or long-term social security. Their deliberate taking of risks is identified as a counter style. The names adopted for the styles are local terms villagers use to ascribe to each other. Interestingly enough, styles do not correspond to specific economic conditions, i.e. money people do not necessarily belong to the top economic layer. What becomes also clear in Nooteboom’s contribution is that villagers do not randomly invest in reciprocal relationships but do so only after carefully assessing their individual orientations, capabilities, and resources.

Looking for the reasons why households opt for different paths for securing a livelihood is one of questions addressed by Nadja Ottiger. In her long-term research on economic strategies of 136 households in two villages of Orissa (northern India), she investigates why some local groups (i.e. tribals) sell, mortgage, or rent out their land more easily than other groups in times of crises. This question is based on the observation that in various regions of India autochthonous groups are loosing access to their land, a phenomenon well known in the literature as ‘tribal land alienation’. Ottiger uncovers that the reason for giving away land is neither found in weaker forms of intra-group solidarity nor in less extended social networks. Rather, she states, in all ethnic groups, households, as the main economic units, are very much self-centred. In the same vein as de Jong and Nooteboom, Ottiger argues that in times of crises, support is strictly received on the basis of reciprocity or of payment. The much propagated “kinship solidarity” turns out to be “at least on an economic level [...] more a myth or wishful thinking [...] than reality.” To explain differences in economic behaviour between various ethnic groups, aspects of social status and identity (caste and tribe) as well as of gender and household composition are crucial. It turns out that in some households the burden to compensate loss of land can be shifted to women: by selling firewood these women can earn money to buy paddy. Thus, the loss of land does not immediately threaten household (food) security.

While the household is the point of departure in many studies, Antoine Kernen considers the role of the ‘labour unit’ (danwei) as a basic unit of solidarity in times of need. In his contribution the author focuses on the increase of workers demonstrations in urban China. These workers’ protest take place in a context characterized by the loss of social benefits won under socialism. In his analysis, based on field data from three Northeast Chinese cities, Kernen favours a political perspective to contextualize and interpret the workers’ demonstrations. He shows how “the nature of their demands (limited to their own enterprise), their vocabulary (which frequently refers to socialist discourse) as well as the modality of their protests (petitions deposit) insert their actions in a well established and tolerated ‘repertoire of contention’ (Tilly 1986).” Workers’ protests are
tolerated as long as they are confined to one enterprise, appear to be spontaneous and stress the urgency of the situation of laid-off workers. By using socialist vocabulary, demonstrations indirectly point at the lost role of the state in guaranteeing material securities. This is most strategically done by old, retired people, because they are still strongly tied to their danwei and now have the time and the experience (from the period of the Cultural Revolution) to demonstrate. Furthermore, they are considered to be the ‘builders’ of the socialist state (and thence not easily criticized). Under these conditions, the Chinese government has until now succeeded in preventing the emergence of an organised labour movement. The author also wonders about the nature of the Chinese State and its ability to invent a new political control in a transitional society, particularly by analysing the new role played by the old ‘Office for Complaints and Petitions’.

The impact of political transformations is also explored within the contribution of Wening Udasmoro. She focuses on the impact of political transitions on the regulation of abortion in Indonesia. She discerns three political eras: the Old Order Era of Soekarno (1945-1967), the New Order Era of Soeharto (1967-1998) and the Reformasi Era, from 1998 until present. During the period under study national regulation policies varied from pro-natal policy to state-ordered birth control and finally to family planning under a regime aiming at democracy. In the present Reformasi Era the pertinent question is less whether abortion is allowed or not but more so how abortion regulation can be useful for national interests. It becomes obvious that in each era the female body is instrumentalized by the state in order to achieve national objectives without considering either the rights or the health conditions of women.

While the regulation of the reproductive power of women and the control of birth and new life is of major concern to the national Indonesian government, the care for citizens who face a decline of their vitality is of much less public interest. Nevertheless, for urban Indonesian families the growing number of elderly people who become dependent on care by others poses a new challenge. In his survey on three Northern Sulawesi towns, Peter van Eeuwijk identifies a ‘triangle of uncertainty’ – namely, social, economic, and health-related insecurities – troubling the generation of those over sixty years of age. Due to the inadequacy of support provided by the state or by private organizations care obligations are relegated to the household, family, and kinship. Since the care capabilities of urban households are easily exhausted, many chronically ill elderly people are neglected, awaiting “release” in bitter isolation. Recent developments show that long-term care is being provided along the lines of intra-generational networks (elderly taking care of elderly), by growing solidarity between the first and the third generation (grandchildren taking care of their grandparents), and by the employment of non-kin (remuneration of professional care-givers). The most vulnerable group of people are old, female, not married, poor, and ill persons – who most likely do not dispose of economic resources to invest in reciprocal relations.

Whereas some groups of elderly people have difficulties sustaining relations of support on the local level, certain young people may actually expand their social relations at the transnational level in their pursuit to seek the fulfilment of their dreams abroad. In her Ph.D. thesis Anna Bally aims at unveiling these migrants’ individual constructions and interpretations of their migration experiences. Introducing her article with the statement of an Indonesian woman, “[a]nd I ended
up in Switzerland”, Bally shifts the focus onto the “emotional journeys” of so-called female “marriage migrants”. Pursuing an ethno-psychoanalytical approach, Bally argues that it is necessary to take into account not only rational, economically motivated decision-making but also irrational, emotional decision-making. Only by following such a comprehensive approach can the “mysterious complexity of human strategies” be understood. The case illustrated in her article, clearly demonstrates that one cannot identify one single motivation leading to the decision of marrying a foreigner and to follow him to his country. Rather, a bundle of motives is responsible for such a decision – including feelings of love, marriage expectations, economic considerations, security concerns, curiosity, Indonesian ideals (ikut suami) or other imaginary aims or identifications. Summing up her findings Bally states that “even if denied or unconscious, love is never free of instrumental aspects. Economic goals [...] are always blended with emotional and symbolic meaning. Making decisions to secure one's livelihood thus might at the same time cover other, namely phantasmagoric goal.” Psychic conscious and unconscious motives and identifications, then, structure these women’s strategies of physical survival and aspired economic security.

The last section of the working paper comprises three shorter contributions, which mostly do not base on the author’s generation of primary data. Rather, the first two of these papers are analyses of secondary data (Yiengprugsawan, Kuerten), while the third is an outline of a Ph.D. research project to be initiated in the year 2005 (Wehrli).

Vasoontara Yiengprugsawan presents an analysis of quantitative data (UN statistics etc.) relating to HIV/AIDS infection and existing prevention measurements in the Mekong sub-region. Her main subject is the linkage between migration and HIV vulnerability in the mentioned region. Various studies have shown that the mobile population is particularly vulnerable to HIV-infection. Yiengprugsawan emphasizes, however, that mobility in itself is not a risk factor for HIV infection. Rather, an increase in vulnerability and risk to HIV/AIDS is caused by the situations encountered by mobile people during migration. The non-existent integration of migrant workers into the planning and implementation of sustainable HIV infection prevention strategies and the lack of their involvement in the development of support networks and services are essential findings of the author’s investigations.

Taking us from health to development concerns, Sandra Kürten examines the processes of urbanization since the Doi Moi policy (1986) in Vietnam. The emphasis of her comprehensive literature review lies on the urban development of Hanoi and on the impacts of the transition from planned to market economy in different areas in town. She describes the development in three different districts in Hanoi: the Ancient Quarter, the French Colonial Quarter and the squat-ter area of Chuong Duong. While developing in different directions, processes of competition and displacement more and more influence the lives of residents within these three districts. Thus, diversified strategies for securing a livelihood are continually looked for. Kürten plans to explore this in more detail in less researched areas that have been influenced by urbanization processes, namely the rural villages surrounding Hanoi.
In the proposal for her Ph.D. thesis, Angelica Wehrli similarly explores the impact of processes of urbanisation and transformation on the livelihoods of the urban population. The author is especially interested in how social and cultural values are subject to change since the Doi Moi policy (1986). For her research project, which will take place in Nam Dinh City, Wehrli plans to focus on individual experiences of citizens as well as on the strategies which they employ to secure their livelihood. During an explorative visit to Vietnam, Wehrli found at least two areas that have been influenced by the recent process of urbanisation and transformation: the perceptions of trade and the presence of Confucians ideology in daily life. Both areas will be investigated in depth by a thorough research in the field.

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References
Anthropological Perspectives on Social Security: 
Multiple Relations of Kinship and Citizenship 

Willemijn de Jong

Studies on social security often depart from a Euro-American institutional and policy oriented perspective, with a focus on the state and other public organisations as the main agencies for providing support to people in times of need and distress. However, with such an approach, large parts of social security systems remain blind spots. This paper addresses the question of how, from an anthropological perspective, the complexity of the issue of social security can fruitfully be analysed.

The following reflections are based on the one hand on recent social security studies, mainly from India and Indonesia, and on the other, on our own research project on local social security and gender in India and Burkina Faso (cf. de Jong et al. 2005). My fieldwork experiences are from India and, prior to this project, from Indonesia. I will outline only main tendencies here.

A functional approach to social security

In a recent ILO publication, social security is defined as “benefits that society provides to individuals and households – through public and collective measures – to guarantee them a minimum standard of living and to protect them against low or declining living standards arising out of a number of basic risks and needs” (van Ginneken 2003: 11). The World Bank circumscribes “social protection” in a similar vein (World Bank 2001: 9). With these institutional approaches, the large realm of support provided by kin and other more or less institutionalised personal relationships in the South and in the North remains invisible. Regarding countries in the South, the small realm of public support for people in the organised sector is unduly emphasised. Moreover, and even more problematic, efforts by the concerned actors to overcome insecurities as well as their notions of security and insecurity remain invisible as well.

Next to the institutional approach we can distinguish the functional – not functionalist – approach with regard to social security of which Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen are well-known proponents. They focus on the “capability to perform certain basic functionings” (Drèze and Sen 1991: 7) as they consider the quality of life in terms of valued activities and the ability to choose these activities as crucial. They particularly distinguish two aspects of social security: “Protection” and “promotion”. Protective social security tries to prevent “a decline in living standards in general and in the basic conditions of living in particular”. Promotional social security aims at “enhancing the normal living conditions and dealing with regular and often persistent deprivations”.

1 The project, in which I did research in urban Kerala, India, and which I headed, was carried out together with three other scholars: Claudia Roth who conducted research in urban Burkina Faso, Fatoumata Badini-Kinda who worked in rural Burkina Faso and Seema Bhagyanath who made investigations in rural Kerala. This research was financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) and the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) from July 2000 until December 2003 and was part of the programme "Research Partnerships with Developing Countries". In Indonesia I have conducted fieldwork since 1987 in a rural area on the island of Flores.
tion” (ibid. 3). Both require different strategies. These definitions show that this approach is policy-oriented, but it fails to give detailed clues for the research of social security.

The anthropologists Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann have developed a more research oriented approach to social security. Their work inspired us in the first place to conduct research on this topic. In the 1980s Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, specialists in the anthropology of law, began to develop an “inclusive” approach to social security, based on their research about different groups of Indonesian people. They were again influenced by the work of the social welfare scholar James Midgley, particularly by his book “Social Security, Inequality and the Third World”, published in 1984. The term “inclusive” refers to research that not only focuses on institutions or organisations, the providers of public support, but also on the individuals and groups of individuals who both use and provide support in the non-public sphere. Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann previously worked in the Netherlands but are now in Germany, and they stimulated scholars of different disciplines to follow their basic approach in studies on social security in Asia and Africa.

In “Coping with Insecurity”, their most programmatic publication on social security, these authors also develop a functional model of social security. The functional approach, as they understand it, is concerned with “what ideas, relations and institutions become relevant as social security under different social, economic, political and cultural conditions” (von Benda-Beckmann 2000: 14). Based on such an abstract concept of social security functions, they consider social security as a field of problems. Concerning the empirical dimension of social security, they formulate the following definition: “Empirically, social security refers to the social phenomena with which the abstract domain of social security is filled: efforts of individuals, groups of individuals and organisations to overcome insecurities related to their existence, that is, concerning food and water, shelter, care and physical and mental health, education and income, to the extent that the contingencies are not considered a purely individual responsibility, as well as the intended and unintended consequences of these efforts” (ibid. 14). These efforts take place within fields of contested norms and values and can also consist of ambivalent, unsocial and illegal ways to cope with insecurity (cf. Vel 1994, Nooteboom 2003).

The authors consider social security as an integral aspect of social and economic life and crucial to the understanding of social organisation and change. With this statement, the double-faced nature of social security as both a social and an economic phenomenon is taken into account, whereas in institutional approaches the economic aspects are often overemphasised. The conversion of economic resources into fulfilment of social security needs, at any level of poverty or wealth is of great importance.


When social security is achieved, it can be inferred that the related social relationships contain a security quality due to “security mechanisms” which enable natural, economic and social resources to be converted into actual social security provisions. Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann stress that resources alone do not provide social security, but they are a precondition for it. With statements such as “One cannot eat rice land” and “Money does not cook”, an informant in Indonesia hinted to the importance of what the authors call “chains of conversions” (ibid. 22).

Von Benda-Beckmanns’ approach concentrates principally on the social practices of individual and collective actors. These social practices are related to the symbolic order, in particular to the general cultural ideas, the individual notions of social security, and the institutionalised rights and obligations. And they are related to the actual social relationships of givers and receivers of social security. Finally, the consequences of the practices are of interest. With this model, the authors also try to overcome the usual dichotomies such as traditional and modern social security, informal and formal social security, or private and public social security. The structural and historical contexts of the social security discourses and practices as well as their genderedness are not explicitly considered in their four-layer model. But in their analyses they refer to these dimensions, particularly the impact of the state.

According to developments in social theories of difference during the last decades, gender is a category with a strong structuring potential with regard to inequality, and therefore cannot be excluded in social security studies. On the one hand, gender structures the societal fields of political economy and the symbolic order, as scholars such as Nancy Fraser, a philosopher and specialist in welfare issues, have shown (e.g. Fraser 1997, Kabeer 2000). On the other hand, gender imprints the interactions of individuals, which is known under the term of “doing gender” (West and Zimmerman 1987). Gender positionality has to be looked at in relation to ethnicity, race, class and age as well (cf. Moore 1994, Anthias 2002). For example, in our research (de Jong et al. 2005) we found that in Burkina Faso and India gender positionalities differ according to occupational or income class, and class is to some extent related to ethnicity. Gender is also related to age, but differently in the two research contexts. Due to the value of seniority, women in Burkina Faso generally achieve more authority and decision-making power with increasing age. This is less the case for women in India.

The whole complex of security efforts or the social security mix of an individual, a group of individuals or an organisation can aptly be called a social security arrangement. We conceive of the social security arrangement of a certain group as consisting of a network of social relationships which can be mobilised to get support. For example, social security arrangements of poor elderly people consist of those social ties that they are able to mobilise in situations of need. These can be relationships with certain family members, with certain members in the local community or with organisations. We call the social security arrangements of the different social groups together the “social security system” of a societal entity.

As mentioned above, social security studies focus on the conversion of resources with the purpose of diminishing insecurity and on the cultural and social dimensions of these resources and
their exchanges. Livelihood studies concentrate more on the economic aspects of subsistence of mostly poor populations. Poverty studies particularly analyse the income situation of the poor and the way they try to fulfil their basic needs. Studies about disasters, which have developed in recent years, concentrate on populations which are particularly vulnerable regarding ecological issues. All these different kinds of studies are concerned with efforts of individuals, groups of individuals and organisations to overcome insecurities, and are thus closely related to the field of social security studies, if not part of it.

The concept of security

Why is it useful, from an anthropological perspective, to put the term “security”, and eventually “insecurity”, at the centre? “Social security” in the sense of statutory social insurance emerged as a concept in the context of European industrialisation in the 19th century. It was a response to pressure from industrial workers who participated in mutual aid societies and was first established in Germany in the 1880s. After the Great Depression around 1930, it was implemented in other Western countries (Midgley 1997). In developing countries, statutory social security has developed since the 1950s in various ways, depending on the colonial regime.

The crisis of the world economy effected a breakdown of certainties. The philosopher John Dewey stated at that time a general “search for security by means of active control of the changing course of events” (Dewey 1929, quoted by Kaufmann 2003: 80). The term “security” became increasingly important in the West, and gradually the need for security came to be considered as a universal anthropological principle. In a declaration in 1944 the International Labour Organisation made “social security” an explicit goal that should be reached globally. As a result this term was established internationally with its specific meaning, namely as governmental income protection through social insurance (Kaufmann 2003).

In addition to the discourse about social security which is informed by Western philosophical ideas about security, since the 1970s a discourse about risk has emerged. Although in everyday language risk is a synonym for danger, the current public discourse regarding risk is strongly related to insurance. Scholars pursuing a Foucaultian approach such as François Ewald consider risk as a neologism of insurance. Risk in this sense is characterised as collective, calculable and as economic capital (cf. Ewald 1991: 198). More precisely, risk is defined as “a specific mode of treatment of certain events capable of happening to a group of individuals – or, more exactly, to values or capitals possessed or represented by a collectivity of individuals” (ibid. 199). Therefore, neither the adverse events nor the actual suffering of individuals are at stake here. Ulrich Beck, who has coined the term “risk society” and therewith strongly influenced academic discourse, argues from a similar point of view. He points to the fact that risks are culturally and socially created and that in the subsequent processes securities, and particularly insecurities, are produced. Thereby, power is exerted and profits are made (Beck 1986).

As already mentioned, von Benda-Beckmanns’ conceptualisation of social security in a wider sense is not only empirically, but also epistemologically motivated. In accordance with the currently crucial human aim for security (cf. Kaufmann 2003), they do not consider conflict or dis-
ruption as the pivot of social organisation, but security and insecurity. Based on this axiom of social organisation they construct their model of social security in relation to social theories by Antony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2000: 7).

According to our view, local efforts in coping with adversities are, theoretically and empirically, fruitfully looked at starting from the concept of security or insecurity. If we adopt the definition of social security by Benda-Beckmanns, in the sense of efforts of individuals and collectivities to overcome insecurities, then the statutory concept of social security and the current concept of risk as contributory insurance are too restricted. They are only elements of social security in a wider sense. Departing from these insurance concepts, we cannot usefully analyse the social security conditions of the poor populations, for example in Burkina Faso or India with whom we have worked, because they hardly benefit from these kinds of provisions. Instead, they rely on other resources and social relations. The broader definition suits the conditions of large parts of the world population better, not only in developing countries. But we have to be aware that security is a concept with a mainly Western genealogy. In the course of research in non-Western contexts, we should reflect whether the meanings of security in our research contexts correspond with those we departed from, and if not, we should adjust security as an analytic concept. In our study on the situation of poor people, we found that it makes more sense to put the concept of insecurity at the centre to be able to detect the limits of security.

**Uses of kinship**

Kin relations as well as kin-like relations with neighbours and friends are of the utmost importance for social security in societies that lack sufficient public provisions. In anthropology at the end of the 1980s Sylvia Yanagisako and Jane Collier developed a combined contextualised approach to the study of kinship and gender as these categories are often culturally constructed in a similar way (Yanagisako and Collier 1987). This approach has initiated a revival of studies on kinship and family issues, which earlier were at the core of anthropological concerns. Their model is based both on the cultural approach to kinship by David Schneider (1972) and on the practice theory of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990). Bourdieu pursued in his kinship studies a functional approach as well and strongly promoted integrated actor and system-oriented studies (cf. also Schweitzer 2000). For our research we adopted the methodological procedure proposed by Yanagisako and Collier which is not restricted to the study of kinship and gender. This procedure relates the social world of actors, their ideas and actions, to societal structures of inequality and to historical developments. Related to the new kinship and gender studies and loosely linked to the work of von Benda-Beckmanns, studies on “shifting circles of support” in several countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa appeared (Palriwala and Risseeuw 1996, Risseeuw and Ganesh 1998). The authors of these studies criticise the often static ideological and policy constructs of the family, and underline the transformations of family and kinship relations and the negotiated character of networks of support.

Kinship studies conducted in India show that idealised notions of the family prevail, although there are radical changes in its content due to governmental and market influences (Ganesh
Two processes can be distinguished: on the one hand there is a widening of kin and community boundaries regarding help in situations of crises and with ceremonies; and on the other hand there is a “sharp defining of boundaries and limits of solidarity and support which can be claimed on a regular basis, through reducing the diffuseness of kinship responsibility and kinship support at the ‘family’ level [and] through emphasizing the patriline and lineal as against lateral ties” (Palriwala 1994: 110). In other words, networks of recognition and prestige, especially of the upward mobile, are expanded, whereas networks of effective cooperation are restricted. Additionally, conjugalcy becomes more and more important and the reversal of authority between generations has sharpened. These processes result in an increasing experience of neglect among the elderly. This particularly applies to women as they have less access to and control over assets (Dube 1998).

According to the notions of the Indian nation-state, the family is “the most vital non-formal social security for the old” (Government of India 1999: 19). However, I found in my study on old age in urban Kerala that in practice the daily support by family members is limited and contested, due to different interests related to gender and age or generation. In the case of the poor, the children of elderly parents often have only small seasonal incomes, whereas in the case of the middle class, the elderly mostly have personal savings, not-seldom pensions and they receive additional help from domestic workers or nurses. An impediment for old age security is the increasing pressure to pay expensive dowries for daughters, also among the poor. These marriage payments, which mainly serve social status, are not reciprocated, contrary to other kinds of gifts, and they prevent the poor from saving. As the giving of support to elderly parents is less gendered than expected, and generally imagined, the receiving of support in old age is gendered in that men are more supported than women. Particularly poor women without husbands may suffer from insecurity, meaning that their daily needs for food are not met. Despite comparatively well-developed education and health facilities in Kerala, the poor elderly of the class of casual workers generally live on the verge of insecurity, particularly in town (de Jong 2003, 2005, Bhagyanath 2005).

Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (1991) finds that in rural Indonesia the circle of daily support has also narrowed. But the circle of support regarding ceremonies and situations of crisis has not been extended. Both these circles have changed towards individualism. For example, support relationships in the Moluccas exist mainly between parents, grandparents and children, but siblings can refuse cooperation. This causes problems because of high child mortality, a rather low life expectancy and migration. According to the norms, the son and his wife should support the parents, as in Kerala, but practices can be different. Adult relatives living in the same household do not necessarily share resources. They often have separate cooking pots and their relationships may be tense, despite ideals of solidarity and mutual assistance among kin and an ideology of patrilineal descent (K. and F. von Benda-Beckmann 2000). Similar accounts exist with regard to co-residing sisters among the matrilineal Minangkabau (Biezeveld 2002). I therefore suggest that the personal history of sharing among kin is more important than co-residence.
In contrast to the ideal image of the supporting village community, von Benda-Beckmann summarises social reality as: “Village life is harsh and has been harsh for generations. Family relationships are a basis for requesting support, but only very close relatives may be asked even where there is no additional basis, such as friendship. People might persist in asking favours, but they have also learned to say no to requests” (Benda-Beckmann 1991: 50-51).

The author does not go into detail regarding the meaning and use of marriage payments. She just mentions that bridewealth can be quite substantial. In my research in Flores, I found that bridewealth is not an impediment for social security as dowries are in India because these prestations are usually reciprocated (de Jong 1998a, 2000). A poor village woman in Flores, one of my key informants, once explicitly linked the giving of marriage prestations to social security in that she compared it with arisan, the rotating savings associations which are widespread in Indonesia. She was too poor to participate in one of the arisan groups in the village, but on a small scale she did participate in gift exchange in order to be able to rely on the help of kin in times of need.

The giving of support to the elderly is often gendered. For example, elderly women in the Moluccas are less well cared for than elderly men. This is not the case in the area in Flores where I did my research. Due to economic and social reasons, a rather high degree of gender equality exists there. I only observed neglect, as we in the West would call it, in the case of the most important old midwife and healer of the area who had fallen mentally ill. She was isolated in a small shed outside the village with the idea that the spirits, which had brought her the knowledge of healing, could visit her there and make her healthy.

Through migration further changes occur, as von Benda-Beckmann impressively shows. The “circle of primary responsibility” of Moluccans who have been living in the Netherlands since about 1950 is small and vulnerable, even though the third generation can make use of kinship networks for support which the first generation could not. Both in the Netherlands and in the Moluccas, support-giving is less enforced and more on an egalitarian base than earlier. Particularly in the Netherlands, there is much room for negotiation and the circle of support is concentrated now on nearest kin (cf. von Benda-Beckmann 1991, von Benda-Beckmann and Leatemiatomatala 1992).

As far as migration within Indonesia is concerned, responsibilities of husbands and migrated children for their families in the village may decrease as new consumer interests are developed, whereby daughters often feel a stronger commitment (Koning 2000, Wolf 2000). Migration is also important in the village in Flores. At the end of the 1980s, almost thirty percent of the children were migrated. Particularly males had access to wages or salaries in the service sector in town. Consequently, a large part of the parents in the village could reckon with some remittances from migrated children (de Jong 1998b). But, it could also be observed that migrated daughters maintained stronger ties with their parents than sons. Further research on migration and support relationships is needed to get a better understanding of the impacts of modernity on people’s conditions of security and insecurity in developing societies.
Unexpectedly, the studies in our project on social security show that it is not only members of the nuclear or the extended family who provide support, but the network of support extends to the neighbourhood. In India this especially applies to the poor (de Jong et al. 2005). For this support network we coined the term “extended neighbourhood” (de Jong 2005). Another important finding of our studies is that the poorer the people are, the lesser they are supported by kin and neighbours. The reason is that poor people are not able to reciprocate in cycles of exchange with kin and other close people. Thus, their support network shrinks.

As in the Moluccas, in the village in Flores people of all levels of wealth strongly rely on specific neighbours with whom they maintain relations of friendship, meaning relations of support. One of the poorest women I know in the village is of high-ranking descent. Two of her three children died at a young age due to malnutrition, and her husband died early due to a lack of medical treatment. She is too destitute to participate in gift exchange at life cycle feasts, and thus has not been able to maintain kin and friendship relations which would support her in times of need. At the time of her husband’s death, a neighbour for whom she worked was almost the only person who supported her with the burial expenses. Apart from her migrated son, her labour power is one of her last resources.

**Uses of citizenship**

To reduce insecurity in non-Western contexts, not only kinship relations are used but also citizenship relations. Regarding the concept of citizenship, we refer to the classical essay of T. H. Marshall (1992) on citizenship and social class. Marshall defines citizenship as a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community, including equal rights and duties. In contrast to the liberal tradition of citizenship, in this conceptualisation the citizen is not an individual member of a state, but of a community. This allows a multi-tier concept of citizenship, which implies full membership of local, ethnic, national and transnational collectivities, and it allows to reflect the relationships between these collectivities and the state, a perspective which is pursued by several authors today (e.g. Hall and Held 1989, Yuval-Davis 1997). Moreover, citizenship according to Marshall entails civil, political and social rights. The latter should lead to a minimum of economic well-being and security.

The social scientist Nira Yuval-Davis considers citizenship collectivities as ideological and material constructions, whose boundaries, structures and norms are a result of constant processes of struggles, negotiations and social developments. Her work is useful in clarifying issues of citizenship and gender. Yuval-Davis claims that women’s citizenship should not only be considered in contrast to men’s, but also in relation to women’s affiliation to dominant and subordinate groups, to ethnicity, origin and urban or rural residence, as well as with regard to global and transnational issues. From an individual perspective, attributes such as gender, class position, religion, origin, ability and phase in the life-course determine one’s citizenship. These approaches to citizenship can be made fruitful for social security research.

Recent studies on social security in developing countries show the importance of new public social security mechanisms regarding membership in informal and formal associations and
NGOs, in addition to being a citizen of a nation-state (e.g. von Benda-Beckmann, Gsänger and Midgley 1997). Some authors see most potential for social protection in cooperative voluntary organisations with membership on the basis of equality. They think that hierarchies of power that exist in other kinds of social relationships can be neutralised, if redistribution is depersonalised and altruistic aims are institutionalised (e.g. Vuarin 2004). Other authors think that their functioning is less self-evident than mechanisms based on kinship, because membership in these voluntary organisations is more flexible, and whether and how they should function so that their members achieve social security has to be deliberately created and negotiated. Their future role regarding social security is therefore unclear (e.g. Leliveld 1994, Hospes 1996).

Both in India and Indonesia, microfinance organisations have become important instruments for development, and at least since the beginning of the last century informal rotating savings associations also emerged in local contexts, often with female participants (e.g. Mohini Seti 1995, Hospes 1995, Parker 2001). These savings associations are economically motivated, to enable the participants to dispose of money for productive purposes, consumption, and ceremonies. Parts of them also have a social security function in that the members support each other materially and morally in situations of crisis. But this is not necessarily the case. It is also debated whether they directly contribute to women’s empowerment because under certain conditions domestic violence may temporarily increase, as reported in cases in South Asia (cf. Locher 2004).

The work of Hospes (1995, 1996) on savings and credit practices in a small town in the Moluccas in Indonesia gives interesting clues concerning the use of citizenship to achieve social security. In contrast to many studies in this field, Hospes pursues a relational perspective and he takes into account the variety of these associations, as well as the different categories of female participants and their agency. Savings associations are organised in occupational, political and religious contexts with different rules, regulations and more or less explicit other purposes. There are for example arisan groups of entrepreneurs of middle-class migrants who also use these groups to strengthen kinship and ethnic ties. The members of savings associations connected with the former governmental women’s groups (PKK) and of those connected with praying groups reinforce kinship as well as friendship ties. Market sellers of the lower-income class of indigenous people, however, try to protect their small daily earnings against the requests of relatives. Accordingly, their savings groups give less importance to kin ties.

An issue which is less debated in these studies, but which I came across in my fieldwork both in India and Indonesia, is that the poorest people are excluded from these group activities because participation requires a regular source of income to meet the contributions. Thus, to achieve social security poor people not only have difficulties to mobilise kin relationships, but also citizen relationships. With reference to Biezeveld (2002: 233) it is important to emphasise that “[p]articipating in a group is in itself not enough to create ‘entitlements’ to care or support, but it may help.” At least friendship and feelings of solidarity are created.

As already mentioned, religious communities can be of importance both with regard to charity and with more formalised welfare. In urban Kerala, poor Hindu caste organisations can have
important social security functions, for example in that they mediate in issues of health care and housing between the people and the local government. Among Muslims and Christians, praying groups can serve certain supportive needs as well. In Indonesia, the Muslim institutions of almsgiving and religious taxes, consisting of different types of provisions, have some significance for social security. This is reported in the case of the Moluccas (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1988) and among the Minangkabau (Biezeveld 2002). Here, wealthier people often prefer to provide gifts through the mosque than on an individual basis. Direct claims are thus prevented and the giver nevertheless achieves prestige. In general, however, the poor only benefit to a small degree from the alms.

Projects by NGOs and governmental organisations are still hardly investigated as to how they can ensure social security. A study about NGOs in Flores comes to the conclusion that motivation and cooperation of individuals are more important as criteria for access to development projects than poverty (Zeuner 1996). This may also apply to other regions in Indonesia. Furthermore, there are governmental development projects at the village level, but again the poorest people are often excluded and thus hardly benefit from them. In this context it should also be emphasised that both in India and in Indonesia there is a strong norm that adult persons are in the first place responsible for their own well-being (cf. de Jong 2003, Biezeveld 2002).

Finally, I would like to pinpoint to the importance of interrelationships of uses of kinship and citizenship, particularly to the possible linkages between governmental support and family support. Most interesting in this realm is a study by Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckman conducted in Indonesia, but the findings may be applicable to other societies as well (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1998). Civil servants who earn rather low salaries often use certain financial means from infrastructure projects conducted by the government to consolidate their own economic and political position and to donate gifts to their kin in the village. Through these off-state activities the civil servants indirectly contribute to their social security in old age. When they resettle in the village, they will be dependent on kin who might then reciprocate their former gifts. From the perspective of the villagers, long-term security is based on kin relationships with civil servants. Therefore, they make investments in the education of their children in the hope that at least one family member achieves a civil servant position. This again weakens the social security networks among the villagers. These processes result in some mutual security provision of villagers and civil servants, but often the latter benefit more. The authors conclude that governing by means of projects in Indonesia has resulted in strong networks of patronage within and outside the state apparatus and to a merging of political and economic structures in that political and economic resources are exchanged through kinship links.

**Studying the micro-politics of social security**

Contrary to an institutional approach, a functional approach to social security leads to a comprehensive understanding of social security. Such an approach departs from the concept of security and insecurity and considers risk where aspects of calculable and collective economic insurance are concerned. A fruitful functional approach includes meanings and uses of the whole complex
of social relationships that serve social security of individuals and collectivities. It takes into account the conditions of social security, particularly the resources available and necessary. It further contextualises the ideas and practices of the actors concerning social security regarding economic and political structures of inequality and historical developments. As the examples presented suggested, social security conditions and mechanisms particularly differ with regard to gender. Therefore, it makes sense to depart from a functional approach that constructs all three layers of the model, the actor level, the structural level and the historical level, as gendered. Such a “difference model” of social security gives due weight to social and cultural dimensions next to economical dimensions.

Individuals from the same social categories show similar social security arrangements with regard to specific kinds of insecurities. In addition to their own material and social contributions, individuals mobilise social relationships with specific family members, neighbours and other locals, such as employers or patrons, as well as specific kinds of membership in local and possibly translocal non-religious and religious associations and NGOs. Additionally, they create specific kinds of relationships with the state.

Considered from a socio-centric perspective, it is important to study the interrelationships of these different social security efforts. In doing so, the question should also be tackled to what extent certain security efforts in the citizenship sphere weaken or strengthen security efforts in the kinship sphere. With regard to development issues, it should also be asked how these different elements of the social security arrangement of a social category or social group can fruitfully be integrated and institutionalised.

Whereas research on social security in a comprehensive sense has made advances since the end of the 1980s, we think that more fine-grained ethnographic studies which focus on individual and collective uses of kin and citizen relationships can help to understand social security networks more deeply. It also can lead to make “security” and “insecurity” as comparative analytical concepts more subtle, and thus more useful cross-culturally and cross-nationally. New research on family and kinship, which considers the historicity and the ambivalence of these relationships, can contribute in a valuable way, to social security studies. Thereby it should also take into account possible insecurities of family support, due to different interests related to gender and age, extensions to neighbourhood, friendship and other local relations, as well as migration and translocal and transnational kin networks. New research about citizenship shows further fruitful avenues for research and may further contribute to clarifications in the field of social security studies. In addition to national legal issues, other more or less gendered dimensions of membership in different sub- and transnational communities, in as far as they are related to social security, should be investigated. What is finally at stake from such an anthropological perspective on social security can be characterised as different micro-politics of multiple relations of kinship and citizenship under changing conditions of modernity.
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Styles of Social Security:
Livelihood and Insecurity in the Uplands of East Java, Indonesia
Gerben Nooteboom

Whereas individual strategies for survival, access, and the maintenance of access to resources (by risk avoidance, diversification, and insurance) are at the centre of attention in livelihood studies, social security studies have traditionally been much more oriented towards mechanisms and institutions which provide support, protection, and welfare (Kaag et al. 2004). In this working paper I shall argue that in order to understand how people manage insecurities in their day-to-day existence, we need an understanding of the strategies of individuals and households and how they create access to resources such as land, labour and capital, while at the same time we need insight into the institutions and structural conditions. I shall introduce the concept of styles of social security to bridge this gap between actor oriented and institutional or structural analyses of insecurity.

During my fieldwork on social security, from mid-1997 till mid-1999, in the village of Krajan, upland East Java⁴, I noticed that the vulnerability and resilience of a household cannot always be related to material aspects such as wealth, poverty, or access to resources alone. The question that arose was: why are some households less affected than others when confronted with adversities and is it possible to distinguish and compare patterns in the ways people are prepared for and are subject to insecurities? At a more theoretical level I was interested in the question of how to analyse social security in an integrated way taking into account both structural and actor notions of social and collective action (Giddens 1984). Can we combine these two rather contrasting perspectives: attention to actors’ and households’ strategies to obtain social security within the enabling and constraining structural context of social security institutions, power relations, and inequalities? Such an approach should comprise the study of provisions of care, support, and welfare to individuals and groups by social and individual means. Provision can thus be either achieved, by individual, social, and collective strategies, or provided by arrangements and institutions offering access to care, insurance, and general well-being to individuals, households, and specific categories of people.

The crux of social security boils down to a few basic questions: how do people get direct or indirect access to resources to secure basic needs, how is this access promoted or threatened by the structural conditions in society, and how do people themselves directly or indirectly protect, secure, and maintain their livelihood? Such questions are relational since making a living necessarily involves other people, such as partners, household members, relatives, the neighbourhood, the community, and possibly larger social groups or associations, to care for and to be cared by. They may be supportive and protective, but they may also demand support, extract resources or even be a threat to survival.

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⁴ Krajan is a pseudonym.
In order to answer these questions, I first give a description of the village of Krajan followed by an evaluation of insecurities and the available social security arrangements and institutions. Secondly, I take some examples from the literature of other approaches to insecurity. Thirdly, I give an overview of the major social security styles I found in the research area and their distribution among the population by describing them in detail. This is followed by a few cases that show these styles within the complexities of everyday life and illustrate the different orientations, choices, and limitations of villagers. In the last section I make several concluding remarks.

Krajan, an upland village

The upland village of Krajan is located far from the large urban centres in Java, on the Northern slope of the Argopura volcano in East Java. The population of Krajan amounts to 3,400 people, almost all of them are Madurese speaking. Unlike many present day lowland Javanese and Madurese villages, the majority of the villagers engage in farming, often supplemented by one or more other income generating activities such as trade, handicraft production, and house construction. Migration rates are relatively low and so remittances from outside are not significant for most household incomes.

Krajan is a relatively poor village compared to other villages in Java, as it lacks special resources such as extensive fertile rice fields (sawah), plots or plantations. Nevertheless, it is slightly better off than other villages in the sub-district (kecamatan), which have even fewer resources, less fertile soils, and less rain. The local agricultural system consists mainly of maize, cassava, livestock, tobacco, and rice production. Land is scarce and not very fertile and yields tend to be insecure. The distribution of resources in Krajan is very unequal. In the case of rice fields, the rich 9% of total population own 53% of the total sawah, the poorest 32% of the population own only 4% of all village sawah.

Conditions that add to the weak production base of Krajan are the insecurities in crop outputs due to infertile soils, malfunctioning irrigation canals, and climatic circumstances. For four to six months per year practically no crops can be grown due to shortages of rain and the lack of good irrigation systems.

Although people in general are able to eke out at least a basic living in Krajan, this is not always a stable or secure affair. Setbacks and adversities such as harvest failure, death, illness, unemployment, and sudden drops in income are recurring risks and threats to villagers’ livelihoods. All people run these risks in one way or another, but not all livelihoods are threatened in the same way, and not all people perceive risks similarly. Poor villagers are, generally speaking, more vulnerable than others (Blaikie et al. 1994; Chambers and Conway 1992: 2) as vulnerabil-

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3 Krajan is one of the eight villages of the kecamatan Pakem, kabupaten Bondowoso and lies at an altitude of about one thousand metres above sea level.

4 Krajan is a so-called IDT-village (Inpres Desa Tertingal).

5 If quartiles are calculated, the richest 25% of the survey population own 74% of all village sawah. The poorest 25% virtually own no sawah (0.7%). Of the 25% of the poorest households in the survey, only two had a tiny piece of sawah. Figures for dry land are comparable, although slightly less unequal (Nooteboom 2003: 134).
ity largely depends on limitations in sources of income, ways of access to resources, and the specific constitution of the livelihood itself (Ellis 2000: 58-62).

From other contributions on social security in Indonesia, it has become clear that if people and families are confronted with an emergency or adversity, such as death, illness, fire, misfortune, or a loss of shelter or assets, most of them can fall back on village or neighbourhood (kampung) institutions and social or kinship relationships (Biezeveld 2002; Koning 2005; Marianti 2002). My study in Krajan shows that support by these institutions or networks, however, is rarely enough to cover all needs and to protect against all negative consequences of adversities. Moreover, those who cannot invest much in social relationships (the poor and destitute) cannot expect much from the different forms of social security in the village and are virtually excluded from most forms of social security. Local social security is basically a reciprocal system and forms of redistribution are not important enough to level incomes between rich and poor. Moreover, the poorest who need support most, receive least, as they are not able to invest in relationships of mutual help.

Institutions, arrangements and social relations in rural areas are definitely not enough to overcome the ‘insecurity trap’ of poorer families. In most cases in Krajan, people and households depend on their own assets and resources in times of need. From a financial point of view, local institutions and arrangements for social security are only supplementary and never free of charge. Thus, village institutions only work partially and are in general more important for richer, than for poorer categories of people. Selfless sharing and simple solidarity among the poor, or between social classes, is rare or non-existent, and the few saving groups (arisan) serve social rather than social security purposes. Institutions and arrangements such as kinship, fostering, neighbourly assistance, patronage, reciprocal gift-giving, and “mutual help” do exist and can be of importance, but, their scope depends on the individual investments in networks by villagers. These investments never guarantee significant welfare or social security in the long run. Under these circumstances, villagers are left - either partially or completely - to the households own investments in specific combinations of access to resources and social relationships for social support. In the next sections, I focus on how they do so by combining different resources and relationships, and on how they have their own social security style.

**Styles in Krajan: balancing livelihood and insecurity**

Many studies on these local arrangements, institutions and mechanisms of support and assistance to other community members in times of need, have a common perspective in that they are oriented towards the supply-side of social security, and tend to focus on *institutions of support*.

In earlier literature dealing with what we now would call social security (i.e. studies about peasant societies dealing with issues of support, subsistence security, mutual help, reciprocity, and forms of exchange) already an important division exists between the assumptions held on the nature of the village and villagers’ actions.8 Key questions posed by these studies included: are

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villages and rural societies moral entities in which a minimum subsistence is secured for all members, or are households and individual villagers calculative and driven by individual motives of survival and profit maximising, searching for a balance between risks and stability in livelihood out of self-interest? This difference in basic assumption about village and villagers’ behaviour still influences academic analyses and government policies on poverty and insecurity. The best expression of this debate, and still revealing for the current different views on social security, has been that between moral and political economists, also known as the Scott - Popkin debate.9

Social security can be viewed as a recurring dilemma between individual spending and collective investments. With regard to individual and household security, villagers have to make choices between potentially conflicting options such as investing labour, time, or capital in livelihood activities for direct consumption and personal accumulation or in communal activities and mutual help. Investing in social relationships, arrangements, and village institutions requires trust, as the investments will only be returned if the majority of the members of the network are willing to return the favour. Moreover, short-term interests and immediate needs contrast with long-term concerns and less certain future needs. This, for instance, occurs when one can choose between wage labour with direct cash returns but with weak ties with the employer, or to take a share of the harvest, which is less certain, but involves a much closer tie with the landowner and as such enhances the opportunities for support.

Investments against insecurity can be made in social relationships and networks (by gift giving, marriage, and making friends), by engaging in reciprocal relations of mutual help, or by individual and household accumulation and saving in cash, cattle or gold. Options for accumulation and investments, however, are confined to realistic financial and social limits and are not simply a matter of free choice. This wide range of options results in diverse, complex and, to a certain extent, unique sets of social security. Notwithstanding this diversity we can see patterns in this complexity of options, here referred to as ‘styles’.

On the basis of local definitions and categorisations, I distinguish four major patterns, which I call styles of social security. A style is a coherent and distinctive manner of acting and doing things (Van der Ploeg 1999: 121; 1990: 11). It can be argued that social security styles reflect solutions for making a living, about a ‘good’ and secure living and about the best ways for people and households to be prepared for the future. I define a style of social security as a general mode of ordering life; a more or less systematic and continuous attempt to create congruence in all the domains of everyday life. A social security style can thus be defined as an observable pattern in the actions and perceptions of people and households in making a living while dealing with insecurities, threats, and risks that endanger their livelihood.

In the process of trying to obtain and maintain a secure and stable livelihood people have a specific style of doing things. These styles are the outcomes of dealing with tensions, i.e. contrasting orientations of people and actual behavioural alternatives. The first tension is between support,
mutual help, and cooperation as against self-insurance and individual accumulation. The second is the tension in economic activities between livelihood activities based on subsistence and local resources against an orientation towards the cash economy and the economic opportunities outside the village.

*Style* is neither a synonym for strategies nor for structures. As mentioned, styles refer to regular patterns of behaviour vis-à-vis adversities, threats, and insecurities because such behaviour is not always, or necessarily, the result of strategic action. Sometimes, clear strategic choices are made, but more often than not, people act according to fixed customary, habitual everyday practices when they are dealing with short-term and long-term needs and hopes and desires, constrained by social demands and expectations.

The styles referred to here are based on specific knowledge and emic concepts used by local people. These folk concepts reflect categorisations and stereotypes that exist in local society. At the same time, however, this local knowledge, and its categorisations and stereotypes, are abstractions that do not fully reflect the actual hustle of activities people employ. To order the diversity of threats and options, actors themselves make qualifications to indicate differences between others and themselves concerning orientations on livelihood, survival, and willingness to support.

In Krajan, villagers often use nicknames and categorise fellow villagers on the basis of their values and orientations towards livelihood and social security. Examples of these locally-used categories are ‘enterprising people’ (*orang bisnis*), ‘money people’ (*orang duit*), ‘stingy people’ (*orang pelit*), and the ‘traditional people’ (*orang asli* or *lugu*). ‘Money people’, for instance, are those who prefer to earn cash and depend on the opportunities of the cash economy for securing their livelihood. ‘Stingy people’ are those who try to benefit from the support given through the old mutual exchange economy, minimise investments, and ignore the claims of others in reciprocal relationships as far as possible.

These folk concepts are interesting, as they indicate the awareness of such differences in livelihood orientations and attitudes. Moreover, they often carry a normative connotation. Being ‘traditional’ has both morally superior and developmentally backward connotations. Morally, they are seen as good people, who are believed to be the true followers of traditional values of support, exchange, and reciprocity. However, economically, *orang lugu* are seen as backward. Those who are oriented on wage labour, trade and beneficial economic opportunities are seen as much more successful. This success, however, can change over time, depending on climatic conditions, market prices, and political-economic developments. During the economic crisis, for instance, the *orang lugu* were less affected than the *orang duit*.

The styles also reflect different value orientations. The following overview (table 1) combines value orientations in economic life with value orientations in social life.
Some of the very destitute and pitiful villagers are effectively excluded from any style, as they were so poor that they had little choice other than to adjust to their poverty. These orang kasihan live in a state of constant social insecurity and have few options left. They cannot invest in social relationships, are not acceptable as wage labourers, and do not own anything to be coveted upon. Although they are entitled to help, since they are to be pitied (kasihan), they are often not helped, do not have caring relatives or neighbours, and are often neglected by aid programmes. Among these people are commonly widows, the old and very poor, chronically ill, and other vulnerable people without caring relatives or productive assets.

The most important feature of styles is that they are at odds with classifications as ‘wealthy’ or ‘poor’. Both poor and rich villagers can share similar orientations towards livelihood and security and have the same style. In all the styles identified both poor and richer villagers are present, although obviously not in similar numbers. In general, more upper and middle class villagers classify as orang pelit because one needs at least some assets, to be oriented towards self-support and greed. At the other extreme, most of the poorer, lower class, villagers are found among the duit and the lugu categories. The most common style in Krajan is that of the ‘village people’ (36%), followed by ‘money people’ (26%) and ‘enterprising people’ (25%). ‘Stingy people’ (13%) form the smallest category. A last remark concerns the fact that the orang lugu are more often found among the elderly. As one gets older, less can be expected from wage labour, or from being stingy. The characteristics of the orientations underlying the various styles are described in more detail below.
Entrepreneurial people (orang bisnis)

‘Entrepreneurs’ (orang bisnis) are oriented towards the cash economy and look for opportunities outside the village to make money. They focus on social relationships to maintain trading opportunities and protection in the long run. For their livelihood, they depend primarily on incomes from trade, peddling, cash crop production (i.e. tobacco) or running a small shop or coffee stall. For richer and poorer orang bisnis alike, incomes are not only generated by using local resources but also by using outside opportunities, such as government or bank-related credit facilities, contacts with traders operating on a regional or national scale, and goods from markets and shops in nearby towns. Also in consumption patterns, they are oriented towards new goods and status products from outside the village such as radios, televisions, mobile phones, motorbikes and jeans.

Social ties and social relationships are crucial for the orang bisnis. In order to be successful in business, they need to invest in, and maintain, reliable relationships with customers, traders, suppliers, and politicians. This network of social relationships provides them with goods, credit, and information about good deals, prices, and the credit worthiness of suppliers and customers. These networks usually extend beyond the small world of the village. Access to information is very important, as the threats and risks in trading are manifold. Profits and prices can fluctuate, stocks can decay, crops can fail, and the risk of default by customers is substantial. For these reasons, they need these networks not only to generate profit, but also for their protection, support, and assistance in times of difficulty. Orang bisnis realise that these networks need to be maintained for the future. Difficulties in life and urgent cash shortages are often solved by taking loans (often from outside the village), by selling or pawning assets, or by asking for the support of friends, trading partners, or political patrons. Moreover, most of them say they are keen on maintaining a reputation as a good village member. They are frequent visitors to weddings, parties, and funerals; ready to share and contribute in an attempt to bind people and maintain reputations. As most orang bisnis keep ties with the village, they often operate in groups, share profits, and are cooperative. Some small cattle traders, without sufficient trading capital, work together to buy and sell cattle. In this way, they are able to pool risks and accumulate cash. Others engage in alliances with retail traders from outside the village and obtain credit. It is especially the orang bisnis who tend to be the most active in mutual saving and credit groups.

Poorer orang bisnis include small traders and peddlers selling chickens, eggs, dried fish, sugar, wood, local medication, and those who run small shops or coffee or food stalls from their homes. Among these people, daily incomes are just enough to make ends meet, and are spent immediately on basic needs. When things go wrong, they rely heavily on the social relationships built up previously.
Money people (orang duit)
The *orang duit* (‘money people’) in Krajan are also oriented towards cash incomes, but differ from *orang bisnis* in their orientation towards social relationships, sharing, support, and cooperation in that they exhibit a general reluctance to contribute to social village arrangements and institutions. As a consequence, they do not expect much help and support in times of need. They rely primarily on cash for survival and livelihood, and hope to be able to earn money until their children are old enough to support them. They try to be, and remain, independent and self-prepared.

Although, naturally, everybody in Krajan would like to have and earn cash, this group is specifically oriented towards fixed and direct incomes such as incomes from wage labour – sometimes outside the village – and they try to ensure a stable livelihood by investing and combining different sources of cash incomes such as wage labour, political activities, and a profession. Their cash incomes, their untied labour relationships, and opportunities beyond the village economy make them flexible and relatively independent of village institutions.

Until the end of 1997, this style was gaining popularity due to increasing work opportunities and because of changing consumption preferences. Wage labour opportunities in Krajan increased due to the intensification of commercial tobacco cultivation and an increase in construction activities. Also, in the region of the Eastern Salient and Bali, more labour opportunities had become available. Some of the villagers were able to obtain a paid job as a security agent in town or at the local telecommunication posts, or as a domestic helper, policeman, or in a shop in town. Others migrated to Bali and Madura on a seasonal basis, while others departed for Malaysia and Kalimantan in search of work. Items such as jeans, watches, radios, motorbikes, and ceramic floors in houses, slowly gained in importance at the expense of cattle, wood-carved houses, and sarong.

The *orang duit* include many poor wage labourers who work in Krajan, or who are constantly in search of work in the East Java region, in agriculture on Madura, or as street peddlers in Bali. Their cash incomes are their main basis for coping with difficulties in life, and as long as cash incomes are relatively stable, regular, and reliable, they are doing well, meeting these wishes. Dissimilar to the ‘entrepreneurial people’ is that this group tries to earn money wherever possible, is not very inclined to invest in relationships of mutual help and exchange, and does not engage in patron-client bonds in the village. They were doing relatively well during the second half of the New Order period and acquired higher esteem and status than the *orang lugu*, who depended basically on wages in kind.

Care and support for the *orang duit* is mainly organised within the household, the nuclear family, or within peer groups of fellow workers. Elderly, handicapped, and ill people are generally cared for by family members. Difficulties in life and urgent cash shortages are often solved by taking out loans, either from inside or outside the village, by selling or pawning assets, or by asking for support from fellow workers or within peer groups. Also, as part of this style, villagers having surplus money on a regular basis may engage in saving and credit arrangements. Examples of
richer orang duit in the village are relatively scarce. They include teachers living from their salaries, certain village officials, and ‘rentenir’, i.e. people living from their pensions, or interests on property or loans. It should be mentioned, however, that the crisis did change the economic situation of this group quite substantially.

‘Stingy people’ (orang pelit)
‘Stingy people’ (orang pelit), conversely, are oriented towards the village economy and its resources of land, cattle, and labour. They try to accumulate on the basis of local resources and make use of village institutions and arrangements, but try to avoid the social pressures of sharing, redistribution, care, and mutual help, and so keep costs as low as possible. According to other villagers, ‘stingy people’ are those who want to profit as much as possible from the social security benefits of older cultural arrangements, but who do not want to invest much in them. In general, orang pelit share the opinion that not much can be expected from village institutions such as mutual help, and that it is better to insure and prepare oneself. In their view, ritual gift giving is often seen as a must, a money consuming necessity, rather than a way of improving future support, investment, or social capital.

They are wary of redistributing their wealth, even if they have plenty of money, rice, or assets available. Family labour - and sometimes bonded labour - plays an important role in their way of making a living and they prefer to invest in their own assets such as cattle and land - not in other people.

Although there have always been stingy villagers, this group includes many younger and richer families - or families on the way to becoming richer. Moreover, it seems this style has gained popularity in recent decades. It offers the opportunity to ignore the claims of others while still obtaining some benefits of the ritual exchange economy and related institutions and arrangements of mutual help and exchange. Later, in old age, some of these people may shift their orientation towards a more reciprocal attitude although they do try to prepare themselves for old age.

The poorer stingy people combine wages in kind from harvest shares and cattle raising, with wage labour, making baskets and other handicrafts. They visit as many parties, funerals, and ceremonies as possible, as these occasions include free meals for low outgoings since poor villagers are not expected to contribute much to these parties. In times of need, they beg from richer villagers and cling to, and emphasise, traditional village values of sharing and redistribution in order to get some support. This support is often not that substantial, since they never contributed much to others, but they might receive a free meal, some rice, or a small gift of money. In this respect ‘stingy people’ are the free riders of the village social security system with their attitude of benefiting from, rather than investing in, reciprocity, sharing, cooperation, and the village community at large.
Village people (orang lugu)

The ‘village’ people, or ‘traditional’ or ‘good’ people (orang lugu) are oriented towards traditional village values of exchange, and are active in (ritual) gift giving, ceremonies, rotating labour arrangements, and mutual help. They clearly put their hopes on obtaining help and support from village institutions and in the form of mutual help if they are in need. Often, they have a strong orientation towards the local non-cash economy. If involved in cash-earning activities, they see this as subsidiary to their other activities. Work and care-taking activities are not only a way to earn an income or to obtain food, these are also ways to engage in and maintain a relationship.

These villagers frequently have conservative ideas concerning out-marriage of children, the village hierarchy, and norms and values of sharing, gift-giving, labour relationships and exchange. Giving large ceremonies, and owning land, traditional rice varieties, and cattle offers status and security (both spiritual and practical); and organising these activities demands extended relationships.

Using social relationships and mobilising networks of exchange in the first instance, constitute the livelihood of orang lugu. Poorer people who adopt this style try to gain access to work, status, and protection by engaging in social (patron-client) relationships. Richer people use their networks, land, and cattle to bind workers to them. The poor orang lugu anticipate mutual help, emotional support, and ritual gifts (sumbangan) from fellow ‘traditional’ people and the large landowner they work for. Increasingly, during recent decades, this style seems to have declined, and lost much of its previous status during the New Order regime, as newer forms of status and upward mobility than ceremonies, cows and land became available. Nowadays, a relatively large proportion of the people adopting this style are the poorer and older people of the village.

Risk taking: a counter style

Not all styles are oriented towards a sustainable livelihood or long-term social security. In Krajan, there is a category of villagers who deliberately take and combine risks. Locally, the term ‘orang nakal’ is used for these people, which means something along the lines of wayward, madcap, or naughty people. The orang nakal are people who do not follow the mainstream norms and values of society, are ignorant of livelihood security, and deliberately take huge risks. Wayward people are not specifically outcasts, but excessive risk-takers who live dangerously such as gamblers, womanisers, and vagabonds. Although many other villagers take risks in business, agriculture, or in other spheres of life, usually these risks are taken within a context of security. These are seen as acceptable risks, which can be taken after a certain level of subsistence has been reached. The orientations of the orang nakal are different. They seem not to care about the risks of losing their livelihood and the things that they have, and are more interested in the chances of winning something and for the thrill of the day. I have described the orang nakal at length elsewhere.  

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10 For a more detailed description see Nootboom (2003: 221-245).
Deliberate risk taking is not an exception in peasant societies, but an attractive style for some villagers who search for an alternative to complying with the village norms and the social pressure urging large investments in social security and reciprocal relationships. Probably, this lifestyle is less risky than it appears since partners in the household and social relations in society can sometimes still offer a minimal safety net. Some of those who lost rice fields, cattle, and their family by heavy gambling, switched to another style and found a place in society by becoming a client, or a labourer, on their former land. Others continue to live dangerously and roam the region in search of work and fun, often joining theatre groups and only return to their houses, parents, or relatives when in need of a meal or a loan. Many of the orang nakal played an important role in demonstrations and political campaigns against the establishment and during the 1999 election campaigns.

In the following I shall present a few examples of how these styles work out in day-to-day existence in Krajan.

**Styles in day-to-day life**

It was mentioned several times that securing livelihood and securing against insecurity leads to the recurring dilemma between individual spending and collective investments. In the following, I present two cases of how villagers deal with these dilemmas on a daily basis.

**The Norwana business family: ‘making money by way of people’**

Fifteen years ago, when the Norwana couple married, they did not start out with much and were ranked as a poor household. The father of Norwana was a peddler, but he died young, and although the family of Norwana’s wife were former members of the village administration, they fell into poverty after 1965. Except for a small piece of land, they did not inherit any land. Nowadays, they have two children and are ranked as having enough to be able to make ends meet. They can organise ceremonies if needed and contribute to those of others. Recently, they bought a small television set.

Over the years, Norwana’s wife made small bamboo baskets and secured a minimal level of household means. In the early years, Norwana was involved in all kinds of agricultural work and took harvest shares on fields of large landowners. However, he is always looking for other opportunities to make money. He travelled a couple of times to Bali and Madura and became known as nakal. In Krajan, he tried to earn money by trading in baskets, by gambling, and by cutting wood illegally. When the new village road was opened and competition increased, he abandoned the basket trade and started to cut more wood. In 1995 he was caught by the forest police. Only after two days, a high fee, and mediation by the village head, was he freed. Nowadays, Norwana has abandoned his illegal activities and avoids risks. He earns a living as a carpenter, cabinetmaker, speculator, trade-advisor, and go-between for large traders and the village head.

Members of the Norwana family go to many ceremonies and assist at all possible mutual help activities. At these occasions, his wife donates small gifts of rice. She has got a good name for
not being greedy, and always willing to help. He now has a reputation as a clever and bold man in trade, having many valuable connections and good relationships. Villagers often seek Norwana’s advice and ask him to accompany them to the village head, or to mediate help, a loan, or assistance. Also, in the event of conflict between families, people, or in marriages, he is often asked to mediate or settle a conflict. Over the last few years, he and his wife were able to give small loans to fellow villagers who were in need of some cash. In return, those people paid interest or were ready to provide the family with firewood, lumber, or information on promising deals.

When asked about his success and the rationale behind his life, he mentions his good relationships, risk-spreading activities, and the wish to make money without working as a labourer or taking huge risks. By taking part in all the mutual help activities in the neighbourhood, and through his good relationships, he receives information on business opportunities and is never short of work. “If something happens to me or my house, those other villagers will help me with labour, food, and loans” he comments.

Ever since Norwana has abandoned his risky activities, the family has primarily been oriented towards cash earnings and social relationships although they recently have gained access to more land by taking pawns of tegal and sawah. They are strongly oriented towards social relationships, participation in village institutions and forms of mutual help. Social relationships are important according to the Norwana family: they yield earning opportunities and goodwill.

**Patik (‘scrooge’): rich and stingy**

Patik was born into a relatively poor family with many children, but has managed to become one of the ten richest villagers in Krajan. He has worked hard and managed to save and invest into local resources such as land, cattle, trees, and bamboo. Generally, he is called the ‘kreket’ (scrooge) of Krajan. It was once commented: “If we need help or loans, Pak Patik never has money, but if we have a cow, or land to sell, he is always willing to buy; ‘to solve our problems’ he hypocritically says.”

In the perceptions of both Pak and Bu Patik and their two adult children, they acquired their wealth by working hard and spending little. “Especially in the first years of marriage, we tried to eat very carefully, live very simply, and spend as little as possible”. They never contributed much to ceremonies, funerals, or weddings – often Pak Patik did not go but he could sustain relationships by sending his wife who was clever at making cookies and gifts, thus saving costs. If he was explicitly invited and had to go he contributed as little as possible. “On the other hand, these occasions were moments when we and our children could have decent meals, and we always took our children along to ceremonies and weddings. In this way, we earned our contribution back right away.” Only in the case of close relatives, they needed to contribute more.

The daughter of the Patiks recalls these ceremonies as big parties. “There was never something special at our home. For me, these ceremonies were great moments and I was nervous the whole day. When it was time to go, I could not eat much and never tried all the delicious food, as I was too afraid, nervous, and shy.” She continues on her upbringing: “My father was very hard and
strict not allowing anything to be wasted. We never ate white rice, never got money for sweets or
snacks, and were never allowed to buy something nice for ourselves even when there was
money.” Her mother always supported her husband in this and became well known for saying:
‘Don’t spend; let’s buy a calf first.’ But even when they had acquired a lot of cattle, their simple
lifestyle continued. Once, when the daughter was a few years old, she was so undernourished
that she lost all her hair and people thought she was going to die. “Neighbours told me I was a
very ugly child at that time and that my mother told others to take me for free, as she wanted to
get rid of me.” Because of such statements, her grandfather got angry with Bu Patik and took the
child to live with him and his wife. There, she slowly recovered. “Although I returned home
when I recovered, I often went to my grandparents when I felt miserable, I helped them with
small tasks and there I received care and attention.”

Pak Patik thinks positively about the future, and sees himself living in clover now: "I own a
number of bamboo bushes in various fields. I bought them cheap and have been harvesting a few
stalks to keep the bushes strong and healthy. If I become old and have given away my land to my
children, I will still be able to sell bamboo canes every now and then, and drink coffee from this
money. I will not be dependent on anyone." His orientation on helping others is very clear, he
says: “My poor friends and neighbours are often helped by my wife who offers them small loans
of rice. To those who raise bullocks for me, I sometimes give a cash advance if needed. Other
people have to work for themselves; they can never borrow any money from me.”

The Patik family is one of the clearest examples of orang pelit in Krajan. They have an ex-
tremely cautious way of generating their own livelihood, and share and cooperate as little as
possible with fellow villagers. They clearly try to save money and not contribute much to ar-
rangements of mutual help, and they are prepared for times when things go wrong.

Concluding remarks

The two contrasting views on local ways of dealing with insecurity are usually presented as mu-
tually exclusive: it is either communal institutions and village structures which provide support
in times of need, based on long-term bonds of reciprocity, or it is individuals designing strategies
to cover their own risks through maximising profit and sharing only among small groups of so-
cial equals. In actual practice, however, the structural and the strategic views can be highly com-
plementary because they address two sides of the same coin, albeit from different perspectives.
Social structures do not determine individual behaviour, but they do set limits and shape it; indi-
viduals cannot act in a social void, they have to take contexts, structures, and institutions into
account. Moreover, depending on the specific conditions, there may be more, or less, room for
individual efforts and strategies to further one’s interests. In my fieldwork I have tried to ascer-
tain both what the role of communal institutions is in providing social security, and what room
individuals have, and use, to achieve such security.

The result thereof is that it pays to look at patterns of protection, coping, and security strategies.
People do not randomly invest in reciprocal relationships or opportunities of social security, but
make specific and meaningful combinations reflecting their orientations, perceptions, and as-
sessments, as well as their capabilities and resources. However, not every combination is open to all. Wealthy people can predominately rely on their own resources and networks, while their less fortunate neighbours must invest heavily in mutual support and care in order to be eligible for social security when they are in need. These combinations can also be gender-specific since men and women can have different orientations and resources. Often, women are much more concerned with household food security and livelihood protection than their husbands. At the household level, these differences are aggregated and may be smoothed, as most activities require the involvement of both husband and wife.

At the village level, therefore, there is a large heterogeneity in strategies and arrangements for social security, stemming from the differential responses of actors to the ecological, economic, political, and social insecurities that they face, and the resources to which they have or can mobilise access. In this heterogeneity, one can distinguish patterns or pathways, or, as I prefer to call them, styles of social security.

In Krajan, this resulted in four main styles ‘enterprising people’ (orang bisnis), ‘money people’ (orang duit), ‘stingy people’ (orang pelit), and the ‘traditional people’ (orang asli or lugu). These styles all are a mixture of livelihood (cash or subsistence economy) and social security (mutual help or self-insurance) orientations. A style is to a large extent ‘inherited’, villagers may be caught in a social security style by being born into a family and acculturated with an orientation towards strong ties with neighbours, relatives, mutual help, and reciprocal relationships. Only slowly, someone can shift to another style. However, for social, cultural, and economic reasons, such a shift of style is not easy since styles carry a history and a legacy: if one is strongly involved in profit maximising and individual arrangements for social security, it is well-nigh impossible to suddenly switch to a style based on strong ties with neighbours, relatives or patrons. There is, nevertheless, room for gradual shifts if one moves out of tight networks, or if one’s economic position changes dramatically.

Obviously, poor villagers are often not in a position to choose from a wide range of options and their actual room for manoeuvre is very limited. Nevertheless, I observed that, even within the lower social classes, people follow different paths in creating a mix of social security arrangements. This, however, should not be understood in a too rigid way. In Krajan, there are very few calculating citizens who deliberately and consciously make strategic, cognitive, and future-oriented choices. Some people may do so, and sometimes strategically combine options, investing, and manipulating situations or people, but more often I witnessed villagers reacting to events in a habitual, customary, and pre-set pattern of reactions, closely watching and following what others did. They did not have to think about each minor decision in life, but could fall back on the repertoire offered by their particular style. The policy implications of a style perspective are important. Some styles are more vulnerable to risks and threats than others. During the 1997 economic crisis, poor people with a style oriented towards reciprocity and mutual help, were much more resistant to the negative effects of the crisis than those poor dependent on cash incomes. Styles are dynamic; they are constantly reproduced and ‘restyled’ by the changing needs
and orientations of villagers. If we want to understand why some people and households cope better than others, indeed, social security turns out to be a matter of style.

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“Why should I get help?”
Inter- and intra-household relations in the context of crisis of smallholders in two tribal villages of Orissa (India)
Nadja Ottiger

In my research on economic, political and ecological aspects of land and forest use of small peasant households in two villages of Keonjhar District (Orissa), I explored economic strategies of 136 households with regard to agriculture, wage labour, and wood selling. The villages I had selected for my study are situated nearby the district capital at the fringe of a forest area. The sale of firewood and timber contributes considerably to the economy of these two villages. Paddy is produced on a variety of fields characterised by various cultivation techniques (shifting cultivation and wet rice cultivation on permanent rice fields) in two different natural environments (hilly forest and plain area). Property regimes also vary for the various fields: common property for forest land used for shifting cultivation, private property for permanently cultivated fields.

In this paper I will focus on aspects of social security of small farm households linked to the control of land and the role kinship relations play in moments of crisis. As land problems are more pronounced in one of the two villages, only data from K. will be presented here. The village consists of 116 households belonging to three tribal groups (Juang, Munda, Santal) and one caste (Gouda or milkmen). With 54.5%, the Juang, as the original inhabitants, form the majority of the village population, followed by the Munda (24%). The Santal only make up 6.3%; a further 15.2% of the villagers belong to the milkmen caste.

During my field research (November 1998 to July 1999 and September to October 2003) and based on the analysis of quantitative data, I came across a phenomenon well known in the literature about so-called “tribals”11 or “adivasi” in India: i.e. tribals losing access to their land. In the discourse on the situation of tribal people this process is most commonly called “tribal land alienation”.12 In the case of K., the Juang, as the original inhabitants of the area and as the largest group of the population under study, give away paddy land to immigrating Munda, Santal, and Gouda. In some cases they sell their land, in other cases they lease or mortgage it, mostly to households belonging to one of the other three groups. As one consequence of this loss of land, the Juang are more involved in selling wood and timber than any of the other groups.

11 Various ethnic groups are officially distinguished from the society of the national majority by culturally loaded terms like “scheduled tribes”, “adivasi”, “primitive tribal groups” (Colchester 1994:72). The commonly used terminology of “tribe”, “tribal people” is heavily debated in academic discourses due to difficulties to find adequate criteria to distinguish tribes from castes and due to the broad range of their economic, social, cultural, and political situation. Criteria like territorial control, political autonomy, and economic self-sufficiency in most cases do no longer apply to the reality of tribal societies in India. In many cases the term “tribe” is used as “a sort of shorthand expression with only an approximate meaning, not one implying a rigorous definition” (Parkin 1992:9).

12 Common explanations of the fact of tribal land loss are poverty of tribal people, the dishonesty of moneylenders, merchants, and rich peasants combined with the helplessness of illiterate peasants, who are
Reasons to give away land

A comparison of the ownership of agricultural land with the area cultivated per household and per consumer indicates the gap between nominal land (as registered land with land title) and cultivated land (measured by quantity of paddy seeds used in 1999) for the various ethnic groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Average nominal land in ha per household</th>
<th>Average nominal land in ha per consumer</th>
<th>Average cultivated land in ha per household</th>
<th>Average cultivated land in ha per consumer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gouda</td>
<td>0.1869</td>
<td>0.0358</td>
<td>1.2995</td>
<td>0.2938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munda</td>
<td>0.3707</td>
<td>0.1110</td>
<td>0.9449</td>
<td>0.2859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santal</td>
<td>0.9892</td>
<td>0.2552</td>
<td>1.4333</td>
<td>0.2821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juang Kodipasa</td>
<td>0.9318</td>
<td>0.2545</td>
<td>0.7660</td>
<td>0.1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Kodipasa</td>
<td>0.6966</td>
<td>0.1897</td>
<td>0.9173</td>
<td>0.2335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rate of nominal land to cultivated land for the ethnic groups in Kodipasa is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Average rate of nominal to cultivated land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gouda</td>
<td>1 : 6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munda</td>
<td>1 : 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santal</td>
<td>1 : 1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juang Kodipasa</td>
<td>1 : 0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Kodipasa</td>
<td>1 : 1.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the Gouda hardly own any agricultural land, the average cultivated area by household and consumer is higher than among any of the other groups. The Juang in contrast cultivate considerably less land than they own. Part of the explanation for the discrepancy between nominal land and cultivated land of the various households and groups are land transfers.\(^{13}\)

When investigating the reasons for transfers of land from Juang households to other households, they turned out to be mostly related to some critical event in the household. Juang households rent out, mortgage or sell land due to the following reasons\(^{14}\):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Cases (n=98)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Death</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sickness</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food scarcity</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debts / to pay back loan</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material needs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Sickness and death are a serious burden for the families because money has to be spent on medical care and at the same time valuable family labour is lost. In case of death in the family, they have to perform the death ritual (*sudho*) linked with immediate expenditures in kind, esp. rice and meat for the relatives, friends and neighbours. During the field research Juang households’ cash expenditures for death rituals varied between 500 and 3000 Rs.\(^{15}\) If there is no or not enough paddy stock, rice has to be purchased, maybe also a goat.

2) In particular, widows with small children or with no son at an age to plough the land as well as single old widows, are susceptible to being forced to give away land. For religious reasons women in India are not allowed to touch a plough. From the 13 non-cultivating households, 8 are widow-headed Juang households. All of them have either sold, rented out or mortgaged their land after the death of their husbands, be it for performing the death ritual and/or due to labour shortage in their household.

3) Food scarcity due to bad harvest, or misfortune in the family mentioned above, force Juang households to give away land.

4) Marriages are a rather expensive affair for a Juang household. They involve large amounts of paddy (400 to 500 kg) partially given as a gift to the family of the bride, partially used to feed the guests. Furthermore, up to four goats, rice beer, and mahua, money to buy clothes for the bride and her kin (dhotis and sarees) and other resources to provide food for the guests are required. In the case of the marriage of Maheswar Juang (the son of a widow, with one brother and one sister) with a woman of Rodhuan in the year 2002, expenditures included the following items:
   - 7 pieces of cloth for approx. 650 Rs.
   - 10 bottles of liquor (*mahuli*) for 100 Rs.
   - 3 goats and 1 cock for approx. 1500 Rs.
   - 1 pig for 500 Rs.
   - 2 *khandi* paddy (40kg) for 280 Rs.

15 In 1998/99 40 Rs. equalled 1 US$; 100 Rs. were 2.7SFr. Daily wage for unskilled wage labour was between 25 to 30 Rs. The price of 1 kg rice was 10 Rs.
- 300 kg rice for 3000 Rs.
- 2 pots of rice beer for 150 Rs.

Overall, these expenses amounted to more than 6000 Rs. in cash and kind.

Although kin and neighbours usually cooperate and contribute to the expenditures for a marriage, the main burden in cash and kind lies on the core family of the bridegroom. Support received by close relatives in the form of cash or kind (rice, goats, pigs) is limited and based on rather strict and balanced reciprocity. The bridegroom’s paternal and maternal uncles, his mother’s and his father’s sisters, and his own married brothers and sisters are expected to contribute towards marriage expenses. However, their contributions may be very small and more of symbolic than substantial material value. Thus, in the above case, the main contribution were 3 khandi rice (approx. 520 Rs.) given by the maternal uncle of Maheswar, which the bridegroom will have to give back in the case of a marriage in his maternal uncle’s family.

5) In at least 6 cases land has been mortgaged, rented out or sold by male members in order to get the means to buy alcoholic beverages. The need to buy alcohol may be the cause of land transactions in other cases as well, although not explicitly mentioned by the families concerned. Excessive consumption of alcohol is a problem mostly concerning the Juang and to some degree also the Munda, but not the Gouda. The higher-ranking Gouda do not drink alcohol at all and the Gouda graziers do it in a more controlled way.

6) The necessity to repay debts or the need for money to satisfy material needs (e.g. to build a new roof, to obtain a plough, a bullock or a bicycle) are further situations in which Juang families give land to others.

These are reasons why Juang households rent out, mortgage or sell their land. However, most of these circumstances resulting in giving away land do to some extent also apply to households of Munda, Gouda, and Santal. They are all facing sickness, death, marriage, crop failure or other risks and insecurities, they all have material needs and they all are in need of cash sometimes. Marriage expenditures, for example, are the same or even higher among the other groups. Thus, in the case of a Munda household, the total expenses expected for the marriage of a son amount to about 8’000 Rs. and in the case of the richest Gouda household marriage expenditures for sons are calculated to be 10’000 - to 20’000 Rs., for daughters even approximately 30’000 Rs. Of course, such expenditures correlate to some extent with the general economic situation of a household and a family.

The hypothesis that the Juang are more vulnerable to crisis than other groups in the research area and thus under higher pressure to give away their land cannot be confirmed. These situations are typical for all small peasant households. The reasons mentioned above cannot sufficiently explain why the Juang are ready to give away land in such situations. That households of other groups do this very rarely can partly be ascribed to the fact that as immigrants they do own less land than the Juang – 78.4% of the private agricultural land belongs to the Juang, while the other three groups own only 21.6%. However, every household with private land has the option to keep it or to give it away. From the 37 non-Juang households with land titles only 8% (3 house-
holds) had given away land, while 59% of Juang households with land titles were involved in some kind of land transfer in 1998/99.

Thus, the following questions remain unanswered: why do non-Juang households not give away land to the same extent as Juang families? And why do non-Juang households with no or less land opt to get more land, thus giving the Juang the option, to give away their land? What strategies and options do non-Juang households follow in order to cope with situations of crisis and are these options also available to the Juang?

Reflecting on these questions I became interested in aspects of social security and the role of inter- and intra-household relations in the context of crisis of smallholders.

**Inter-household relations**

One possible hypothesis could be that social networks providing support in cash or kind to households which are facing economic pressure or emergencies are relieving the pressure that would otherwise force a family to forfeit its land. Thus, households with better social networks and enjoying a higher degree of solidarity, including economic support from outside the household, would be less vulnerable to temporary or permanent loss of land. Maybe such networks and forms of solidarity are weaker among the Juang than among the other groups?

To answer these questions I analysed kinship relations among the households in the two villages. Furthermore, with members of several households of the various groups I discussed the help and support they may expect and get in times of crisis and need.

Descent rules of all ethnic groups are patrilineal and patriclans are exogamous. In all four groups most households are linked to some other households in the village by affinal and/or consanguineal ties. Thus, most household members do have relatives living in the same community. However, the results of this analysis show that relatives do not play the crucial role which I had expected them to play in critical situations.

There were no substantial indications that in moments of crisis kinship rights and duties or forms of solidarity vary in a significant way for the various ethnic groups. On the contrary, in all ethnic groups, households as the main economic units are very much self-centred and they depend to a large degree on their own family members, resources, and capacities. In case of an emergency little or no support is received from others and even close kin do abstain from assisting. If a household is receiving support at all, this help is strictly based on reciprocity or on payment – e.g. labour for labour or labour for cash – also among close kin. However, the Gouda seem to have an advantage in comparison to the Juang and the Munda with regard to credit: they may get financial or material support from relatives, although they have to pay back these credits with interest. There seems to be enough trust among Gouda relatives that credits will be repaid. This is not self-evident for other groups. People say that it is difficult to obtain credits because creditors are not sure to get back what they give, not even from relatives. The possibility to get credit without giving land as a security helps to stabilise the economic situation of a household in case
of emergency. Moreover, it enables a household to invest and improve its general situation by acquiring land and by paying for labour to cultivate more land.

A further astonishing finding of my research was that in all ethnic groups, free support from kin is not expected. To be responsible for one’s own household and to cope with difficult situations is considered to be normal. When asking people, whose families were facing serious problems, whether they did get any support from their kin, they often reacted with a counter-question: “Why should I get help? They have their own families, they have to take care of themselves.”

Thus, a household who suffers from misfortune has to deal with this situation on the basis of the resources and capacities of its family members. One might interpret this absence of support to be caused by a lack of means and possibilities – poor people do not have the means to support other poor people. However, there seems to be little cooperation and support between better-off households or between better-off households and poorer households as well.

This is not to say that other households do not get involved when a household is facing a crisis: social and economic arrangements supporting a household in times of crisis are possible, but these arrangements are costly. For example, a widow with small children who is not able to cultivate her paddy fields may get the possibility to work for a richer household in the village and earn her minimal daily food for her family. She may even find somebody willing to rent, hold in pledge or buy her land – but in return, she will temporarily or forever lose access to an important resource of her household.

Within the limits of my analysis, kinship solidarity between households, at least on an economic level, turned out to be more of a myth or wishful thinking than reality. In the village under study, kinship ties beyond the household level are more important on symbolic and ritual levels than with regard to material and economic support. The fact that there are very few joint and extended families within all ethnic groups of K. confirms the general impression of a rather fragmented community, consisting of households with strong centrifugal forces within the household resulting in early separation of smaller family units. Once economically split up, the cooperation between brothers or fathers and sons is not guaranteed, and in some cases it is considered more appropriate to ask for assistance from non-relatives than from close kin.

That my research findings in the field are not exceptional for peasant households is confirmed – among others – by Netting (1995: 194) who analysed smallholder communities:

Suprahousehold unilineal lineages or bilateral descent groups may indeed exist among intensive cultivators, and they may perform important corporate functions in regulating and organizing marriage, settling internal disputes, and handling external conflict by legal negotiation or armed

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16 For a general view of family ideology and reality in India see Shah (1998).
17 McDougal’s (1963) observations of early separating Juang households and Juang families were largely confirmed by my own field experience. It may well be that centrifugal forces are even stronger in villages like K.: situated nearby the district capital and close to areas of wet rice cultivation they offer more economic opportunities (sale of firewood and timber / farm wage labour / off-farm wage labour) for household members than more isolated and interior villages – even without land or only little land households can manage to become economically independent.
combat. The kin group may be a political body and a religious congregation. But the constituent smallholder households do not produce or consume in common, and they do not redistribute their crops, livestock, or property to approximate some social ideal of equality. This does not imply either any lack of interhousehold cooperation or the presence of some atomistic, laissez-faire household independence. Indeed, smallholder communities, where labour demands are often heavy, where seasonal bottlenecks may be severe, and where certain tasks and projects may far exceed the capacity of any household work force, are rife with examples of voluntary labor groups. But these socially recognized forms of labour exchange are what Marshall Sahlins has called balanced rather than generalized reciprocity, and they produce goods and services that are by and large consumed or retained by individual households. Individuals or households who perform labour for others do not do so in an altruistic fashion, where “the material side of the transaction is repressed by the social,” where the counter obligation “is not stipulated by time, quantity, or quality,” or where “the expectation of reciprocity is indefinite” (Sahlins 1972: 194). Rather, the exchange transaction stipulates “returns of commensurate worth or utility within a finite and narrow period and is subject to a more or less precise reckoning” (ibid.: 195). Although exchanges within the family household may emphasize sharing, and occasionally sustained, one-way flows of resources, relations among households of smallholders are usually much more consciously and calculatedly balanced.

Characteristic of a crisis is, however, the fact that it usually takes time and resources to overcome it and that balanced reciprocity is not possible within a finite and narrow period. A widow, for example, may lack male labour for extended periods and, thus, may not be able to exchange the kind of labour she is in need of. Therefore, she will have to pay for male labour. If she lacks the means to do so, she is forced to reduce or even give up cultivation. A household losing one of its bullocks also faces serious problems because it will not be able to plough the fields unless it pays for the service of getting a bullock from another household or unless it can cooperate with another unlucky household also possessing only one bullock.

Intra-household relations

Given the fact that all households of all groups basically have to face their economic problems and constraints themselves, intra-household relations are of crucial importance to understand household strategies and reactions to crisis. There is a broad variety of household realities in the village under study with regard to intra-household relations. Neither the idea of a household as a cooperative unit based on altruism of individual household members pooling labour and income for the common wellbeing of everybody, nor the idea of a household as a unity held together by an authoritarian and powerful family head, fully cover household realities in the village. The idea of a household as composed of individual actors with their own preferences, interests and strategies reflects the reality of many households more adequately.

The degree of cooperation and conflicts among household members, the degree of power and authority a household head has, the bargaining power of men and women, of older and younger members varies between households, and it varies in the course of the household developmental
cycle. Aspects of sexual division of labour, ideas about who has to contribute what and how much at which age to the household income, the bargaining power between men and women, young and old influence economic strategies and behaviour of households and individuals. Intra-household relations are structured by bargaining power and fall-back positions18 of individual members, by aspects of gender, age and marital status. These in turn are related to aspects of social status and identity (caste and tribe) and to gender ideologies that play an important role in the economic behaviour and strategies of the households of the various ethnic groups – also with regard to critical events. This is the field where I found major differences between the various ethnic groups.

The following description of the situation of a Juang widow illustrates the mix of factors coming into play while handling a difficult household situation:

Nila is a Juang woman at the age of about 50. She is the mother of two sons and two daughters, all of which are not yet married. Her daughters at the age of 14 and 20 are supporting the family. They sell wood, they work on the family’s own paddy fields and they also engage in farm and off-farm wage labour. Nila herself works on her own fields and if necessary she also sells wood. Two to three days a week she grazes her goats together with the goats of some neighbours, who in turn graze her goats on other days. Nila complains that her eldest son (now 24) does not plough her fields. He is lazy and he is always drinking, she says. He is angry with his mother because she has not yet arranged his marriage, he says. But how can she find a girl for a boy like him who is lazy and drinks too much? How can such a boy become a husband taking care of a family? Where can she take the paddy from to give to the parents-in-law and to feed the guests during the marriage ceremony? Last year Nila tried to get him married, but he refused to contribute anything to his marriage. So she stopped looking for a bride. Now he refuses to plough the paddy fields and Nila has to organise paid labour to plough her farms. Sometimes she is not able to cultivate all her fields due to the lack of male labour in the family, due to the lack of means to pay wage labour or due to non-availability of male wage labour for ploughing. She does not get any free support from her brother-in-law living next door to her; and she does not expect any free support. He has his own fields to plough and his own family to take care of, she says. However, if ploughing is not done properly and at the right time, yields will be smaller.

Actually, one man in the family would suffice for ploughing. This was the reason why Nila had sent her second son to do wage labour in a family living in another village. He is transferring part of his salary to his mother. Now, however, Nila thinks about calling him back to help her.

Several times Nila had rented out or mortgaged parts of her land to other villagers. This occurred when she was in need of money for medical treatment for herself and for her children. Once she rented out land in order to contribute money to a marriage of a friend of hers, hoping that she will get this gift back in the form of a similar contribution from the family of her friend when her son gets married. Nila prefers to rent out land instead of mortgaging it, because renting entails a smaller risk of losing land: after it has been cultivated for a certain number of years she will get back her land without having to repay any money for the land rented out. She could obtain more money by mortgaging land, but she may not be able to pay back larger amounts of cash. Thus, she may lose her land definitely.

The less land Nila’s family cultivates, the more it depends on other sources of income. One important income-generating activity is the sale of firewood, mainly done by Nila’s two daughters. On the other hand, Nila cannot cultivate all her fields due to the lack of male labour and cooperation. Like other widows in the village, Nila lost land after the death of her husband because her sons were too small to plough for their mother. She managed to cultivate some of the fields by hiring male workers. Some of the family’s land, however, was lying fallow for several years. The Sarpanch of the village sold this

18 A person’s fall-back position is an important factor of his or her bargaining power; here the term refers to options he or she has if cooperation within the household ceases (see Agarwal 1998: 54). It is a concept elaborated by Amartya Sen to analyse conflicts and cooperative arrangements.
land to some Gouda families and they now claim this land to be theirs. To retrieve this land would be very difficult and would probably result in an open conflict between Nila and these families. Nila does not believe that she would be able to get back the land. What use is there in claiming her rights from the 
\textit{tahsildar} (an official from the Revenue Department), if he is corrupt and being bribed by those who have taken away her land, she asks.

In Nila’s family the eldest son is refusing to do his work at the expense of his mother and sisters. The fact that women in India are not allowed to touch the plough makes them dependent on male labour for cultivation. But there are no social barriers for Juang women to sell wood and engage in wage labour. Juang girls from the early age of about 12 years contribute considerably to the household income while Juang boys are expected to fully contribute their labour only after marriage. But not only do Juang boys and men contribute less work to the household, they also spend larger sums of their income on personal needs, while women’s income is mainly spent on household needs.

The fact that there is no rigid sexual division of labour between Juang men and women with regard to available economic options (farming, wage labour, and wood selling) combined with a gender ideology ascribing far reaching responsibilities for the fulfilment of household needs to women while allowing men to pursue their individual interests, partly explains why the Juang are less involved in agriculture: Juang households give away paddy land because the burden to compensate loss of land and consequently loss of paddy to feed the family can be shifted to Juang women who are heavily involved in selling wood and are engaged in wage labour in order to obtain rice. These two economic options are restricted for Gouda households. In contrast to many Juang households they follow the strategy of increasing access to land.

Higher ranking Gouda families consider women’s work outside the household not appropriate – Gouda women work on the family’s paddy fields and better-off Gouda households even use wage labour for cultivating their paddy fields and restrict their women’s work to purely domestic duties. That Gouda women would sell wood is almost unthinkable. In these households men even provide firewood for household consumption. From time to time they collect it in large quantities, whereas in all other groups the collecting of firewood for own consumption is mainly women’s work. Wage labour for girls and women (even farm wage labour) is considered degrading – an exception being farm wage labour for other Gouda, preferably some kin. Instead, cultivating land and selling milk is considered to be the appropriate way of life for higher-ranking Gouda men. Even under critical economic circumstances selling wood is not a viable economic option for them. When asked, why they do not sell wood, they answer that they do not know this kind of work,\textsuperscript{19} that they would have to move with the Juang in the forest in order to learn it and that they do not want to mix with the Juang. Off-farm wage labour is only performed by men, only reluctantly and only if it is of utmost necessity. In 2003 some Gouda told me about a serious drought that occurred about 12 years ago. But even at that time the Gouda did not sell wood and the women did not engage in wage labour. Only men went for road construction, pond digging etc.

\textsuperscript{19}This argument however is a rather weak one since Gouda men do go into the forest to collect timber and firewood for own consumption.
Thus, it is a combination of caste, social status, and ideas about appropriate economic activities for Gouda women and men that results in an effort to keep or accumulate land for cultivation. Of all 16 Gouda households, 12 are landless on paper, but all of them cultivate land in Kodipasa - land that they mainly got from the Juang.

When facing a crisis Gouda households will try to overcome it by other means than to abandon cultivation. They may send a male household member to engage in wage labour, a female household member may be hired to work on some relative’s fields, and they may sell a cow or some goats or they may seek a credit from some relatives. Moreover, intra-household relations among the higher-ranking Gouda are characterized by stronger structures of authority between parents and children that enforce cooperation of household members and the pooling of incomes. Gouda boys are expected to contribute to the household at an earlier age than Juang boys. A lower degree of individualism of household members further enhances the economic performance of Gouda households as economic units and renders them less vulnerable to crisis.

Two conclusions are important:

Social security in the two villages depends most of all on members from the own household. Kinship ties beyond the household level are more important on symbolic and ritual levels than with regard to material and economic support. Any misfortune is immediately reflected in the household situation and requires reactions based on the resources and capacities of its family members. Thus intra-household relations and dynamics are crucial in determining household strategies and reactions to crisis.

The ecological problem of forest degradation (as a consequence of economic strategies of wood selling households) is in many ways related to all households in the villages: even if the Gouda do not sell timber and firewood themselves, they are part of the problem of forest degradation insofar as the Juang (and especially Juang women) compensate loss of land (given to the Gouda) by selling wood.

References


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20 There was only one Gouda widow in the village and she had two adult sons who were able to plough the fields. Gouda widows without male labour face the same problems as Juang women – they depend on male wage labour for ploughing.
The Reemergence of Street Protests:
State Workers Challenge the Chinese State

Antoine Kernen

Demonstrations by people working at, laid off or retired from China’s state enterprises have been steadily increasing in frequency since the mid 1990s. Despite some uncertainty over the published figures, about 120,000 is the most frequently quoted annual total number of demonstrations over these past few years. Because of their brevity and the limited number of persons involved, they do not rival the great mass movements that convulsed China in earlier years, but they do betray a quite new phenomenon: the recourse to street protests for the purpose of expressing worker discontent to the authorities. Yet, their very frequency should not mislead us into thinking that they have become an everyday means of protest. Gatherings in public spaces are still forbidden, as they are dependent on official authorization – which is extremely difficult to obtain.

The multiplication of workers’ protests has occurred simultaneously with the speeding up of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) Reforms since the beginning of the 1990s. The reinforcement of “budget constraints” was then combined with the granting of a greater leeway in personnel management and the laying-off of workers. Since then, the SOEs (and old collective enterprises as well) have regularly eliminated portions of the workforce through pre-retirement schemes and xiagang. This proceeds from the Chinese government’s policy of eliminating the redundant workforce from SOEs. As a result, many workers experienced a sharp reduction of income. This laying-off process should come along with the implementation of the new urban social safety net. But this has turned out to have more substance on paper than in reality. The xiagang workers, the unemployed and the pre-retired receive their salaries or pensions only on a very irregular basis, or do not even get paid at all. In addition to the xiagang system, it should be stressed here that the pre-retirement scheme had been used extensively to lay off redundant workers from the SOEs. Other laying-off measures have been characterized by an immediate separation of the workers and their SOE, with a dismissal indemnity that can vary greatly. So workers’ protests take place in a context characterized by the loss of social benefits won under socialism, and also by the government’s difficulties to set up a new social welfare system in a climate of widespread corruption (Kernen and Rocca 1998 and 2000).

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21 60,000 demonstrations in 1998, 100,000 in 1999, 137,000, in 2000 135,000 The figures given here appeared in the Far Eastern Economic Review (September 6 2001). The South China Morning Post claims that there were 207,605 workers’ demonstrations in 2000, of which 135,000 were officially registered, (SCMP, October 3, 2001). For more information see the websites of the China Labour Bulletin (http://iso.china-labour.org.hk/iso/) or Lu Siqing at the Centre of Human Rights and Democratic Movement in China website (http://www.89-64.com/english/indexen.html.

22 Xiagang are workers who have been furloughed from state-owned enterprises with little chance of recall. Xiagang first began to appear in the middle 1990s, when party-state officials permitted managers to start shrinking their workforce at state-owned enterprises. The Chinese government does not consider these workers to be unemployed (at least till 2002), because state-owned enterprises are responsible for issuing stipends to their xiagang.
This context is very important to understand the multiplication and the banalization of the workers’ mobilization. Indeed since special funds have been granted by the central government to secure the pensions and other unemployment allocations, the worker protest have become less frequent. Also, as is well known in the field of social movements, there is no automatism between economic hardship and social mobilization. In China, workers laid-off from SOEs are not “objectively” the most disadvantaged or the less protected of social groups. Migrants workers are surely facing a much harder economic and social situation, but it is more rare to see them protesting. We may notice also that inside the different kinds of laid off state workers; it’s the early-retired state workers that are the most prone to protest. So the questions are why and how those protests became possible, and what did they reveal in the transformation of the Chinese state.

The actual worker protests are indeed quite different from popular protests that occurred earlier in the People’s Republic of China. The “novelty” of these worker protests is first due to the fact they do not take place in a situation where the regime is in crisis. The actual political situation is thus radically different with the one that prevailed at the time of the big demonstration of Spring 1989. There is no perceptible division among the present leadership which entertains a collegial appearance.

Nor can the worker protests take advantage of a “window of opportunity” similar to the one which opened in 1989 with the death of Hu Yaobang, a former Party Secretary who was then in “disgrace”. Such a “window of opportunity” associated with mourning was in fact prolonged in 1989 by the perceptible divisions within the leadership as well as by the historic visit by Mikhail Gorbachev. This chain of events enabled the students to build a durable movement thus to acquire a high profile, both nationally and internationally.

We should also stress that the Chinese government has not lost its repressive capacity towards any social movement that it perceives as a threat to its authority. Anyone in doubt over this matter has only to recall how harshly it cracked down on Falungong and on the initiatives taken by dissident intellectuals.

We will thus defend the hypothesis that the relative tolerance of the regime toward state worker protests reveals a new selective opening for a limited expression of contention. This new space for autonomy must be linked to the more open access to legal procedures, and the larger use, which is encouraged today, of the old complaints procedure. This renewed use of the “right to claim” takes place in a context where the State retreats from the direct management of the economy and tries to act as referee in the new social conflicts that are often linked to it. These partial transgressions that are being tolerated thus have a certain functionality for the State in a process

23 On this subject, I rejoin to critics solicited by the work of Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (1970), on the social frustration of many social movements theorists.

24 In China, as in other authoritarian countries, mourning for a great leader opens, briefly, a window for people to express dissent. In 1989, just as on Zhou Enlai’s death in 1976, the population had had time to publicly express its attachment to a great departed leader and, by contrast, to criticize those still in power.

25 Gorbachev’s visit marked the reconciliation between China and Russia after 30 years of latent hostility.
recomposition following its shift to a market economy. In turning away from the complaints deposit repertoire, worker protests enlighten the day to day evolution of the Chinese political system itself, a situation which is very different from the immobilism that is so often depicted.

As the state worker protests occur at a time of limited political opening, it is interesting to analyze them in terms of interaction, to understand how structural elements can influence the form taken by mobilization. To do this we will rely on the reformulation of the concept of “structure of political opportunity” as developed by Sidney Tarrow (1994). In order to avoid a too mechanical conception of labour protest, Sidney Tarrow (2001) insists on focusing on the interaction between the different actors themselves and on the way in which they perceive, reinterpret and take advantage of it.

In our present case, the state workers seem to have a clear perception of the implicit rules dictated by the regime for the expression of contention. In order to legitimize their demands, they tend to lean on the laws and repeat publicly their own attachment to the regime, thus avoiding to inscribe their action in a logic of confrontation. On the other side, the authorities use different strategies to limit the development of the protest, trying to confine them within the complaint deposit framework. It is difficult indeed for them to enter into a logic of criminalization of these state worker movements as they haven’t yet officially declared the end of socialism.

To describe how these original interactions between state workers and the authorities are taking place, I shall first of all show how they do fall in line, in some respects, with a legal and everyday activity, the complaints procedure. This repertoire of contention had been formally institutionalized before the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and relegalized again at the beginning of the Reforms in 1978, and finally explicitly encouraged, in recent years, concurrently with the development of the Chinese legal system. Following this, I will examine the process of transgression of this “repertoire of action”, emphasizing the original forms that these movements adopted. I will then turn back to the sociological profiles of the demonstrators and the organizational structures of these movements, which are usually very atomized, and analyze the quite indirect linkages that sometimes unite them.

The present study is based on several surveys which where conducted in the provinces of North-East China from July 1997 to April 2003. Two types of interviews were carried out: one type with the authorities of Harbin and Shenyang; another with workers involved in small scale protests, done under difficult conditions with workers-claimants in front of complaint local government offices, and later visiting them in their enterprise. During the last few years, I also discussed with several laid-off and retired workers from a few SOEs which had endured a number hardships. Apart from this field research, I also consulted of course different independent sources on the subject. Since the Chinese official press does not usually make any mention of social strife, most information on such conflicts is being channeled essentially through a number of newly established parallel information networks. The most important are the The China Labor Bulletin of Han Dongfang, and especially The Center of Human Rights and Democratic move-
ment in China of Lu Siqing, both based in Hong Kong. Few social science articles have been written on workers’ protests, since they constitute as such a new phenomenon, although one may mention high quality papers including those by Trini W. Y. Leung (1998; 2002), Ching Kwan Lee (2000a, 2002b), and Cheng Feng (2000, 2003), William Hurst and Kevin O’Brien (2002). From a more historical perspective, works by A. Walder (1986, 1993) and E. Perry (1986, 2001) are certainly undisputable references.

1. Demonstrations as a complaints procedure?

The connection between street demonstrations by state sector workers and the practice of lodging complaints is explicit even if there is some incertitude in the terms used to designate the movements. Local officials, when interviewed, generally use the term “collective complaint” or “collective petition” (jiti shangfang), when they do not use vaguer, more pejorative phrases such as “disorder” (luan) or “unrest” (nao shi).

True that in many respects, these demonstrations still fall within the procedure for administrative appeal which was adopted by the Chinese regime in its earliest days. The practice has been institutionalized by the Communists since the 1950s with the setting up of offices for lodging complaints and petitions (xingfang bangongshi/ xingfang ke), but its origins go back much further; we will not however talk about this now (Bianco 2001; Perry 2001). The practice aims at giving people access to an appeals procedure when they perceive a decision affecting them to be unjust. Chinese people have used this tool more or less widely according to the times (Luchmann 2003). Sometimes the authorities have used it as an instrument for controlling how political compliance with the activities of local administrations is effective or for checking if new laws and regulations have been properly implemented. To make the process easier, letterboxes were provided where complainants could deposit their complaints. Nowadays, these boxes have been superseded by open hotlines so that people may denounce cases of corruption. It can be seen from these few examples that lodging complaints is part of the normal functioning of the Chinese communist regime. In no way does the practice challenge the established order, since it is aimed at ensuring that laws are justly applied (Thireau and Hua 2003; O’Brien forthcoming). Workers in state enterprises are not, in any case, the only people to use this procedure; it is widely used by workers in the special economic zones (Thireau and Hua 2003), as well as by country people for tax and land problems (O’Brien and Li 2004) and by townspeople in cases of expropriation or house purchases. We should note too that in recent years a new procedure of legal arbitration has been juxtaposed to the administrative one (Thireau and Hua 2003).

The workers of any particular state enterprise who take to the street in any numbers are therefore acting within the complaint-lodging repertoire of contention. This is so, first of all, because such demonstrations bring together only those suffering precisely the same injustice – groups of workers all belonging to the same state enterprise. And secondly, it is because the demonstrators,


27 South China Morning Post (May 3, 2003).
like complainants, are blaming the managing authorities of their enterprise for failing to provide the contractual social benefits to which they are entitled such as *xiagang* and unemployment allocations or pensions; sometimes they made a connection with corruption. Their claims are generally focused on payments – whether for pensions or allocations – that have remained unpaid. The demonstrators deliver a petition to the authorities asking them politely to intercede on their behalf with the management of the enterprise to bring these irregularities to an end. After all, they are demanding nothing more than the exercise of something they consider, as do the authorities themselves, as an established right. And, when they condemn the leaders of their enterprise for corruption, they do so to expose irregularities in the process of transferring ownership or in the procedure for closing down a failing enterprise (Kernen 2004). Not only are they wholly complying with the official discourse of the day on the struggle against corruption, by asking for the law to be justly applied, but also with the logic of the formal filing of a complaint. In other words, their claims remain centered on quite specific infractions of the law, and stay within the context of the enterprise. Seen from this angle, the demonstrators are taking on the role of complainants, limiting themselves to pointing out how a regulation is being badly implemented. While today’s workers’ demonstrations are a totally new phenomenon since 1949, they widely used the existing repertoire of contention (Tilly 1986). Such an extensive reuse of the complaints procedure probably owes much to the fact that workers are cobbling together existing repertoires of protest, if not even more to the fact that their creative faculties are now being stimulated by the narrowness of their actual margin for manoeuvre.

The transition to demonstrations: the weight of numbers

Yet, by playing on the weight of their numbers and on their ever longer and ever more organized physical presence in public places, these movements are actually moving outside the complaint-lodging field of activity. Such workers turn out in dozens, sometimes in their hundreds, in front of the city hall, chanting slogans and carrying banners and blocking the main entrance to the building.

On a given day there are 300, perhaps 400 persons, who are demanding their pension. As with many other retirees and early retired from the same city, the payment of their pension benefits has been delayed. They claim that they have not received anything for the past eight months. And therefore, on that given day they have taken the decision to protest in front of the city council and ask for an explanation. Nowadays this type of event is quite common: during my stays in Shenyang, the street protests happened on a more than daily basis.

In order to monitor such a banal street protest the Shenyang authorities tried initially to channel the rioters towards the office of complaints. A few civil servants, who appeared on the street at the same time as the rioters, gently tried to guide them there. Of course, mediators will hardly criticize the validity of the protesters’ action, nor will they point out that they are gathering ille-
That given day the retirees are stubborn, they ask for an immediate appointment with the mayor. The mediators, as the personnel in charge of the city hall, hesitate, then attempt a diversion by saying that a delegation could be received the next day but that today the person in charge of the pension funds is absent. The rioters refuse. They have waited long enough. They demand an appointment this very day, and make it clear that they will not budge form the entrance of the city hall otherwise. The authorities will not have any of this. That is when people start to get angry, rioters who up to then were quite calm start shouting slogans: “We want our pensions! We want our pensions!” At the same time the police starts to intensify its pressure, plainclothes policemen with cameras appear on the scene, others set the rioters apart while preventing the passers-by to stop, and finally a hundred or so policemen in uniform take position around the city hall. However, near the police barrier next to the town hall entrance, discussions with the rioters continue. Soon they actually obtain the much hoped for appointment with a municipal official. While fifteen or so retirees enter the building, the chanting of slogans gets stronger. However, this appointment leads to nothing more than a few vague promises, and soon before midday the street riot is dispersed without any violence. And as the security forces go back to their quarters singing a patriotic tune, a few groups of rioters seethe and share their anger with the passers-by. They vow to return soon.

In refusing to leave the entrance to the local government building, the rioters also relinquished the “petition deposit” repertoire to enter into a struggle with the authorities. They are inventing the “manif”, on the pattern developed in 19th century France as described by Michel Offerlé (1990). Through this collective dimension, the demonstrators attempt to exert pressure and force the authorities into a trial of strength. They are no longer simply presenting their grievances to those in charge, but publicizing them.

In the context of a democratic system, social movements tend to capitalise on the impact of their mobilization, either through the media or at the polls. In the Chinese context, the transition to street demonstrations has no media impact. The rare article dealing with workers’ demonstrations generally appears well after the event, once the conflict has been resolved. In the absence of any “sounding box” at the national level, demonstrators have begun wishing, on a very few occasions, to make the issues about which they are campaigning known at an international level. At Daqing, for example, at the time of the big demonstrations of 2002, right from the earliest days of the struggle some demonstrators attempted to block a train connecting Moscow with Peking, hoping to attract the attention of the foreign passengers on board. Quite regularly too, the union dissident based in Hong Kong, Han Dongfeng, receives phone calls informing him of

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28 Investigation in Harbin and Shenyang.
29 See, for example, the report by the NGO Human Rights Watch, Paying the Price: Worker Unrest in Northeast China, July 2002, vol 14, no 6. Available online on the website: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/chinalbr02/
the situation in such and such an enterprise in China. It is the same with some foreign journalists based in Peking. For the present, however, such actions are still rare, bearing in mind the numbers of such movements (Cai Yunshun 2002). It is true that they are risky and often rebound on those who attempt them. At Daqing and at Liaoyang, the contacts that were made with dissident organizations or the international press were added to the list of accusations facing the movement’s leaders.

Since then, with no media coverage, the only way left for the demonstrators to force the local authorities into trials of strength is by making full use of their “nuisance value”. By this means, such movements attempt to acquire political visibility and, through it, hope to force the authorities into taking their claims into consideration. They think that, by “creating a problem”, they will break the local understanding between the bosses of the enterprise and the political authorities to “manage” as quietly as possible the social crisis arising from the privatization or collapse of state enterprises. Whether by gathering in front of the authorities’ headquarters, or by blocking an important highway, or a railway, the demonstrators seek to break the silence blanketing their campaign. The protestors verbalize this strategy as “disorder” (Cai Yunshun 2002).

Thereafter, even while they continue to address themselves to the local political authorities, their goal in making use of their nuisance value is really to catch the attention of the higher authorities. In this sense, they are playing – as with the filing of a formal complaint – on the diversity of those who make up the Chinese state. A practice that is not new as Laura Luehrmann (2003:846) points out: “During the period immediately following the 1959-1961 Great Leap Forward famine, many complainants bypassed locals bureaus, even dramatically presenting their pleas written in blood (xue shu) to central authorities.”

For their part, the authorities do not immediately outlaw the demonstrations. On the contrary, the local authorities try their best to keep them within the existing structures for filing complaints thus preventing that the worker complain have an echo outside their fief. City governments in the North-East have thus moved their complaints’ bureaus closer to the seats of power (city halls or provincial government buildings). Several officials come hastily out in the role of mediators to greet any group of complainants, escorting them peacefully to their offices. In doing so, they are attempting to keep this new kind of protest within the legal bounds. In some cases, they have also used intimidation to prevent groups of workers to go directly up to Beijing or to the provincial capital to raise their case.

As is pointed out in a recent article by Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li (2004), this is where we reach the limits of the concept of “political opportunity structure”, which over-simplifies the characteristics of the state in its relations with social movements. Demonstrators in China do not find themselves in a relationship with the state as a unique entity; they come up against a plurality of state actors some of whom may make ad hoc alliances with them. In his article, focusing on the countryside, O’Brien shows how the lodging of complaints offers the provincial or central

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30 Han Dongfeng and the China Labour Bulletin published detailed information on different protests that occurred in China. The annual statistic or estimation on the number of protests that occurred in China usually comes out from the official Chinese union.
authorities a means of control over the local administration. Even though this same interplay exists between the different levels of State power, the cases of workers’ demonstrations are structured in a rather different way. The state is concerned, not with ensuring the proper implementation of a law, but with containing any threat to social stability. By taking to the streets, the workers are indirectly drawing attention to the local authorities’ failure to “manage” the transition without any trouble. The local authorities thus find themselves obliged to find a quick method of calming things down, by referring upwards to higher levels in the hierarchy.31

As we know, the idea of social stability (shehui wending) is a very sensitive one in China, and particularly when it comes to workers’ disputes. The Chinese government becomes panic-stricken at the prospect of an autonomous and organized workers’ movement analogous to the Polish Solidarnosc. This is why the impact of these small street demonstrations is quite often great enough for the demonstrators to win, if not their case, at least some small compensation to improve their everyday diet. Such little misdemeanors – the street demonstrations – accompanying the normal procedure for filing complaints – have in fact a big political impact. The relative haste with which the authorities are prepared to compromise with the demonstrators clearly encourages the development of this type of campaign.

Nevertheless, the demonstrations still fall within the repertoire of the filing of complaints. As we have said, in addition to the fact that their aim is to attract the higher authorities’ attention to a misapplication of the law, the complainants do not generally employ from the start such “extreme” tactics. They usually resort to them only after having tried to make their case through the normal administrative or legal procedures. The demonstration is thus understood, in most of the cases I study, to be a procedure of last resort. If most of the complainants transform themselves into demonstrators only after the institutionalized procedure has failed, it may be analyzed as a way not to break but to strike a deal with the system, as an attempting to exert pressure in order to make the system work better.

**New ideological approaches for legalizing illegality**

Even though these demonstrations, restricted to employees of the same enterprise and limited in their claims, are not outlawed at once, the fact of taking to the streets is still understood by the demonstrators as a challenge to the established order. They clearly perceive the risks incurred when they widen the complaint filing repertoire; and so they attempt to justify their action by the urgency of the situation, while putting their claim into the language of socialism. Socialist discourse is present as well in the context of lodging complaints, but the bureaucratic character of this approach is more suited to a more legalist and argumentative expression of their grievances (Thireau and Hua 2003).

31 And it happens that, in their turn, the local authorities make use of the risk of instability to win subsidies from central government.

32 See, for example, on this subject, in the report by Human Rights Watch, *Paying the Price: Worker Unrest in Northeast China*, op cit.
During the demonstrations, the workers’ appeal unmistakably brings to bear the ideological arsenal of socialism (Lee Chingkwan 2000a; 2000b). They dress their claims up in terms like “working class”, “proletariat”, “socialism” – to the point that their slogans, such as “Long life to the working class!” or “No to capitalism, yes to socialism!”, convey at times a whiff of the Cultural Revolution\(^3\). When the demonstrators proclaim their loyalty to socialist values they are expiating the illegal act of taking to the streets. And one finds that a broadly similar strategy was adopted by the student demonstrators of 1989, just as a pre-emptive measure to forestall any labeling of the movement as “counter-revolutionary” (Zuo and Benford 1995).

It is also true that, by quoting back at the authorities the discourse that is still the official ideology, after twenty years of economic reforms, the demonstrators are exposing its contradictions. They succeed all the more skillfully in turning the Party discourse in their own favor because, for them, it still has some reality. Historically, workers in the state sector used to have a special status. They were made to believe that they were the avant-garde of socialism, and that they collectively owned the enterprises where they worked. In “struggling against capitalism”, they are demanding that a whole world, with all the norms and standards to which they had become accustomed, should be preserved: they want to hold onto the “socialist” way of managing social relationships. That world, now passing into history, was paternalistic. It tied workers for life to their production unit; but, in exchange, it guaranteed them a job with certain material advantages. This type of organization still has meaning for workers, even now that they have lost their jobs and have barely enough to live on. In this sense, it is possible to draw a parallel with the concept of moral economy. James Scott (1985) defines this term as a pre-capitalist and agrarian form of organization in which the landowners swap a little of their wealth for some social recognition. Even if the Chinese workers go beyond Scott’s subtle forms of protest, in the case of urban China, the workers’ demonstrations are, like Scott’s agrarian revolts, a reaction aimed at restoring an old order that has probably disappeared forever. One can imagine the authorities’ condescending attitude to these workers, the last to dream of a socialist paradise. So the use to which the workers are putting the socialist discourse is not merely instrumental.

In consequence, it is not surprising that their discourse should also refer to the role they once played in Chinese society. That was the case, for example, during a demonstration in front of the Harbin city hall where a group of retired people waved a placard saying, “I’ve given my youth to the Party. Today I’m old – but the Party doesn’t even give me any leftovers. I’ve asked my children for money, but they’re all out of work.”\(^3^4\) More generally, many retired people feel nostalgia for the Mao era, when the city was prosperous. A former employee of a pharmaceutical factory in Shenyang says, “The reforms have done nothing but destroy the city’s enterprises. Before, we were rich; now we’re just about scraping a living.” These former heroes of the building of socialism are bitter. They think the government has deceived them, and that it no longer respects its workers or retired people.


\(^{34}\) Interview Harbin (Oct 2001).
The urgency of the workers’ plight also serves to justify their resort to demonstrations and their short-circuiting of the official channels for complaint. We are obviously not suggesting that this urgency might be faked, but that it is put forward as a justification for demonstrating. This urgency makes it easier for working-class mobilization to have a kind of legitimacy. The revolts are presented as founded on despair, which implies that they are spontaneous: angry outbursts, with no ulterior political motives. In proclaiming their poverty, demonstrators are not defying authority; they are merely expressing the fact that they are hungry. Faced with such a demand, of course, the authorities are embarrassed. Cheng Feng (2000) reports a comment from a Chinese union leader that amply reveals the dilemma in which they find themselves: “If they repress these demonstrations, the government would appear indifferent to the condition of the working class and would create even more resentment among the workers.”

By playing on the official ideology, the urgency of the situation and the lack of formal organization of their movements, the workers have not only managed to have small scale protest tolerated by a system hostile to mobilizations it doesn’t itself control, but sometimes they also succeed in forcing the authorities into negotiations, and win a few concessions. Confronted by this kind of workers’ demonstrations, the authorities find themselves trapped.

2. Features of the groups mobilized: retired people out in strength

Beside the repertoire used by the workers to express their claims, it is interesting to analyze the sociological profile of those who are mobilized. Several researchers have pointed out the high proportion of retired people in these movements, but there is no doubt that Hurst and O’Brien (2002) were the first to throw a clear light on this primary characteristic. They focused their analysis on what motivates retired people to demonstrate, advancing two significant factors. The first relates to the symbolic importance of breaking a pension agreement, while the second is based on the pattern of existence open to this fringe group within the urban population. I shall take up here both of these two elements, following them up and then bringing them into my chosen perspective.

Basing their study on interviews with unemployed and retired people, O’Brien and Hurst (2002) show the importance of how their interviewees perceive their pension agreements. For a number of them, any breaking of this contract legitimizes, or could legitimize, their taking to the streets to preserve their pension rights. It is true that, for those involved, and for a considerable proportion of the urban population, non-payment of pensions is perceived, not just as illegal, but also as immoral. Urban dwellers’ sympathy with retired people’s demonstrations is manifest. Whereas there are many of them who would heed to the authorities’ advice on the necessity for unemployed people to seek a new job, the battle of retired people is seen as a just cause. Even several heads of enterprises, during interviews conducted in the Northeast, told me firmly that paying out pensions was for them a priority, ahead of paying wages as a whole or paying taxes. It is of no consequence here whether such declarations of intent were actually put into practice. The city authorities in Shenyang, being very aware of the problem, have created jobs for retired people so
as to provide them with a small income. It must be said that demonstrations by retired people are a daily event in that city.

Thanks to this wide public support, retired people’s claims are not perceived as aimed at maintaining a few ancient corporatist privileges, but as just and morally right. Workers’ complaints have slipped into the field of social morality, and this is also noticeable with the demonstrations against corruption. These last are attended by people of more diversified social backgrounds, even though retired people still play a central role in them.

Another very interesting argument advanced by O’Brien and Hurst (2002) relates to the life-style of the militants. Based on the work of Doug McAdam, in particular, it starts from the following premises: 1. - Demonstrating takes time, 2. - Those with some practical experience of demonstrations are more ready to turn out again. In the Chinese context, it is the younger pensioners who combine both these characteristics. They have the time, and also the experience of workers’ militancy that they acquired during the Cultural Revolution (Perry and Li 1997). Unemployed people, being younger, and having family responsibilities, cannot gamble on the unpredictable results of mobilization, which, moreover, in the Chinese context, is still a high-risk activity. To survive, they have no other choice but to find an income, being sometimes forced to migrate.

The young retired people and the early retired, as well as having time and some experience of demonstrating, also enjoy political near-immunity by reason of their age, and because they embody, more than anyone else, the “reality” of the building of socialism. Knowing that the authorities are uneasy about cracking down on this former avant-garde, which is still carrying the banners of socialism, it is easier for them to go out on demonstrations. It is hardly surprising then that, even in the largest demonstrations, there is always a strong contingent of retired people playing a leading role in the movements and their organization. Thus, the presence or the use of retired people takes on a strategic dimension. As with the huge demonstrations in Liaoyang, most of the leaders arrested were retired or nearing retirement. At Daqing, after the arrest of workers’ representatives, the responsibility for handing over a petition demanding their release fell to a pensioner in a wheel-chair. In the course of such demonstrations, old women play a dynamic role, chanting the most radical slogans or dramatising their plight by appealing on their knees to the authorities. In addition to this strategic use of retired people for their immunity to criticism, the demonstrators bring out the old and infirm to advertise the immoral attitudes of the authorities. In other words, it is the rank and file who put themselves forward in these demonstrations, reminding people that they are acting, not in the field of political opposition, but simply in that of complaint. Those in power find themselves almost obliged to respond paternalistically to their demands, while controlling and preventing the development of autonomous organizations.

3. Movements without leaders?
Workers in the state sector are not favorably placed for organizing their own movements. Even if the role of the official trade unions is changing a bit, they usually do not provide adequate communication channels for workers’ demands (Feng Cheng 2003). Admittedly, this has not always
been the case: at the start of the reforms, in particular, after the unions were reinstated during the 1980s, they were more outspoken in their criticism and their protests demanding greater autonomy from the Party (Perry 1995). In addition, during the 1989 upheavals, certain sections of the union movement also rallied to the students’ cause, but they have since then been brought back in line. Today, the unions only rarely support the demands made by state workers 35.

Being unable to protest through the official channels, a few workers in Shenyang have tried to develop new organizational structures. As the crisis deepened within the state enterprises, these new organizations took the form of informal workers’ networks of mutual aid. Their stated objectives were minimalist, since their only aim was to collect donations to help out the most impoverished families. To make sure that no Polish-style situation could develop, the official union took care to take control of these self-help networks and to carry out their tasks themselves. Today, the central authorities will not allow any autonomous organization to develop in any sector, and most particularly not in the trade union field. They will crush any attempt at forming an autonomous union.

The workers, being unable to rely on existing organizational structures, or to form new ones, have very narrow margins for manoeuvre in organizing their movements. Therefore, even though the demonstrations are widely tolerated, they have not led to new organizational structures, such as autonomous unions. It must be acknowledged that the people in power have succeeded in confining protest to the informal networks within enterprises. To be tolerated at all, a workers’ movement must appear to be spontaneous and limited to a single enterprise. With no visible organization or leadership, it thus falls within this margin for manoeuvre that the Party today leaves open to the state workers.

Of course, such an appearance of spontaneity does not in itself explain how demonstrations come about, since any social movement, in order to exist at all, must have a certain level of organization, social networks and a collective identity (Tilly 1976, 1986).

Once these movements increase in size, however the Chinese government seeks out and arrests “leaders”. Is that the proof that these movements are better organized than they allow to appear? Cai Yongshun (2002), basing himself on a field study, takes the view that the leaders of these movements are generally minor officials who put their skills to the service of such movements. I would rather support the idea that these movements are still barely organized at all, and that they mainly rely on the significant networks that unite members of a single plant as well as on their strong group identity. This is all the more likely since today’s demonstrators are able to call upon the skills offered by new legal advice centers, usually largely independent or run by a few lawyers involved in labor issues. It is true that all across China you now find in almost all provincial capitals centers, which are often opened by a Law School Professor sponsored by his university employer and the local authorities. Wuhan University thus has established a Center for Protection of Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens. Due to the presence of volunteers and the financial support of some foreign governmental cooperation agencies or NGOs involved in a Human

35 Interview with Han Dongfeng.
Rights programs in China36, the access to these centers is usually almost free. They are of course not directly involved in any worker protests but do sometimes help them to formulate their grievances in informing them of their rights. Also through meetings held both inside China and abroad, the main animators of these centers, often sponsored by the same foreign organization or agency, get to know each other and have the opportunity to share their experiences among themselves. I’m not saying that they add up to a new kind of dissident network. They are all acting strictly legally but are symptomatic of the political transformation that is affecting the Chinese regime from below.

In the absence of leaders or sophisticated formal organization in these movements, what should be emphasize is the strength of the group identity that has been able to develop in the confined locations of the Chinese work unit (danwei). It is known that in China, the role of the SOE was not (and still is not) limited to a given person’s type of work. Group identity was the basic politico-social structure to be found in urban life, and it still performs a vital function in the cities. Work units or danwei, by regrouping in a single location both workshops and living quarters divided the city’s workforce into a great number of largely autonomous cells, thus contributing to a fragmentation of their social life. Today, this subdivision of urban areas has consequences on the structure of dissent. It may well contribute to fragment it, but paradoxically, it also favors its emergence (Lee 2000).

The networks built within a danwei cut across the various social strata represented within it, because it is founded not only upon the horizontal solidarities forged on the shop floor but also up on loyalties associated with family, generation or patronage. People get married within their danwei, while the individuals in each age group once sat on the same school benches before their paths diverged. Without forgetting the very real oppositions that may exist between management and employees, we should also stress the vertical networks cutting across hierarchical structures.

The existence of such vertical networks means that information travels very quickly; in such a place, nothing is really secret. In the case of many demonstrations, it has been noted that the workers or retired people were reacting to a piece of information that had reached them. In several cases the spark had been ignited by the contents of a handwritten anonymous poster denouncing some particular manoeuvre by the management. In addition there have been demonstrations in response to concessions offered by the authorities themselves. Thus, shortly before the 1999 National Day, an article in the Shenyang newspaper announcing a special payment for the city’s unemployed and retired people triggered several demonstrations.

The function of the social networks cutting across the danwei also helps us to understand the central role played by retired people in these mobilizations. Indeed, at the present time, with the danwei rapidly decomposing as economic and social organisms, the retired people act in some way as their life blood. For young people, forced into seeking redeployment outside its walls, the danwei has gradually lost any meaning; but things are different for those retired or forced into

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36 Many of these human rights dialogues are merely a way to put human rights under the carpet of bilateral relationships but I am particularly impressed by the work done by the three Scandinavian Countries in this field.
early retirement, who still spend most of their time drinking tea in the factory yard and chewing over their grievances. The *danwei*, their own *danwei*, had been and still is their whole life. Whereas, in most countries of the world, unemployed and retired people quickly lose contact with their workplaces and cannot use this type of network for mobilization, things in China are very different. The workers continue to live on the factory grounds; and unemployment or retirement has virtually no consequence on their social roots. For those without work, the *danwei* remains a space for living and socializing. They do not need to form new networks to organized demonstration. The structure of the *danwei* thus explains how demonstrations have arisen in a political context where any autonomous organization is strictly forbidden. This is true at least in the relatively large and formerly well organized *danwei*. In many smaller enterprises, the community doesn’t have a high chance to survive long after the collapse.\(^{37}\)

We know that, in any social movement, someone must make the decision to write a petition, and someone must organize the gathering of signatures: these are not in any case illegal activities. Yet, to do these things, the workers in state enterprises may, even though the initiative is still clearly theirs, apply to these new legal advice centers that are springing up in many large Chinese cities. In other words, the workers can rely on these new outside resources to draw up their list of complaints, help them compose letters, or organize their arguments. Thanks to the existence of these centers, the movements do not have to draw on their own resources for legal and procedural skills.

**Conclusion**

Apart from describing the mechanisms of mobilization and the form taken by these movements (operating within a restricted space that prevents them from challenging the regime’s authority or even its political thinking), how may we explain how state workers have come to this form of action? Before their “political” awakening, they were not unresponsive to change. By dint of their own resourcefulness and a few fiddles, they were developing redeployment strategies to bring in extra income. But, with the coming of “privatization” among the state enterprises, constraints, controls and redundancies were inflicted upon state employees, putting an end to their humble strategy for coping with the transition. Up until then, they had been relatively spared; now they have to confront a situation that is socially very difficult.

However, the harshness of their plight cannot by itself account for the mobilizations. They are part of a wider context, the transformation of governance itself. The workers mobilize thanks to their widening access to legal procedures and possibilities. The complaints procedures, however inefficient, illustrate the willingness of the Chinese government to find new solutions to social conflict. Accordingly, the state’s relatively tolerant approach to these demonstrations indicates that it intends to invent a new and central role for itself, that of arbitrator in the struggles of a society in transition.

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\(^{37}\) Thanks to D. Solinger who made me aware of this point.
The fact remains that this change has not been matched by the development of organizations sufficiently structured and autonomous to transmit social demands. The state, for security reasons, has to cope with social conflict without the benefit of institutional mediation: it is still left trying to manage the relations between the government and the people on an individualized basis. When it comes to the workers’ struggles, this approach leads to the proliferation of demonstrations, since no structure is in place to communicate people’s most basic demands. The authorities are constantly being taken by surprise; they intervene as each emergency arises. It amounts, in the end, to nothing better than a system of crisis management.

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Regulations of Abortion in Indonesia: 
Securing Whose Interest? 
Wening Udasmoro

1. Introduction
The aim of this article is to analyze the impact of the political transition on the regulation of abortion during three different eras in Indonesia. It also shows how abortion and women’s reproduction have always been objects of the State’s regulations without considering an appropriate social security system. In general, the government sees abortion, which is always viewed as a woman’s responsibility, as a moral problem that has to be controlled in order to construct what they call the “good social morality”. In reality, the regulation on abortion does not only refer to the moral questions but imply also other factors relating to the State’s objectives and priorities. The three political eras, in postcolonial Indonesia – the Soekarno, Soeharto and Reformasi eras –, have regulated abortion in different ways based on their power interests. They have had different objectives in their politics that affect regulations on abortion. The problems of economics, demographics, nation building and the relations with other powers, such as religious groups inside the country and the international world outside the country, have been the basis of the State’s consideration in regulating abortion. The interests of women, the most affected group by the regulation of abortion, are, however, not considered in those regulations. Based on the above situation, it is important to examine how the different priorities and objectives of the different eras have impacted on abortion regulation and how the lack of a social security system in those different regulations has affected women.

1.2 Strict Prohibition of Abortion in the Pro-Natal Era
Soekarno’s era (1945-1967), known also as Old Order era, was established in the post-colonial time just after Indonesian independence from the Dutch colonial regime (Ricklefs 1993). This era had its particularity in regulating women’s body and sexual reproduction. The regulation on abortion was one of the factors that show how the State controlled and organized the female body for certain interests. The Penal Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana or KUHP) stated that abortion was strictly prohibited. The women or the ones who help them performing abortion would be sent to court and punished. There was no tolerance, not even in emergency cases.

The prohibition of abortion, on the one hand strongly referred to the moral and religious teachings. The government and religious leaders were still preoccupied by maintaining the concept of sin and criminality of abortion. The important representation of religious leaders and political groups in the parliament ensured the respect of these concepts. On the other hand, however, the abortion prohibition was related to the State’s objective for national reproduction. Soekarno’s government was known as a regime that emphasized the spirit of nationalism (Anderson 1993) in order to maintain Indonesian independence in its discourses and politics. His government called
for ‘revolution’ which meant a struggle of all of Indonesian people against Western neo-colonialism (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung 1959). Population growth was considered as a solution for ensuring the national defence (Koentjaraningrat 1994).

In order for this pro-natal policy to succeed, the government supported by religious leaders and groups encouraged women to participate in nation building by giving birth to a lot of children. The government perpetuated the existing slogan, such as ‘a lot of children, a lot of fortune’. The aim was to emphasize that the participation of women in enlarging the population was not only useful for themselves and their families in ensuring their economic position in the future but also for helping the nation ensure its integrity. With the strong spirit of nationalism in this era, Indonesian women, especially those who lived in Java, responded to the call and gave birth to an average of five to six children. As a result, the population increased rapidly. In 1950 the population was estimated at 77.2 million; in 1955 at 85.4 million (Ricklefs 1993) and according to the National Census dated 31 October 1961 (United Nations 1966), the population was 96.3 million in Indonesia.

This policy had an impact on the practices of family planning and abortion, which both Soekarno’s government and religious leaders rejected. The rejection was related to a cultural aspect, as discussing sexuality was a taboo at that time, but also contained political and ideological aspects. Each of them had different discourses related to this interdiction but arrived at the same terminology about controlling women’s reproductive function. Soekarno and the nationalists accused family planning programs as part of Western propaganda to limit the manpower of non-western countries. They stated that it was against the revolution of the nation. Religious leaders argued that according to Islamic teaching the modern method of contraception were seen as refusal of the natural obligation for reproduction and considered this as a threat for the regeneration of human beings. It was against religious rule and thus sinful (Hull 1974).

In 1957, an organization named Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association (Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia or PKBI) was founded. This organization is the offspring of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), which was concerned about the “population bomb” and pioneered family planning campaigns internationally. However, PKBI was not authorized to actively promote the use of contraceptive methods (Koentjaraningrat 1994). It was only allowed to promote the health and hygienic systems in the society. Related to abortion, the Penal Code became not only the basis of consideration from a juridical point of view but also for reinforcing the idea of procreation. The Soekarno government saw women as a symbol of fertility and obliged them to continue the pregnancy in any circumstance. There was a common understanding in the society that the struggle of women to give birth to children was seen as natural and even a jihad (holy war). A woman who died due to her pregnancy was seen as sacrificing herself for the child. The law that did not give any tolerance even for sick women or the ones in the emergency cases shows how their struggle for procreation was an obligation that passes over their essential rights for life. As a result of such policy, there was no possible health system provided for those who needed abortion services. The State did not even assign any hospital to help women whose lives were in danger because of their pregnancy. On the contrary, women and
health providers performing abortion were becoming the victims of the law. Many of them were sent to court and jail. To avoid the juridical pursuit, the traditional medicines (jamu) and the help of secret traditional healers (dukan bayi) then became the solutions of women with unwanted pregnancy.

Thus, during this era, women and their bodies were placed in the central of solution for national morality and integrity. Abortion long considered as a threat to religious teachings’ stability became more taboo with this pro-natal policy. In other words, the religious teachings about sin and criminality of abortion supported the pro-natal policy and this policy reinforced the concept of sin and criminality of abortion. This policy resulted to the total absence of health system and protection for women who wanted or had already an abortion.

1.3 Restrictive Abortion in the Era of Population Control

Abortion was regulated differently during the Soeharto era (1967-1998), also known as the New Order era. Basically, the Penal Code was still applied as law to criminalize abortion. However, there were other regulations during Soeharto’s 32 years in power. Firstly, in 1992, the government created the Health Law 1992, with article number 23 stating that “certain medical procedures”, a term to replace the word abortion, were tolerated based on medical grounds (Hull et al. 1993). Secondly, since the 1970s, the government informally tolerated menstrual regulation in certain clinics for married women in cases where contraceptive methods had failed. Menstrual regulation, known also as induced abortion, is a termination of pregnancy practiced before ten weeks of pregnancy (Moeloek et al. 1989). The Health Law and the Penal Code were applied together since 1992. Although different regulations existed the continued presence of the Penal Code implies the resistance of government to challenge the status quo whereby society and religious leaders and groups still believed in the criminality of abortion. On the other hand, the informal menstrual regulation practices show how abortion was also utilized to solve another problem, namely population control. The political system adopted by Soeharto’s government had as its main objective accelerating the development of the nation. That era aimed to build Indonesia as a prosperous nation where economic improvement was considered of paramount importance and the focus of government’s policy.

In the New Order era the huge population of the country was viewed as a hindrance for the development plan. In order to reduce the population, the modern contraceptive for family planning was accepted. Unlike Soekarno, Soeharto’s government was known as pro-Western (Sundhussen 1997:466). With the cold war the ‘West’, especially the United States, had political interest in Indonesia as one of the important countries in Asia. To attract Indonesia’s attention, they proposed development program assistances. The New Order received substantial financial and technical assistance, notably from the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and also from other international institutions like the World Bank and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (Chapman 1996:3; Hull & Hatmadji 1988). The government provided an annual budget of 153.3 million Rupiah and 1,131 million Rupiah for 5 years for family planning programs (Mochtar & Syarwani 1990).
In order to legitimate the population control policy, the Soeharto government convinced religious leaders and society in general with the famous slogan of having a “small happy and prosperous family”. The slogan referring to the good of the family engendered acceptance from religious leaders. It became a successful strategy because family happiness was part of the objectives of the society and also the general discourse in religious teachings. Besides, the small space given to religious leaders and groups in politics (Bourchier & Hadiz 2003) obliged them to follow government’s regulations. In 1970 the government established a new organization called National Family Planning Foundation to implement the national program of family planning in the country (Lembaga Keluarga Berencana Nasional or LKBN). In the early 1980s the organization changed its name to the National Family Planning Co-ordination Board (Badan Keluarga Berencana Nasional or BKKBN). With the support of Golkar (the ruling party in the New Order), civil servants and also the presence of military forces that had the task to ensure the participation of women in family planning programs, and thus the number of family planning acceptors increased. In 1973-1974 there were 14,037 adherent groups; there were 90,065 in 1978-79, and in 1983-84 this number had doubled to reach 184,191 groups (BKKBN 1986). The total fertility rate between 1967 and 1970 was averaged at 5.6 births per woman; the estimated figure for early 1990s has fallen to 2.99 (BKKBN 1992).

However, because the number of women experiencing contraceptive failure was significant, the State practiced an informal regulation that allowed married women having this problem to undergo menstrual regulation. Since 1973, the Raden Saleh clinic – a specialist clinic for training and research in family planning at the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Indonesia – introduced this abortion method (Djohan et al. 1993). The Jakarta police informally authorized this practice. Other clinics, such as the clinics of Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association, named Panca Warga, also performed such a service (Djohan et al. 1993). The PKBI had several clinics all over Indonesia but notably in the big cities. The religious leaders did not have any complaint or comment about this service. The fact that this regulation was authorized informally made its practice discretionary and accessible only to certain women, such as the ones living in the cities or middle and upper class women (Udasmoro 2003). This non-transparency and the limited service were intentionally directed at avoiding the widespread practice of abortion in society. Neither the Soeharto government nor religious leaders chose to openly debate about it. For the government, the success of family planning was essential because the budget provided for this program was very high. It is possible that abortion was considered as one of the crucial ways for this program to succeed. For the religious leaders and groups, the limited service of abortion was acceptable, on the one hand as a solution to limit the access to abortion and avoid the understanding in society that abortion for family planning was permitted, and on the other hand as a way to (discretely) support the government population control program. The government and the religious leaders legalized this kind of abortion as win-win solution.

Restriction on the practice of abortion was used to minimize conflict within the society in general and especially with the religious leaders and groups that still attached the idea of criminality to abortion. The special tolerance given aimed to ensure the success of national development and
population control program supported by the international organizations. However, this politics of compromise had failed to achieve the objectives. The particular clinics tolerated to offer the service were too small compared to the total number of abortion in Indonesia. The number of abortion was estimated at 1,500,000 (Tjitarsa 1993) cases per year, whereas the majority was performed illegally against health and safety regulations, by traditional healers and unauthorized doctors. As a result of this policy, poor women, especially those who lived in the marginal regions, and unmarried women were the most affected groups. Married women who were ignorant of the existence of the service became also victims of the regulation. Because of this lack of knowledge about the services they could not access safe abortion, while those who knew about its existence could not and afford the cost of it. This practice contributed to the deterioration of women’s health.

1.4 Attempts to Redefinition of Abortion in the Era of Democratization

The regulation of abortion is facing a new challenge in the era of reformasi (1998-present). The new political system in which democratization is the main objective of the nation brings the regulation of abortion to a new front. The authoritarian bureaucratic-military vision of the State and society that dominated the Soeharto era has been replaced by a greater emphasis on civil society and increased political parties’ participation as the primary focus of order and stability (Rabasa & Chalk 2001). The parliament in the democratic sense of the word is perceived as having more power and legitimacy than any other time since the 1950s.

The regulation of abortion in this period is not yet clear because the government is still relatively young and in the process of reconstructing many aspects of politics, including abortion. However, recently the parliament showed a more favourable and co-operative attitude towards the amendment of abortion law as advocated by women’s organizations under the umbrella of the Women’s Health Foundation (Yayasan Kesehatan Perempuan or YKP). This group and the parliament have prepared the draft of the new law on abortion to be inserted in the New Health Law. In this new draft law, abortion is perceived from the specific concern of the health of women. Health is defined in terms of the physical, psychological and also social health of the women. It means that pregnant women with psychological problem and in the case of rape should be given the choice of abortion. The draft was revised six times and in February 2004 before it was finally accepted by the factions in the parliament (Widyantoro 2004), including the Islamic parties’ factions who were convinced by the importance of women’s health and the argument that certain Islamic schools authorized abortion before 120 days of pregnancy. However, this draft of law still needs the approval from the government or and especially the Department of Health that still refuses abortion except on medical grounds.

The regulation of abortion is more challenging for the government because there are different demands from many different groups and institutions. The fact that the government is trying to find an appropriate and reliable form of democracy that Indonesia should adopt allows different interest groups to insist on their demands. One of the important aspects of democratization understood by the Indonesians is to be free to express opinions. As a result, the government and
certain religious groups no longer monopolize the regulation of abortion but some other groups insist on their rights to express their arguments and representations. The birth of various women’s Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) marks the demands for the improvement of women’s position in many aspects, such as economics, social, politics and human rights, including abortion. The government in its policies considers these NGOs, usually claiming they are in line with international institutions regulations, such as the WHO and other United Nations organizations. Besides these NGOs also religious figures that had small space during the Soeharto era are now reappearing and trying to regain their power and legitimacy. Various Islamic groups declared different perspectives about many issues, including abortion. Moreover, the fact that Indonesia is still economically dependant on the West, especially the United States, provokes more complicated political decisions that the government has to take.

The issue of abortion is therefore placed in a problematic situation. First, inside the country, the parliament, women’s groups and certain religious groups and parties accepting the possibility in Islam to view pregnancy as beginning 120 days of pregnancy, attempt to legalize abortion in favour of women’s health. However, other conservative religious leaders, such as the Indonesian Muslim Leaders Assembly (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI) are insisting on the criminalization of abortion. Outside the country, the government is attempting to follow the recommendations of the International Conference on Development and Population in Cairo in 1994 and the Fourth Women Conference in Beijing in 1995, which both discuss women’s reproductive health rights and the safe motherhood, but feels at the same time uncomfortable accepting abortion because of George Bush’s policy on abortion. George Bush, with his re-installation of the Mexico City Policy or Gag Rule, clearly emphasized that US will stop all financial support to countries or organizations that legalize abortion. This statement worries the government.

This problematic situation results to the non-acceptance of the Draft of Health Law sent by the parliament. There are no changes related to the regulations of abortion. Apart from that, the informal practices of abortion by clinics that provide menstrual regulation continue in the big cities. The procedure involved becomes an obstacle for unmarried women to have safe abortion. Women, who can afford the cost of abortion financially, look for the possible services in secrecy. Being attracted by this business, the unauthorized doctors who perform abortion for high prices are more difficult to control. The absence of regulations on the sale of medicines at pharmacies obliges the poorer women to perform self, but unsafe, abortion. The rate of women’s mortality caused by unsafe abortion keeps on increasing. Women’s bodies are still in the battlefield and in the problematic situation where the State’s is trying to find a compromise that can fulfil the demand of all of the groups concerned. Although democratization has been attempted, other interests are still the preoccupation of the State especially in the case of abortion. Finally, the interest of women, regarding questions of health and rights, are overpowered.
1.5 Conclusion
From the above discussion, it can be deduced that women’s bodies and reproductive functions have been used by the State in the three different eras in order to fulfil its national objectives. The question is not only whether abortion is allowed or not in the Indonesian society but also if it is useful or not for the State’s interests. The significant changes of government regulations on abortion with the building of nation show how women’s bodies are staged as the property of power. The changes of the eras influence certain changes of regulations but primarily in the practice of abortion. The body of woman is used to fulfil the needs of each era in order to achieve their objectives without considering women’s essential and individual rights. The most important issue to emphasize is that State’s position regarding the regulation of abortion is influenced by various aspects, such as for minimizing the conflict with religious groups inside the country or pursuing good relations with the international community, but less so by for women’s interests. The position of women is marginal, which put them in the unfavourable place while ignoring their need for safe abortion. As a result, we can conclude that there is no era that focuses on the question of women’s health system for women’s individual interest and rights. Women with unwanted pregnancy still have to find the services of abortion - mostly in clandestine and unsafe ways - by themselves.

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When Social Security Reaches its Limits.
Long-Term Care of Elderly People in Urban Indonesia

*Peter van Eeuwijk*

**Introduction**

For more than two decades, most countries in the South have undergone a fast and fundamental ‘health transition’ (Caldwell 1993; Wilkinson 1994). In Indonesia, demographic change is very rapid, and the country can be classified as an exceptionally fast ageing society (Hugo 2000; Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta 2003). Epidemiological transformation leads to a new general health profile due to a distinct shift from acute infectious diseases to chronic non-infectious illnesses and injuries (Departemen Kesehatan 2002; Koesoebjono and Sarwono 2003; van Eeuwijk 2003c). Urbanisation along with migration processes is in full swing in Indonesia and will lead in a few years to a society whose majority will soon consist of urban citizens (WHO 1998; van Eeuwijk 2003b). Moreover, change of lifestyle goes along with these processes and leads to new socio-cultural forms such as altered nutritional habits, work patterns or household composition and living arrangements (van Eeuwijk 2003a). The dynamics of ‘health transition’ show two distinct characteristics in societies in the South such as Indonesia: firstly, they show an amazingly high temporal speed, and, secondly, they affect an extraordinarily high number of people (van Eeuwijk 2004).¹ One has to wonder whether existing structures and current developments in Indonesia are still sustainable under the weight of these gigantic transformations. Furthermore, we should not forget the crucial fact that since 1997/8 Indonesia is still passing through a far-reaching economic crisis, which has hit the hardest the urban masses.²

**The nature of care and long-term care**

Based on the dynamics of ‘health transition’ in Indonesia and with regard to wellbeing and social security of elderly Indonesians, Hugo (2000: 318) has referred to the growing social and economic unreliability this age group is facing in contemporary Indonesia. Against the background of his assumption, van Eeuwijk (2002: 25) has formulated a ‘triangle of uncertainty’ for urban elderly in Province North Sulawesi, our research area³, which is made up of three corners:

1. social uncertainty: filial piety and kinship obligations are no longer guaranteed;

2. economic uncertainty: the material and financial support system is not reliable anymore;

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¹ In comparison with ‘health transition’ in Europe and North America, 100 to 150 years ago.

² See for example Koesoebjono and Sarwono (2003) for their analysis of how the economic crisis has affected elderly people in Indonesia.

³ The research study ‘Growing Old in the City’ lasted 3 years (2000-2002, 2003) and consisted of an international and interdisciplinary research team (6 members from Indonesia and Switzerland: 4 anthropologists and 2 medical scientists). The principal research approaches came from Medical Anthropology and Public Health. The Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) has co-financed this research project.
3. Health uncertainty: Apart from communicable diseases, urban elderly are increasingly vulnerable to non-communicable diseases as a result of, for instance, expanding lifespan, changing lifestyle and altering socio-economic conditions.

Care

Both formal and informal care schemes for elderly people in urban environments are strongly influenced and shaped by this triangle. In fact, elderly care occurs mostly under these insecure conditions, even though we may not neglect and underestimate the resources, capabilities and resiliences of elderly people. Accordingly, Phillips (2000) has identified elderly care as one of the most urgent problems of the ageing process in the Asia-Pacific area, and he clearly advises against "the potential dangers of over-reliance on informal and family sources" (2000: 5). Helman, a British medical anthropologist, concludes that the rapid ageing resulting in an increasing number of chronically ill elderly "will require a major shift in the medical paradigm […] – a shift from ‘cure’ to ‘care’" (2000: 8). The main question that arises from this framework is: how can appropriate elder care be provided under the circumstances of unreliable social networks, economic shortage, a rapidly growing number of elderly people – including a steady increase in number of chronically ill elderly – and of hardly existing formal welfare structures?

Niehof describes "care as both attitude and practice" (2002: 181) that involves talking about and acting as well as intending to do it. As a consequence, she frames care as a process or dynamic that consists of four interconnected phases (Niehof 2002: 181):

1. Caring about: assessing need for care and calling for attention;
2. Taking care of: assuming responsibility for the need for care and assigning the kind of agency;
3. Care-giving: meeting the need for care and representing competence to give care;
4. Care-receiving: assessing the appropriateness of care and calling for responsiveness.

Van der Geest (2002: 8) calls these phases a process "moving from awareness and intention to actual practice and response". Care is according to him a "process that sustains life" and which represents "the moral quality of life" (van der Geest 2002: 8): In other words, a society with a certain moral standard and claim has the obligation to provide adequate care for its members.

In her framework of ‘care arrangements’ Niehof identifies five different levels where care takes place, namely on the individual, household, community, state and market level (Niehof 2002: 184). The household – as core care provider in most societies – is in fact the main unit of analysis. Nevertheless, every country or society reflects its own pattern of care arrangement depending on the flow of resources and contributions in care and on the corresponding level that receives or provides it. Finally, Phillips (2000) broadens the scope of what care encompasses. From his view, care is not only understood in the sense of covering health matters, but also social care, housing, material welfare and religious well-being.

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4 See for instance Keasberry (2002) and the many facets of elder care in rural Yogyakarta.
Long-term care
Following the definition of Phillips and Chan (2002: 3), long-term care incorporates health matters, personal care and social services that are provided at home and in the community over a longer period for an adult who lacks or has lost his/her capability to care fully for him-/herself and to maintain his/her independence. Both authors underscore the heterogeneity of present-day elderly that results in very different long-term care needs, which can change abruptly and drastically. A second important point concerns the process of rapid feminisation of ageing (van Eeuwijk 2003a): A lot more old-aged women – and the majority of them are elderly widows – are and will be in need of long-term care than elderly men (Phillips and Chan 2002), and, on the other hand, women are highly dominant in care-giving practices including elderly women as main caregiver. Both aspects call for a gender-sensitive approach in long-term care research as well as in long-term care program implementation. Niehof succinctly concludes (2002: 181): "The whole [care] process is gendered.”

In the past, family and kin units in Southeast Asia took generally care of elderly people with severe ill health, physical and mental disabilities and functional impairment and thus in need of long-term care and existential support; long-term care was provided by mostly younger family and kin members, and the majority of caregivers were women (Leung 2000). Filial piety, kinship obligation, responsibility and respect towards the elder family member were considered to be normative integral parts of informal, family- and kin-based care arrangements between children and their elderly parents (van Eeuwijk 2003a). With progressing ‘health transition’ leading, for instance, to new family structures, new household compositions, to women’s work outside the home and smaller numbers of children, the capacity of caring for frail elderly becomes increasingly limited (Leung 2000), and attitude and engagement of children concerning their generous readiness of providing long-term care are in change (Keasberry 2002). Kreager (2003: 12) analyses the present-day situation in Indonesia as follows: "We should not succumb to the cosy assumption that where there are children, they can be counted.” In this context, Niehof (1995: 434) introduces the important term ‘negotiation’. This means that particularly in bilateral kinship systems elder care and support were and are not per se assured and reliable: They have to be negotiated and re-negotiated for every case and from time to time, which all the more applies to long-term care where the position, capability and power of bargaining shape old-age vulnerability. But as Schröder-Butterfill (2003) and Marianti (2002) clearly show in their studies on Java (Indonesia), even under bad (health and socio-economic) conditions elderly still have care alternatives in their wider environment and ample scope in mobilising resources and capacities as social actors and not as victims of circumstance.

Study area
The Province North Sulawesi had a total population of 2.8 million inhabitants in 2000. The three selected urban locations reflect different degrees of ethnic and religious heterogeneity and varying stages of urbanism. Metropolitan Kota (Municipality) Manado (388,000 inhabitants) represents a very heterogeneous population regarding religious affiliation, ethnic diversity and socio-economic distribution; provincial Kecamatan (District) Tahuna (29,000 inhabitants) shows a
rather homogeneous population (but spatially separated: Sangihe and allochthonous Tidore ethnic group) and semi-urban Kecamatan Tomohon (74,000 inhabitants) a very homogeneous composition (Minahasa ethnic group) (van Eeuwijk 2003b, 2005).

In 2000, North Sulawesi Province has shown an average life expectancy at birth of 68.5 years (national: 67.97), and 7.7 per cent of its population (national: 7.6) have reached 60 years or more (Kantor Statistik 2001; Departemen Kesehatan 2002; Koesoebjono and Sarwono 2003). On political community (Kelurahan) level, our seven samples range from a very ‘young’ age structure (with 2.9 per cent of elderly citizens ≥60 years) up to communities with a markedly ‘aged’ population (13.4 per cent respectively).

While there are old people’s homes in North Sulawesi, a stagnation of number of homes and to a certain extent of inmates could be observed between 1990 and 2000 (see Table 1) (Kantor Statistik 1991, 2001). In 2000, private providers run eight homes, the government provides only three houses.

**Table 1: Number of homes for elderly people (panti werda) and number of inmates in Province North Sulawesi, Indonesia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of homes for elderly</td>
<td>10 homes:</td>
<td>11 homes:</td>
<td>11 homes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2 state owned</td>
<td>• 2 state owned</td>
<td>• 3 state owned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 8 private owned</td>
<td>• 9 private owned</td>
<td>• 8 private owned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of inmates</td>
<td>385 elderly:</td>
<td>514 elderly:</td>
<td>533 elderly:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 49 men</td>
<td>• 122 men</td>
<td>• 102 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 336 women</td>
<td>• 392 women</td>
<td>• 431 women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There is a significantly high proportion of female inmates in these homes (on average 77 per cent between 1990 and 2000, see Table 1), which is a first strong indication that the absolute number of elderly women is increasing (in comparison with that of men) and that a certain number of aged women can no longer fully rely on their informal care networks. As a matter of fact, 98 per cent of our elderly respondents (men and women) were very reluctant to enter an old people’s home arguing that as long as they have children and own a house, they would never enter such an institution on their own free will.

**Urban elderly and long-term care in North Sulawesi Province**

The number of urban elderly people who are currently in need of any sort of long-term care is quite high: of totally 75 households (with at least one ill elderly) of our sample in three different cities, 40 households (or 53 per cent) have at least one elderly member who needs intensive care.

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5 According to Abikusno (2002), a proportion of older people (≥60 years) that exceeds 7% on province level in Indonesia indicates an ageing society, which applies also to the Province North Sulawesi.
over a period of more than one month (see Table 2). Ill elderly in the remaining 35 households did not suffer from chronic illnesses and were not in need of long-term care. There are no significant variations in terms of urban locality.

**Table 2: Number of households with an elderly person who is currently in need of long-term care**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Manado</th>
<th>Tahuna</th>
<th>Tomohon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=75</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=25)</td>
<td>(N=25)</td>
<td>(N=25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>53% (40)</td>
<td>44% (11)</td>
<td>64% (16)</td>
<td>52% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>47% (35)</td>
<td>56% (14)</td>
<td>36% (9)</td>
<td>48% (12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*source: field research PvE*

Therefore, long-term care is not an uncommon and infrequent phenomenon in elder care in this urban environment. Beside other constraints of daily life in a town, a majority of these households have to bear this burden of long-term care and perform it in a mostly informal way that is without support or advice of professional caregivers. We may thus conclude that long-term care belongs for the most part to the lay realm of the family or household.

**Socio-demographic characteristics of long-term care receivers**

The urban elderly who are in need of long-term care (N=40) are characterised as follows (van Eeuwijk 2003b: 331). The average age was 69 years. There was about an equal number of men and women, but three times as many widows as widowers. The respondents’ religious and ethnic affiliation reflects the overall distribution in the respective towns. In terms of economic means, 15 aged persons had less than about 50.000 Rupiah to spend per week, and six elderly had no money of their own and fully depended on their family or other relatives. 12 people had more than 50.000 Rupiah and seven even more than 100.000 Rupiah per week to spend.

**Health profile of ill urban elderly**

The health profile of the ill elderly reflects the predominance of progressing chronic illnesses such as vision problems and rheumatism (see Table 3): They gradually lead the sufferer into long-term care. These disturbing and hindering illnesses have indeed a strong impact on mobility.

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6 The lower age limit for inclusion in the study was 60 years. This corresponds with the official definition by the Indonesian Department of Health of orang lansia (an acronym for orang lanjut usia, ‘people of advanced age’) (van Eeuwijk 2003c).

7 1 US$ is equivalent to 9.500 Rupiah (in 2001/2).
and agility, autonomy and independence as well as on individual activity of the individual elderly and they lead finally to a gradual loss of these important urban necessities (van Eeuwijk 2003b, 2003c). With diminishing vision and limited body movement, for instance, caused by painful rheumatism or post-stroke paralysis, most activities of daily living (ADL) cannot be performed any longer in a proper way and have to be carried out more and more by other persons: A first level of dependence is reached.

**TABLE 3: Kind of illness leading to long-term care for ill elderly (multiple mentioning)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illness</th>
<th>Total N=40</th>
<th>MANADO N=11</th>
<th>Tahuna N=16</th>
<th>Tomohon N=13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eye complaints, vision problems</td>
<td>23 (57%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheumatism</td>
<td>17 (42%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastritis, stomach troubles</td>
<td>10 (25%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronchial asthma</td>
<td>8 (20%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypertension</td>
<td>7 (17%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migraine</td>
<td>7 (17%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-stroke paralysis</td>
<td>6 (15%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diabetes and obesity</td>
<td>6 (15%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental problems</td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical weakness</td>
<td>3 (7%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic cough</td>
<td>3 (7%)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other health disorders</td>
<td>7 (17%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: field research PvE

Other degenerating illnesses such as hypertension, diabetes or gastritis are less bodily impeding, but demand for a strict care regime leading, for instance, to a change in nutritional behaviour and drug compliance. Chronic illnesses and infectious diseases with chronification are to a great extent responsible that elderly become dependent on long-term care (see Table 3) and by this increasing at the same time their social and economic dependencies. Besides, we may not forget that most elderly in our sample (32 of 40 ill elderly) suffer from co-morbidity (i.e. suffering from more than one illness): Apart from chronic illnesses, they also suffer regularly from ‘common’ acute infectious
diseases such as malaria, dengue fever and diarrhoeal diseases.\(^8\)

**Caregiver arrangements**

The most frequent caregiver type in our study sample is a combination consisting of a wife (of a male elderly) and a child (see Table 4). A child alone – in most cases a female one – takes care of the elderly in 15 households, and the wife alone provides intensive care in 10 cases; the arrangement of husband and (female) child is also found in nine cases (see Table 4). Other caregiver types encompass other kin members such a sister, grandchildren or daughter-in-law even though not very frequently found (see Table 4). This is due to the fact that long-term care is considered to be a very intimate process, and hence a certain social closeness is a prerequisite for effective long-term care.

**TABLE 4: Types of caregivers (per household with chronically ill elderly) providing main long-term care**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Caregiver</th>
<th>Total (N=75)</th>
<th>Manado (N=25)</th>
<th>Tahuna (N=25)</th>
<th>Tomohon (N=25)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wife + child</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband + child</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child + grandchild</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child + daughter-in-law</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child + sister</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife + sister</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister-in-law</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housemaid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child + housemaid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandchild + housemaid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife + child + grandchild</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife + child + niece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No caregiver at all</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: field research PvE

Hardly ever husbands alone take care of their own wife. Non-kin persons who are paid for their services such as a housemaid or a nurse are rather seldom until now but it may become a real

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\(^8\) This phenomenon is called the ‘double burden of disease’ (van Eeuwijk 2003b, 2003c). Gwatkin, Guillot and Heuveline (1999) consider this ‘double health challenge’ a distinct characteristic of impoverished segments of a population.
option for the future particularly for better-off elderly people. Six cases do not have any caregiver due to deliberate alienation or exclusion from their families, or due to natural loss of all family members. These particular elderly had to cope alone with this situation.

In most households (69 per cent), a combination of inter- and intragenerational long-term care support (i.e. wife or husband and child) has become a new and frequent pattern of care giving (see Table 4). Many Minahasa and Sangihe elderly underline the normative adat customs by emphasising that until recently the child as symbol of filial piety and bearer of care obligations had the important role as single important caregiver; but today most elderly persons prefer to rely on both the children as well as on a member of the same age group when in need of long-term care. Therefore, we come across the fact that healthy elderly people become increasingly caregivers for frail elderly of their same age (e.g. an elderly wife takes care of her old ill husband). A second matter concerns an obviously gendered long-term care: As Table 4 shows, the majority of the caregivers are female (including the ‘child’). We may thus conclude that long-term care does not only form a part of the realm of the household, but particularly also of the sphere of the women, no matter whether old or young.

Provided activities in long-term care

Several main activities of provided long-term care that are carried out by the above listed caregivers can be classified as common activities of daily living (ADL) such as washing clothes, dressing and bathing the elderly and giving him/her food (see Table 5). For elderly people in need of long-term care these activities are of particular vital importance because it guarantees hygiene and cleanliness as well as bodily strengths of the weak elderly. Without maintaining these routine tasks by the caregivers, human ageing would become a process without dignity and hope.

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9 The Indonesian adat means unwritten and mostly not codified rules, precepts, customs, and rules of conduct. Its broad scope includes local law as well as traditional ritual and ceremony (van Eeuwijk 1999: 6). According to Minahasa adat, parents’ care obligations among siblings have to be ideally performed in a rotational cycle (paayoon) starting with the eldest married child.
TABLE 5: Main activities of long-term care (per household with at least one elderly person) provided by caregivers (multiple mentioning)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Activities of Long-Term Care</th>
<th>Total N=150</th>
<th>MANADO (N=50)</th>
<th>Tahuna (N=50)</th>
<th>Tomohon (N=50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To wash clothes</td>
<td>110 (73%)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To give drugs</td>
<td>106 (71%)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To give food and drink</td>
<td>103 (69%)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To console and give recreation</td>
<td>98 (65%)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To massage the body</td>
<td>84 (56%)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To dress or change clothes</td>
<td>62 (41%)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To accompany to toilet</td>
<td>59 (39%)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To bath the elderly</td>
<td>58 (38%)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To put the elderly to bed</td>
<td>42 (28%)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: field research PvE

Certain practices are directly interconnected with the illness episode, such as giving drugs and providing a massage\(^{10}\), and may not become a routine activity when the elderly has already recovered; but during long-term care, for instance, giving drugs is very crucial and manifests the moral responsibility of caregivers towards the recipients of care. Furthermore, the immaterial psychological activity of consoling and giving recreation is a very essential one, and 65 per cent of the caregivers are willing to provide this important emotional and mental support that has a great impact on perceived ‘quality of care’ and social inclusion. Table 5 also shows the following pattern: The more intimate the activity is (e.g. going to the toilet or bathing), the less frequent the suffering elderly allows his/her caregivers to carry out this task. Culture-specific notions on gender-related behaviour and bodily proximity play an essential role. The elderly person tries to maintain the ability to carry out these very personal actions on his/her own as long as possible.

**Caregivers and the burden of long-term care**

The great majority of caregivers are willing to provide even intensive, stressful and laborious long-term care for their elderly family and kin members as Table 5 and the below-mentioned case reveal.

**The case of Ibu T., 71 years, Minahasa, Catholic, widow, hemiplegic:**

Ibu T. had already suffered two heart attacks in one year. After the second attack, her son brought her to the Catholic hospital but she was sent home after only two weeks. After long disputes and harsh negotiations her three children had decided that the oldest child, her son, would

\(^{10}\) Body massage is a very popular preventive and curative practice in Indonesian households; it is definitely not found among Western routine care activities.
put her up. Her right body part was completely paralysed, from face to foot; she could not speak, eat, urinate nor move her body. *Ibu* T. had led until then a very active and independent life. Now she found herself suddenly struck down on a thin mattress in a dark stuffy and humid corner of the kitchen. Her daughter-in-law took care of her and had become accustomed to keeping an eye on her during her daily housework. In the beginning, *Ibu* T.’s two daughters, her grandchildren, sisters and also neighbours came for short visits, but after some weeks, only her daughter-in-law took care of her. *Ibu* T. was suffering soon from decubitus ulcer, she had water in her legs and arms and showed signs of depression. She could not eat properly nor sit up and speak anymore. On the other side, her daughter-in-law showed physical and mental fatigue and complained about the passiveness of *Ibu* T.’s own three children. Family life and harmony was severely disturbed and under permanent stress. After three months, *Ibu* T. started suffering from heavy pains in her legs and needed professional medications, but her son could not afford it because he had just lost his job. *Ibu* T. convulsing with pain was now crying a whole night long, and only her daughter-in-law could comfort her. After four months, *Ibu* T. had another minor heart attack; three-quarter of her body were now paralysed and she was almost blind and dumb. It was a hopeless battle against the time of dying. Her daughter-in-law remained the only person to bring some water and rice gruel three times per day and to wash away the excretions in the evening. In immense agony *Ibu* T. passed away after five months of extremely severe sufferings. The family felt rather relieved after this long time of continuing tensions and stress.

As a matter of fact, not every long-term care case faces such extreme care situations such as bedridden elderly hemiplegics (see above-mentioned case) or almost disabled and crippled elderly where the full range of long-term care activities (see Table 5) has to be carried out. Only five of 40 elderly (12 per cent) in our sample present such very severe and wretched cases. The scope of provided elder care activities encompasses normally four or five of the listed daily actions (see Table 5). Nevertheless, lay caregivers have generally experienced the following main burdens while carrying out long-term care in their households.

- **Physical burden:** the bodily fatigue of the mainly female caregivers (and often young girls) increases with the temporal length of provided long-term care. Physical efforts such as to dress or undress an elderly or massage his/her body are hard work beside daily routine work. In short, long-term care keeps caregivers running and busy in an already exhausting everyday life.

- **Economic burden:** many caregivers complain about rising financial costs due to long-term care. This may include food (often special nutrition) and clothes, costs for medication and rehabilitation tools, consumables (e.g. cigarettes) and not to forget the loss of income because of staying at home. Sometimes, available housing space has to be expanded because of an additional person in the house.

- **Social burden:** there are interpersonal tensions not only between caregiver and recipient of care due to divergent expectations and hopes, but also among the caregivers’ social unit such as family, household members and relatives as a result from failing renegotiations about distribution of obligations. Moreover, the person in need of long-term care may be considered
as a foreign body and not accepted by some family members. Sometimes clashes arise between children and idle children-in-law, but also between a caring housewife and passive males (such as husband or son), or moral pressure of relatives on caregivers result in social stress through accusations and rumours.

- **Psychological burden:** some caregivers are not up to maintaining long-term care when they take care of elderly with rapidly degenerating health condition. Hopelessness, despair, anger, and the feeling of not being able to cope with these sufferings of the elderly often result from it. But also pressure from other kinsmen to be responsible for the current health condition of the elderly makes caregivers mentally frail and unconfident.

- **Infrastructural burden:** housing space in a crowded city is usually restricted. New housing arrangements and dispositions have to be made for an elderly person who needs long-term care to guarantee his/her intimacy, reclusiveness, and a certain degree of autonomy. Sometimes, modifications in the house have to be made such as toilet facilities for disabled people, ropes or grab handles in the house, or walls for a new compartment. In short, already narrow urban housing space is further constricted, and that creates usually tensions between family members.

In fact, lay caregivers in our sample question their competence and capability to care for an elderly sufferer. In most cases, family caregivers did not get any training on how to carry out this manifold task of long-term care. Moreover, numerous long-term care cases have happened all of a sudden and thus without any preparation of all involved parties. Many caregivers consider particular fields as ‘spheres of shortcomings’ due to lack of professional knowledge about, for instance, nutritional and dietary matters, physiotherapeutic exercises, hygienic and sanitary measures, use of rehabilitation tools, and appropriate medication. These deficits in long-term care quality reduce the degree of caregivers’ competence and lead in many cases to self-doubts on their side. Lay caregivers are thus under strong moral pressure to provide care as satisfactorily as possible and to assume responsibility towards both the related social group as well as the health professionals.

As a result of the above-mentioned deficits in lay long-term care and of rather low attendance of biomedicine in this domain of care – not cure! – in Indonesia, ”the urban elderly hope for an increasing commitment on the part of biomedicine to their persistent chronic illnesses“ (van Eeuwijk 2003c: 15). Suffering elderly in North Sulawesi have expressed their high hopes for illness recovery and mitigation of their chronic ailments due to an increased attention of biomedicine towards long-term care concerns. Indeed, as Lloyd-Sherlock (2002) shows, many health planers consider biomedical health services for older people as expensive and complex interventions, but for many chronic diseases affordable and satisfactory treatments are actually available and acceptable. For example, eye impairment of most elderly people in our sample may be cured in a cheap and efficient way (e.g. ambulant ophthalmic surgery) – or they would be simply provided with a pair of glasses. Moreover, some chronic illnesses of elderly people in North Sulawesi may be preventable in an earlier stage if biomedical services would provide information about adequate treatments for both recipients of care as well as caregivers and facili-
tate access to it. But we should not succumb to the cosy assumption that biomedicine will fully replace existing social, economic and psychological lay care of elderly in North Sulawesi, but rather may act as proactive complementary health provider.

**Old-age vulnerability and long-term care**

When focusing on the term ‘vulnerability’, I agree with the following conceptual definition of Blum, McNeely and Nonnemaker (2002: 28): “[We] refer to ‘vulnerability’ as an interactive process between the social contexts in which a young person lives and a set of underlying factors, that, when present, place the young person ‘at risk’ for negative outcomes.” This definition advances Chambers’ basic concept of ‘vulnerability’ (1989: 1) by combining a negative event in someone’s environment with his capability to cope with it (or even not). Watts and Bohle (1993) further elaborate the vulnerability model that is based on the initial notion of ‘risk’; they define ‘vulnerability’ in terms of exposure to strains or crises, of capacity to cope with adversity, and of potentiality of suffering serious consequences in an event of a crisis and recover from it (Watts and Bohle 1993: 118). This view rests upon the notion that someone may be exposed to an unforeseen event, and that he has to react on it and may develop the possibility of a slow recovery with internal or external support.

Moser (1998: 3), when describing ‘vulnerability’, talks of insecurity and sensitivity that encompasses also resilience and responsiveness to certain negative changes: Not everybody is affected by a negative event in the same way and to the same degree, and some will cope with these conditions and reactivate resources in a positive way, while others will not.

When talking about urban elderly in North Sulawesi, I understand the term ‘old-age vulnerability’ in the context of long-term care as being exposed to uncertain outcomes of long-term care, that is to failing long-term care. Particularly vulnerable elderly urban Indonesians suffering from chronic illnesses and who are in need of long-term care may be described as individuals who may not be provided with adequate and appropriate long-term care, who share the risk of crisis in long-term care provision, and who may not recover from this crisis.

According to our research findings, the scope of vulnerability to failing long-term care regarding ill elderly people in urban North Sulawesi is centred on the following domains.

**Marital Status**

Unmarried elderly people are vulnerable to failing long-term care due to the fact that they do not have children, children-in-law and grandchildren to provide long-term care: They are simply lacking the entire support network of the spouse’s family. Unmarried women are very much vulnerable to social exclusion and destitution by not complying with cultural norms (adat) thus resulting in unreliable long-term care because of dependence on insecure intragenerational and mostly non-kin support.
Older women are more vulnerable to failing long-term care than elderly men due to their limited social power in bargaining the conditions for long-term care strategies (especially in patrilineal and bilineal societies) and by virtue of having few own material resources and human capital (e.g. education, information, knowledge). Elderly widows are most exposed to failing long-term care because of relatively unequal status in their family and among their spouse’s kin, and they do not feel empowered to challenge their caregivers. Many older widowers are strongly encouraged by family and kin members to remarry a, whenever possible, younger woman.

Poor elderly people (women and men) are vulnerable regarding failing long-term care in terms of having only small financial resources and material assets in a mostly impoverished environment that does not allow appropriate long-term care. They don’t feel in a position of power to ask for better (and mostly more expensive) quality of long-term care from their caregivers, and access to professional health support such as needed medication, physiotherapy, check-up or diet is not given due to lack of financial means. Bargaining power of poor elderly people is weak, as they cannot participate in relationship of reciprocity: They lack the resources and assets to restore and compensate financial burdens of caregivers.
Social capital12
Elderly people (women and men) with a low degree of trust, reciprocity, information, and cooperation associated with social networks are more vulnerable than elderly with high social capital (e.g. performing mutual aid, collective actions, or solidarity support). Elderly who don’t develop bridging and bonding networks during their lifetime are likely to be excluded or omitted from existing informal vertical and horizontal social networks providing long-term care for them (such as family, relatives, neighbourhood, associations, or age groups).

Caregivers
Elderly people (women and men) suffering from long persisting chronic and multiple health disorders are likely to be vulnerable to diminishing appropriate long-term care. Caregivers tend to reduce their long-term care efforts with increasing health deterioration of the elderly sufferer in connection with temporal length due to growing physical, economic, social, and psychological burden. With increasing severeness and duration of chronic illness frail recipients of care become more dependent on caregivers, and accordingly long-term care becomes more uncertain and unreliable due to rising burdens for caregivers.

Conclusions
Sources of old-age vulnerability of failing long-term care encompass not only structural conditions (such as marital status) and physical and material circumstances (for instance, illness severeness and economic hardships), but also social realities such as gender and social capital. We may conclude that vulnerability regarding long-term care is based both on structural facts as well as on notions, attitudes, practices and modes of behaviour that may lead to increased or diminished vulnerability in old-age.

The most vulnerable elder group or elderly individuals regarding failing adequate and appropriate long-term care provision are needy unmarried women and impecunious widows. Where provision and implementation of long-term care for frail elderly is the outcome of pragmatic and harsh negotiation and regular re-negotiation among various family and kin members such as in bilaterally organized Minahasa and Sangihe society, old women, particularly elderly unmarried women and aged widows, share a weak position of bargaining power due to cultural attitudes (adat) regarding gender and marital status. With regard to the ‘triangle of uncertainty’ in North Sulawesi, the Minahasa and Sangihe household is not a ‘safe shelter’ for frail elderly females: Access to health as well as to adequate long-term care decreases with increasing age and according to their sex (van Eeuwijk 1999, 2003a).

In all but a tiny fraction of cases, long-term care and its activities are provided and performed in the realm of the family and household that is in the lay sector. In North Sulawesi, formal state-run or private institutions provide only a very few professional long-term care options. Women

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12 Putnam (1995) describes ‘social capital’ as parts of social organisations such as networks, norms or social trust, that enable coordination and cooperation among people for mutual benefit.
adults and adolescents) are undoubtedly the main caregivers and thus the immediate bearers of most long-term care related burdens. This fact makes caregivers vulnerable to manifold constraints that may lead to failing long-term care. In short: recipients of care are vulnerable due to the vulnerability of their caregivers. This correlation between vulnerability of recipients of care and vulnerability of caregivers is seldom addressed in literature on elder care.

The current context of a dynamic, but harsh urban environment shapes long-term care and its forms and degrees of vulnerability. Social and economic constraints are present in caregivers’ burdens, in provided long-term care activities as well as in bargaining power of frail elderly. Monetized city life makes long-term care a commodity and therefore impecunious elderly vulnerable to failing long-term care because of lack of financial bargaining power: Respect and reciprocity are interrelated in commoditized urban life. With rapidly changing social, economic and physical environment in urban areas of North Sulawesi resulting in a ‘triangle of uncertainty’ old-age vulnerability is increasingly influenced by the monetary abilities of both recipients of care as well as caregivers.

But urban environment creates also new forms of long-term care which may lead to a more resource and resilience oriented perspective in ‘old-age vulnerability’ discussion thus counterbalancing the frailty of elderly people facing long-term care (Blum, McNeely and Nonnemaker 2002: 28). As a matter of fact, resources of elderly (as receiver of long-term care) are not yet fully recognized and utilized by their caregivers and taken into consideration. Vulnerability of failing long-term care can be reduced by, for instance, supporting salutogenetic behaviour, inspiring abilities, activating ‘ageing spiritedness’, and networking in social matters. In the latter case, intragenerational support will gain importance as a future resource in old-age vulnerability: Elderly individuals or groups support other old individuals who are in need of long-term care – a phenomenon that has been rarely investigated. We have met this ‘elderly help elderly’ situation in urban areas of North Sulawesi where non-kin relation in elderly care becomes more and more essential. In times of changing support schemes, this ‘same age group’ network may reduce old-age vulnerability by mobilizing resources of the elderly as caregiver.

Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Romana Büchel, Annuska Derks, Susanne Loosli and Sue Thüler for the perfect organisation of the Workshop ‘Social Security in Southeast Asia’ in Berne in November 2004. Many thanks go to the Institute of Ethnology (University of Berne) that has facilitated the realisation of this Workshop. I am indebted to Romana Büchel for her skilful editing of this paper.
References


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List of plates
Plate 1: An obese elderly lady with diabetes and hypertension is still carrying out daily work in her household (Tahuna).

Plate 2: Suffering from severe rheumatism, arthritis and visual impairment, this lady (at the right side, with her granddaughter and a neighbour) just manages to guard her daughter’s kiosk (Tomohon).

Plate 3: For weeks and months, this hemiplegic elderly lady (with water in her joints) is lying immobile on her mattress (Tomohon). She is not the described widow in the case study.

Plate 4: In a market gardening project: life is work for this elderly widow who suffers from asthma, rheumatism and hearing impairment (Tahuna).

Plate 5: Some income generating activities of an elderly couple (Manado): the husband (suffering from rheumatism and hypertension) works as tailor, and his wife sells plantains.
"And I ended up in Switzerland"

Biographies of Indonesian Migrant Women

Anna Bally

Some journeys had destinations of which the traveler was unaware...

(R. Hubank 2002: North, 208)

"And I ended up in Switzerland": This statement, which I chose out of a biographical interview with an Indonesian migrant woman, might seem rather vague. I found this quotation more and more apt though in describing some sort of emotional conclusion made by many of the migrants I spoke with. Indonesian women stranding here on this strange island called Switzerland in their mother-tongue – how did this come about? At first sight, "ending up in Switzerland" might sound like coming to Switzerland by pure chance or personal destiny but not really consciously or on purpose. This woman whom I met twice spoke at great length about her childhood and youth in Indonesia (Riau), about her first years of adulthood in Singapore and her difficult marriage and migration experiences. When she finally enunciated the above cited words, the tone of her voice seemed to convey the ambivalent quality of her emotional journey from curiosity and ambition to fearful despair and back again to hope and cautious optimism.

No (or little) research attention has been focused so far on these emotional journeys of so-called "marriage migrants" from Indonesian destinations to Europe, even though there is some research with similar topics and methodology on migrants from other Southeast Asian to European countries (cp. Lauser 2004, on Philippine marriage migrants to Germany). One of the central questions of my ongoing Ph.D. research project could be stated as follows: Which inner motivations in relation to which external conditions led to these adventurous journeys? From which places did the women start and at which places did they "end up"? According to recent notions of places as socially constructed, gendered and contingent sites, home as a starting point of migration as well as abroad as its destination can be analyzed as complex constructions of social-political and idiosyncratic meaning experienced through everyday practice. As I am most interested in the migrants' own constructions and interpretations of their migration experience, I would like to add a more metaphorical quality to the concept of place in using it as an image of starting points and destinations, related to individual life histories, fantasies and identifications. Like Silvey, who conducted research in South Sulawesi, I am also interested in understanding how individual interpretations of women's sexual morality interact with local, household and national gender discourses to shape mobility decisions and experiences in a changing economic context" (Silvey 2000: 145).

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1 This interview was – untypically - conducted in English and not in German or Indonesian or a mixture of all three languages.
In the late 1980s I stayed in Indonesia for about two years doing field research in a small town in the highlands of southwest Sumatra. Today, the various insights resulting from this project (cp. Marschall 1995), allow me to identify elements of Indonesian national discourse on marriage, morality and gender roles in the Indonesian women migrants narratives. Even if it is impossible to conceive of Indonesia as a culturally homogeneous place of origin, we cannot deny that there are shared discourses, and traditions. In other words, while one cannot really speak of a common origin, there is at the same time a perception of something like common “roots”. Discursive elements of a collective quality may then be related to change and persistence of individual concepts in the women’s construction of their migration biographies.

Presently I am working at eight biographical case studies of Indonesian women living in Switzerland. With a ninth woman I am engaged in a long-term psychoanalytically oriented case study. My focus lies on the particularities of each migration biography, in consideration of conscious and unconscious strategies and identifications. With each of these women I try to (re-)construct her subjective narrative related to migration. In the interviews they are invited to look back as well as ahead. The cases are analyzed as exemplary patterns of marriage migration. Special attention is concentrated on the phase from first meeting to finally marrying a Swiss man. The main part of the empirical data comprises interview transcripts / protocols of the intensive long term case history (around 50 meetings over a period of two years) and of biographical interviews with eight women. Up to now I met these eight women once or twice, but I will meet them again for follow-up interviews one year later. In using different methodological approaches, that is long-term versus short-term and follow-up interviews, the deepened knowledge about psychodynamic and social processes shall be combined with a "thick description" of the diversity and situatedness of individual migration experiences.

Being in the middle of my Ph.D. project, research results cannot be described in more detail yet. This article shall situate tentative findings from one of the interviews within a rough overview on Indonesian migration and mobility in general, as well as on migration of Indonesians to Europe and Switzerland. I will first begin with some figures that may embed the individual life histories of Indonesian migrant women in Switzerland within a larger context. I will then describe the research sample and close this article with a glimpse of one of the biographical interviews.

The theoretical and methodological focus of my research project lies on the “inner” experience of migration and on migrants as interpretative subjects of their own mobility. I also include aspects of social and economic structure, (post)colonial history, citizenship and population studies to situate the individual migration projects. Even if one is not inclined to explain individual mobility exclusively according to economic rationalities, data for example on the patterns and directions of migration flows are helpful to better understand individual agency as related to economic and cultural change.

Today, so-called labour migrants, or more precisely, contract workers, account for the majority of Indonesian migration movement. This nation of more than 230 million people (est. 2000) is a quintessential labour surplus nation, and one of the world's major sources of unskilled international migrant workers (together with Mexico and the Philippines). According to Hugo, a social
geographer from Australia, "the legal labour migration has a number of distinctive characteristics. It is overwhelmingly unskilled and, (…) it is dominated by women. These women are predominantly employed as domestic workers, with particularly large numbers deployed in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and Hong Kong" (Hugo 2002: 2) Between 1995 and 1999 the recorded average annual labour migration from Indonesia comprises 288'000 men and women, the main destinations being Malaysia and the Gulf region (IOM 2003). "Even in Malaysia, where males have traditionally dominated labour migration (...), females now outnumber males among official overseas migrant workers, although males still dominate the larger numerically undocumented workers” (Hugo 2000: 108).

During the last decade, Indonesia has faced disruptive economic and political transitions, which led to a growing sense of insecurity for the majority of Indonesian citizens. This radical change led to some seemingly contradicting effects thereby "differentiating women's and men's crisis-era mobility pressures and experiences" (Silvey 2000: 143). Silvey states that in her research area "in the Makassar Industrial Zone (...) in Sulawesi, women migrants faced more intense pressures to return to their villages of origin, while male migrants were encouraged to remain in the zone" (ibid.). The Makassar Industrial Zone at the same time became "a stigmatized place where they believe prostitution has grown more widespread over time" (ibid.).

But at the same time we have recent research that documents a "feminization" of worldwide transnational labour migration (cp. Lutz/Morokvasic-Müller 2002). In Indonesia too there is a growing number of girls and women every year who do not return to but rather leave their villages of origin for a workplace in another country. Female workforce seems to be "called back" or "sent out" according to complex intersecting reasons and local conditions.

Perhaps indirectly due to the 1997 financial and economic crisis, international labour migration is receiving an unprecedented amount of government attention. This may be related to the fact that the crisis has drawn greater attention to the remittances brought in by migrant workers. Hugo (2002: 5) states that:

International migration will increase in significance in Indonesia over the next decade. The continuing effects of the economic downturn after 1997 and the associated devaluation of Indonesian currency has made working overseas an even more attractive proposition to Indonesians. This is being recognized by the government, which is becoming more involved in deploying workers in other countries with the objective of increasing foreign exchange earnings, improving the skills of its workers, and reducing unemployment and underemployment at home. While several million Indonesians have benefited, especially in a financial sense, from international labor migration, many others have been exploited and suffered abuse because of the lack of simplicity and high formal and informal costs of movement, inadequate preparation, and a lack of support in destination countries."

Estimations of remittances sent to Indonesia by Indonesian migrant workers abroad range from 1.29 billions to almost 2 billions of US dollars per year for the period of 1999-2002 (IOM 2003). A considerable part of these estimated remittances was brought in by women. These women often work under precarious conditions – first of all in Saudi Arabia. They work as domestic servants, domestic work being an area where labour legislation does not even considers work as subject to labour law protection. "The 1988 and 1993 'Broad Outlines of State Policies' (Garis-
garis Besar Haluan Negara: GBNH) refer to women as *sumber (daya) insani* (living resources) who will contribute to development in line with their essential nature” (Wagemann 2000: 312). So, on the one hand, ideas on the morality and nature of women are adaptable to a changing world when it seems necessary to the different social actors, male or female. On the other hand, strict moral rules are applied by communities and political actors in a selective way to control women and to reserve employment possibilities for the male, as shown in the example of domestic work migration to and from the Makassar Industrial Zone.

As already stated above contract workers main destinations outside Indonesia are Malaysia, Singapore and Hongkong and the Gulf states. If we now focus on more general migration patterns, including not only contract workers, but also more permanent forms of migration, what do we see here regarding favorite destinations?

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2,715</td>
<td>N.Z. Census of 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>47,158</td>
<td>ABS 2001 Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>US Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bureau Current Pcp. Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada*</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10,455</td>
<td>Migration Policy Institute 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>16,400</td>
<td>OECD, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>OECD, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>168,000</td>
<td>OECD, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>12,295</td>
<td>Federal Statistical Office Migration Policy Institute 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland*</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>Swiss Census 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BFS Neuchâtel 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hugo 2002, 1) * Countries appended by author

Australia and the US are the most favorite destinations for Indonesians outside Europe. “The trajectory of growth of the Indonesia-born population of Australia (…) shows a doubling in the last decade (…) The flight of many Indonesians of Chinese origin following the crisis has been a factor in this movement” (Hugo 2000, 108). In Europe, the Netherlands as the former colonizer of the Indonesian archipelago, not surprisingly show by far the biggest population of Indonesian origin. Inflow of Indonesians to the Netherlands has decreased since the 1970s due to legal restrictions of immigration, but is still higher than for example to neighbouring Germany. There is, however, not much recent research on the topic of migration and integration of the Dutch population with Indonesian origin (cp. Willems 2002). The Indonesian population is reputed to be fully integrated. This is reflected in the statistical classification of this population. In the Nether-
lands "persons with a Japanese and Indonesian background are classified as 'western' on the basis of their social and economic position in Dutch society" (Alders 2001, 3).

Switzerland is not such a historically self-evident destination as the Netherlands; neither is it an "easy" destination for Indonesian immigrants. Swiss immigration law is very restrictive and Indonesian citizen can reside in Switzerland almost exclusively as husbands or wives of Swiss citizen. Many of them go through the experience of a devaluation of their education and of their professional and social status. We also do not have any informal sector worth mentioning in Switzerland. There are few "side streets" for migrants, and a lot of obstruction and discrimination. Indonesian migrants, of course, share most of these problems with migrants from other countries, who don't speak German or French fluently. Nonetheless, a small but growing group of people with Indonesian origin is living in this country. From the 1990s the increase of Indonesian immigrants has become significantly higher for women than for men. In the year 2000 there were 1,485 female and 925 male living in Switzerland whose citizenship at time of birth was Indonesian (BfS Neuchatel 2004). The increase of the female Indonesian population in Switzerland since about ten years is probably not (only) linked with crisis and social insecurity in Indonesia; more likely it has to do with mobility and communication possibilities and with social change. From the heterogeneity of the Indonesian population in Switzerland we must assume that there are growing chances to meet Swiss travellers, anthropologists or business people almost anyplace in Indonesia.

Indonesian migrant women quite often refer to being part of the group of "Asian people" in Switzerland. As I was told many times, there is a sense of belonging to a somehow bigger Asian community of people with similar behaviour, sense of humour and cooking. However, the feeling or wish to belong to this imagined Asian migrant community within Switzerland is dependent on situative factors. There also can be emotional trouble linked to the possibility of being wrongly identified as an Asian sex worker or a "mail-ordered-bride". As one of my informants puts it: "We Indonesians are usually clothed more decently, a little bit more elegant. You can tell us apart from Thai women." Stereotypes and phantasies which associate Asian (mail-ordered) brides with night club dancers and prostitutes are widespread. Probably every woman of Asian looks has to cope with these stereotyping social constructions and/or racist treatment. Although my research focuses on women only, it can be assumed that men face stereotyping patterns too. Their positions might be different regarding the intersections of the discourses, though.

An Indonesian women falling in love with or accepting the courtship of a white man usually has to go through the task of fighting against the suspicion of bad sexual morality at two places, provided that she does not want to break with her family. In Indonesia there is a contemptuous discourse on the loose or bad sexual morals of white people. White tourists are notorious for being clothed indecently, for consuming alcohol and drugs, and for being in search of sexual adventures without any sense of responsibility. An Indonesian woman therefore has to defend and prove her own as well as her future husband’s virtue if she falls for a Westerner. Together they have to convince her family that he is not a bad person although he is white. After that, the experience of being confronted with seemingly similar stereotypes is awaiting them in their new
home if they migrate to Switzerland. These somehow corresponding discourses speak of contempt or dread and at the same time of fascination, curiosity and desire. Here, we could follow the hypothesis of a structural connection between different forms of female mobility (marriage-migration or love-migration, labour migration, trafficking) and hegemonic patriarchal discourse on gender roles (cp. Kappeler 2003). In accordance with this hypothesis, hegemonic post-colonial discourse, which intersects hegemonic patriarchal discourse, forms a structurally related common ground of gendered Southeast-Asian migration. These thoughts will be picked up again when discussing one of the interviews.

Before coming to this interview I will first briefly outline the research sample. The nine women were selected out of a sample of twenty women who answered a letter which I sent to 80 women married to a Swiss. I chose these 80 women from a list of more than 800 addresses of Indonesian-Swiss couples / families, kindly given to me by the Indonesian Embassy in Berne. The group of nine women do not constitute a random sample as one can see from the description of the procedure. When choosing this group I looked for maximum variance regarding the following criteria: age, time of arrival in Switzerland, marital status, motherhood / without children, education, work, ethnicity, religion, region of origin in Indonesia, place of residence in Switzerland (urban or rural area), and the socio-economic situation.

The nine women of my sample are between 27 and 46 years old. They stem from families with an average number of more than five children and they tend to be the younger ones in their families. They come from Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Riau and Bali, two of them refer to themselves as being of "Chinese origin". Four of the women are Muslim, four are Catholic and one is a Protestant. The decision to marry a Swiss took them between one and five years. They have lived in Switzerland between one and 12 years. One of the informants was brought to Switzerland when she was a small child. Today she is 25 years old, married to a Swiss and mother of one child. Two of the women remarried a Swiss after they got a divorce from their first husband. Four of the nine women do not (yet) have children (belum punya anak) out of different reasons, though. Every woman had at least some village-to-town or intra-insular migration experience, three of them had travelled to or lived in other countries before settling down in Switzerland. Even though the population with Indonesian origin in Switzerland has been qualified as "mostly un-educated" by a member of the local Indonesian embassy, census data suggests that the level of education and professional training is higher than in Indonesia on the average (BFS Neuchatel 2004). This certainly is the case regarding my small sample of which only one woman went to school for just five years. All the other women finished school (tamat SMA) and have different sorts of professional training from university degrees to vocational training either absolved in Indonesia, Switzerland or a third country.

I will now come to one of my case studies. Yati is one of the women of my sample, who comes from a neither poor nor wealthy family background. I chose Yati’s migration history because her case seemed to be so ”ordinary” at first sight. However, it was the encounter with Yati and her narrative which triggered the following thoughts on a psycho-economy of migration and a critical reflection of common categorization of migrants.
At the second floor of a chalet-like house, at a rather remote place somewhere in the Swiss Alps, I was welcomed by a delicate young woman, highly advanced in pregnancy. She was ready to talk about her life and stated at the beginning that she too had to do fieldwork during the years of her studies. Yati is 27 years old and comes from Sulawesi, where she grew up in a village as the youngest of three children. Both parents were teachers and she and her older sister went to university in town to become teachers as well. This meant a considerable financial burden for their parents over many years. After finishing her studies Yati was waiting for her already assured permanent employment and worked on a temporary basis as an English teacher for civil servants. In the spring of 1999 she took the ferry boat to visit her uncle. On this ferry boat Yati met a white tourist. Apparently there are not so many tourists in this region of Sulawesi. Like all the other young Indonesians, Yati was eager to practise her English. Patrick was on a journey round the world and Sulawesi was his last destination.

Yati didn’t let me know a lot about getting closer or becoming lovers. I didn’t expect her to, since this was our first conversation. At first, her parents were opposed to the idea of their daughter marrying a foreigner. But as Patrick agreed to convert to Islam and since he was such a friendly and disarming person, they finally gave the couple their blessings. The marriage took place one and a half years later in Switzerland. Yati is pregnant now with their second child and, at least to me, seemed happy.

I admit this might be a projective impression. I experienced the ability and social norm to look happy and hide difficult feelings many times during field research in Indonesia. This norm to save face and not to burden other people with personal worries does not only apply towards strangers, but also towards parents and partners. But nevertheless, Yati talks rather convincingly about strategies to overcome (and not to just hide) sad feelings. She is actively engaged in the community of neighbors, and she has become a member of the local national costume group. When she gets homesick or feels lonely, she practices her religion, calls home or visits some Indonesian friends in the lowlands.

Yati recalls that, with a considerable bureaucratic delay, her teacher's diploma from Indonesia was finally sent to her three months after getting married. Yati comments: "The head teacher was still waiting for me [to take my job as a teacher in Indonesia]. He said: You can send a letter and say that you will be back within a year. I will be waiting for you!" Yati repeatedly refers to the very difficult decision she had to make. From her point of view there was a lot to be said against marrying at this particular time in her life. "If you have a good education, the most important thing for us is to work and not to settle down with a family." A good education is regarded as a privilege for most Indonesians. This leads to a sense of responsibility, which includes the wish to return what was given to them in the first place. This sense of responsibility fits well to the norms of female duties or to the sometimes latent obligations of children towards their families. With the respectable profession of a teacher, a woman in Indonesia has the opportunity to remain single for quite a long time without automatically risking her good reputation. With Yati’s family living at a distance in the village she could have led a less controlled life in the city and earn the fruits of her and her parents efforts. As a brilliant and hard-working student supported by a grant,
she even would have had the possibility of joining a students’ exchange program in the United States. Settling down could have been a prospective goal for somewhere along the way. But along came this Swiss tourist.

Patrick invited Yati to Switzerland so she could give a try to living with him in this country: “Yeahh – - for myself, I don’t know, because – we met and fell in love and then I decided to come here, to leave.” Two different perspectives on one difficult decision: What did she come for and what did she leave? During our conversation I got the impression that she is here in her own home now, satisfied with bearing her second child, and at the same time she is still amazed at how she got here.

Well, we know by now that Yati set her professional career aside and followed her husband. *Ikut suami* - following the husband – an accepted expression in Indonesia, quoting at the same time common gender roles, Indonesian nation state ideology, and more personal motives that may be smuggled into this motto without directly revealing them.

Like many binational couples, Yati and Patrick decided to live in Switzerland and visit Indonesia once a year. Yati herself explained this to be a somehow logical consequence of the different economic conditions of the two countries. Yati’s argumentation is widespread and convincing. But there are other argumentations too, be it on the basis of economic reasoning, be it by the strategy of foregrounding emotional motivations and imaginary aims. Living in Switzerland can turn upside down the seemingly simple and logical choice of this country of residence for Indonesian-Swiss couples, at least for some of the women I worked with. One of the women, for example, would rather raise her daughters in Indonesia. She believes Indonesia to be the better place for her daughters to become ”good decent girls” and to prevent them from moral and physical danger. Another woman asks herself why her husband isn’t ready to run the risk of accepting a different, more unscripted lifestyle in Indonesia together with her and their baby son. Two of the women long for their partners to find a job in an Asian or English-speaking country, as they don’t see a professional future for themselves in Switzerland.

It is commonly implied that, on one side, economically motivated migrants would rather follow rational strategies of securing a livelihood and that, on the other side, so-called ”love-migrants” would follow irrational emotions. What if we try for once to use these rules of differentiation when looking at our own strategies of choosing a partner, our own questing for security and emotional balance? In western society of today, instrumentality seems to mark bad taste in manifest combination with love, though. We tend to project the more instrumental aspects of love onto the other. This other may be an underprivileged, "needy" marriage migrant.

Even if the level of education in Switzerland on the average is not lower for women than for men anymore, there still are certain gendered patterns of choosing a partner. Women still tend to choose a partner ranking higher in job-related status and income prospects than themselves. This tendency has surely changed for the privileged, for example students, but not for the entire population. “Love” comprises many different wishes and fantasies at the same time. Even if denied or unconscious, love is never free of instrumental aspects. Economic goals on the other side are
always blended with emotional and symbolic meaning. Making decisions to secure one's livelihood thus might at the same time cover other, namely phantasmagoric goals. We need to allow for the fact that fantasies matter and do have real consequences. Then we can no longer interpret the choice of a place of residence as just a logic, natural and neutral consequence of different economic situations or as based on an irrational concept of romantic love. If we only follow the image of either rational, for example economically motivated decision making on one side, irrational and emotional decision making on the other side, we lose something crucial about the mysterious complexity of human strategies. In analyzing migrant women’s narratives, I will look for these complex and ambivalent entanglements of position / situatedness and desire. Psychic motivations, especially identifications and narcissistic goals are important to better understand women migrants "agency" in all its shades, be it that as a result this kind of agency seems reasonable to the researcher or contradictory and even unintelligible.

As a consequence of these thoughts, categorization of migrants become shakier. As a provisional result, I regard Yati as being a labor migrant, because childbearing, child raising, doing housework and loving is a lot of work. I also look at Yati as a love-migrant, because it somehow seems to be the mystery of “falling in love” that finally led to the decision to leave her country and her career behind. I then focus on Yati as a marriage-migrant. At least Swiss immigration law, but also Indonesian norms and to some lesser degree Swiss norms forced her to marry. Then I am also looking at Yati as an economic migrant, because I believe that she followed her husband out of economic reasons too. Finally, I consider Yati as a woman who deliberately chose to migrate out of curiosity, with many conscious ideas and unconscious phantasies about her future life in a western country. She and her husband followed the deep rooted hegemonic patriarchal and colonial discourse in deciding who has to give up what. So Yati conforms to gendered role patterns in following her husband. At the same time she undermines the norms in living another life and loving another love than she ever expected to. The follow-up interview in the spring of 2005 will show what further changes Yati has gone through. A more specific description of Yati’s life and migration history can be drawn only then. Yati, who also landed up in Switzerland, uses other words for her own (provisional) emotional conclusion: "You can’t have everything you want.” I would interpret these words as her negation of the still vital wish to have access to all the things in which she already invested a lot of emotional, social and financial capital.

References


Internet


Migration and HIV Vulnerability in the Mekong Sub-Region¹

Vasoontara Yiengprugsawan


During the past few decades, HIV/AIDS has increasingly become a major global health concern. In the globalization era where the notion of territoriality of the nation-state has been blurred, there is increasing recognition that population mobility has become one of the factors in the spread of HIV/AIDS. However, public perception that migrants constitute a health threat to their host communities could lead to discrimination and xenophobia, which in turn could bring about a false sense of insecurity to the local population (IOM 2004).

This paper examines the linkages between migration and HIV vulnerability in the Mekong sub-region, comprising Cambodia, Laos People's Democratic Republic (Laos PDR), Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Yunnan Province of China – all of whom share water resources along the Mekong River. The unequal and asymmetric development in the sub-region is creating an unprecedented flow of people, capital, and goods across borders. The Golden Triangle area, which connects Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Yunnan, has long been notorious for the production of opium poppies and is on one of the major trafficking routes. The combination of transnational trade in drugs and trafficking in persons has resulted in many parts of the sub-region in becoming flash points of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

The paper focuses on the specific characteristics of the major migrants and mobile population groups. Mobile people are those who “move from one place to another temporarily, seasonally or permanently for a host of voluntary and/or involuntary reasons” (UNAIDS 2001: 3). Key mobile employment groups in the Mekong sub-region include commercial sex workers, cross-border migrants, seasonal workers, traders, uniformed officials, transport workers, fishermen, and seafarers.

From a public health perspective, the key link between human mobility and the epidemiology of HIV is not the country of origin of the migrant but the conditions of life during the voyage and at the destination (Decosas and Adrien 1997). To understand the spread of HIV in the Mekong sub-region, it is necessary to take into consideration the prevailing sexual values and the patriarchal nature of gender relations in the sub-region. Separation from family and socio-cultural norms, isolation and loneliness, as well as a sense of anonymity that offers more freedom make migrants

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¹ This paper is extracted from my Master’s thesis submitted in 2003 to the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, New York. It comprises a compilation and analysis of relevant academic research, including qualitative and quantitative studies, reports and publications from government ministries as well as international and non-governmental organizations.
more vulnerable to adopting high-risk behaviors such as engaging in unprotected casual or commercial sex, drug use and heavy drinking.

A great majority of the migrant workers in the Mekong sub-region are not registered, resulting in a lack of legal or social protection, which in turn determines their access to health care, legal support, and other forms of assistance. Insufficient language skills and different cultural practices are highlighted as additional obstacles to migrants’ access to health care services (Haour-Knipe and Rector 1996). Such restrictions also make it difficult for HIV prevention and awareness programs dealing with migrants and mobile populations to offer suitable services. Below follow some of the key findings of my thesis.

Lack of access to information and health services including HIV/AIDS preventions

While studies of certain highly mobile groups such as truck drivers, commercial sex workers, and traders have contributed to the understanding of migration as a factor in the spread of HIV/AIDS, more extensive studies are still required. They should include, for example, examining access to reproductive health care and services, available opportunities for HIV preventive interventions, existing barriers to seeking treatment, and cultural biases. Such studies would provide essential information for developing interventions that respond to these issues.

Migrants participatory action methodologies

It is essential that migrant workers be involved in planning and implementing strategies and actions as well as in the development of support networks and services in order to reduce the conditions that increase the vulnerability to HIV. The long-term involvement and commitment of migrant workers is essential since individuals that are stigmatized and fear discrimination are less likely to be willing to share information with people from outside. While peer groups may sometimes foster sexual risk taking, they may also serve as reference groups for appropriate behavior and as important sources of information about condoms and sexuality. The chances of programs increase when the migrants are involved in the research and understand the importance for themselves (Wolffers and Bevers 1998). It is therefore of utmost importance to include migrant and mobile populations into mainstream HIV/AIDS programming at the national level.

HIV-related travel restrictions

HIV-related restrictions to cross national borders can have negative consequences, such as discriminatory denial of entry, deportation without legal procedures, and fostering racism and xenophobia. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have trenchantly argued that no discrimination should be made on the basis of HIV status. The International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, issued in 1998 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and UNAIDS, state: “[T]here is no public health rationale for restricting liberty of movement or choice of residence on the grounds of HIV status. Where states prohibit people living with HIV/AIDS from longer term residence due to concerns about economic costs, states should not single out HIV/AIDS, as opposed to comparable conditions, for such treatment” (UNHCHR and
The creation of a blanket policy of mandatory testing for and deportation of migrants will only create a backlash to the control of HIV/AIDS.

**Intra-regional cooperation in Mekong sub-region**

The development of sustainable responses to the spread of HIV/AIDS requires national governments to act before HIV/AIDS becomes a high social and economic cost. In the sub-region, Thailand and Cambodia have shown that strong government commitment, early and adequately funded and targeted interventions can curtail the growth of the HIV epidemic. Addressing issues related to HIV/AIDS as it concerns mobile populations also involves co-operative action between countries, donors, organizations and local communities. Intra-regional planning and implementation across the sub-region will respond more effectively to the challenges posed by the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Mekong sub-region.

**References**


Annex

The below map demonstrates the geographic setting of the sub-region where six countries are sharing water resources of the Mekong river.


The table shows the estimated number of people living with HIV/AIDS, the percentage of women as well as the adult infection rate in the Mekong sub-region. The table aims at giving a comparison of the current HIV situations among the different countries in the sub-region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Transmission</th>
<th>Estimated number of people with HIV/AIDS</th>
<th>Estimated number of women with HIV (Age 15-49, in %)</th>
<th>Adult infection rate (%)</th>
<th>Estimated adult and children death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Heterosexual</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>51,000 (30%)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Heterosexual</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>&lt;500 (&lt;29.41%)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Heterosexual/Injecting Drug Users</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>97,000 (29.40%)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Heterosexual/Injecting Drug Users</td>
<td>570,000</td>
<td>200,000 (35.09%)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Heterosexual/Injecting Drug Users</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>65,000 (29.54%)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>Heterosexual/Injecting Drug Users</td>
<td>840,000 (all PR China)</td>
<td>190,000 (22.62%)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Percentage of women with HIV/AIDS is calculated on the estimated total number of people living with HIV.
Securing a Livelihood in Hanoi
Sandra Kürten

Introduction
Since the 1960s research on urbanization in Southeast Asia has focused mainly on the development of mega-cities such as Bangkok, Jakarta and Manila. These cities expanded in line with national economic growth. Vietnam’s cities, in contrast, passed through a process of socialist urban development characterized by stages of “de-urbanization” and “zero urban growth”. Moreover the second Indochina War led to a tremendous movement out of the cities. These different pre-conditions make the urbanization process in Hanoi, as experienced in the last decade, a particularly interesting topic for research. Hanoi’s more recent urbanization process is closely linked to the passing of the Doi Moi policy in 1986. The Doi Moi policy set the stage for a transition from planned to market economy and led to socio-economic forces that had a great impact on the lives of the people of Hanoi. This became mostly visible during the 1990s.

Within this paper I will describe how the economic liberalisation has affected the outlook and the livelihoods of people in three different districts of Hanoi. These districts are the Ancient Quarter, the French Colonial Quarter as well as the Squatter Area of Chuong Duong. The first two areas give a good example of the expansion of the private sector, whereas Chuong Duong can be considered as an outcome of rural-urban migration initiated through increasing disparities between rural and urban areas. These are also the areas that have so far been most researched and about which there exists a great deal of publications that provided the base of my M.A. thesis. Within this paper I will, however, also pay attention to the less researched areas around Hanoi, which will be the focus of my future research.

Socio-economic transformation of the Ancient Quarter
The first area of interest is the ‘Ancient Quarter’ of Hanoi. Since the legalization of private sector economy in the mid 1980s it has been redeveloped as commercial centre. As a consequence illegal private building activities in the quarter have increased. Logan (1994: 65) refers to this as “‘do-it-yourself’ building boom”. This boom indicates that the people of Hanoi have started to improve their living conditions on their own, independently from the state. Most residents convert the ground floors of their traditional ‘tunnel-houses’ into sales rooms. Some would, because of lack of space inside, even expand their sales- and living rooms onto the streets in front of their houses.

In the ‘Ancient Quarter’ an expansion of formal economic activities as well as of informal activities can be noticed. The formal sector is made up of private retail trade. Attracted by the rising economic opportunities a lot of new traders have come from other parts of the city or even from other provinces. They opened up larger and more modern shops than the ones of the older residents. The rising competition results in the displacement of former residents that do not have the financial capacity to extend their businesses (Waibel 2002: 218 f.). Besides the formal retail sec-
tor, an informal economic sector has developed. In Hanoi there is an increase in economic activities of street hawkers and petty traders on the streets. In addition to that, mostly female, door to door peddlers from the surrounding countryside sell agricultural products. Forbes (1996: 62) terms these informal activities *Pavement Economy*.

**Commercialization of the French Colonial Quarter**

Within the French Colonial Quarter one can note in recent years a transformation from a residential to a commercial area. Multinational enterprises, international organizations and local businessmen show a growing interest in the villas in this area. The colonial-style houses are converted into representative offices, embassies or large shops. This leads to the displacement or even eviction of former residents.

The government owns a great part of the villas and seeks to gain profit by renting them to affluent people. As Koperdraat and Schenk (2000: 68 ff.) report, the former tenant then has three options. Firstly, the government offers a low financial compensation for leaving. Secondly, the tenant can receive accommodation in a newly built state apartment usually situated on the outskirts of the city. Thirdly, if a tenant refuses to vacate a villa the police might force him to leave.

Since they belong to the low-income group, former tenants often find themselves in the so-called *metropolitan dilemma*. The concept of the *metropolitan dilemma* was developed by Berner and Korff (1995: 209 f.) and refers to the situation of low-income employees who have to live near the city centre because they do not have the time and money to commute daily. But in most cases it is their residential places that are threatened by eviction because they occupy highly valued land in the city centre. Most residents cannot afford to buy or build a new house elsewhere. That is why they have to agree in resettlement. As a result they lose their income opportunities in the city centre.

**Squatter areas as a consequence of rural-urban migration**

Another consequence of the Doi Moi reforms is the growth of rural-urban migration, especially to Hanoi. In the pre-Doi Moi era internal migration had been restricted by the household registration system. Without this registration people did not receive subsidized food or employment. Since the system has broken down rural urban migration has increased.

Most of the migrants work in the informal sector as cyclo riders, garbage collectors or porters on the market. Many of these migrants live in squatter areas on the bank of the Red River, which are located near to the Ancient Quarter and to the French Colonial Quarter. They usually live in small shacks built on illegally occupied land, which means that they are in danger of eviction. It is therefore important for the residents to establish social relations which can help them secure their livelihood.

Such social relations in the squatter areas often base on the rural-based networks through which migrants came to the city in the first place. Migrants of the same home town tend to move to the same district in Hanoi, a process also called chain migration (see, for example, Li Tana 1996). This has the advantage that newcomers can count on the assistance of fellow villagers when they
seek employment or housing. In the last years these social relations have led to the emergence of informal organizations named *phuong hoi* (guild), *to or nhom* (group) (Li Tana 1996: 55).

**The Squatter Area of Chuong Duong**

An example of a squatter area is Chuong Duong, which is situated on the banks of the Red River. The authorities of Hanoi have already planned to tear down the squatter area in order to build a motorway or a port. They eventually decided against it, because it would mean that a great number of people needed to be resettled (Harnois 2000: 107). Residents of the squatter area have now taken action to improve their living conditions by themselves. This could result in the creation of a *locality*. With the term of the *locality* Korff (1991: 14 f.) refers to loosely structured relations of mutual assistance between people living in a spatially defined area. The *locality* develops from “social creativity”, the will to improve living standards on one’s own.

Several initiatives such as the raising of money to solidify the banks of the Red River or the establishment of savings groups show that the foundation for social organization has already been laid (Harnois 2000: 106 f., 130). Moreover Berner and Korff (1995: 214) name social relations such as kinship, friendship and neighbourship as basis for social cohesion. The continuing existence of these relations is ensured by chain migration.

**Rural villages at the outskirts of Hanoi**

A fourth area, which I will discuss now, has thus far not yet been much researched. It concerns the rural villages surrounding Hanoi. The existence of the people living there is increasingly threatened by construction projects of multinational joint-ventures. With the expansion of the city, farmland belonging to the villages is becoming highly valued land. In recent years traditionally flower growing villages have been transformed to modern housing sites. In 1996 the government gave permission to the Citra Westlake Project in Phu Thuong ward which was to accommodate 50,000 people. For their farmland the residents were offered both financial compensation and the possibility of employment within the project. The villagers accepted the offer because they were willing to integrate into the urban economy. But with the financial crisis in 1997 the project was stopped and the joint-venture denied paying the reimbursement (Leaf 1999: 313).

In my future research I plan to focus exactly on these social and economical implications of the residents’ integration into the urban economy. This research would include a survey on changes of lifestyles in a selected village, taking into considerations various issues described above. Do the residents of this village commute into the city centre for work or do they find employment in a project nearby? How do these new employment opportunities affect their income? A further step would then be to examine indicators of social change. Based on the assumption that the adoption of an urban lifestyle usually affects traditional patterns of social organization two issues would be of interest: On the one hand the transformation of family relations and on the other changes in the relationship between man and woman. These issues relate to the question whether adolescents tend to leave their families to live on their own in the city. And if so, can this be
regarded an indicator for the loosening of traditionally strong family ties (e.g. child piety)? In this context it is also of importance to look at, for example, the age of marriage and the amount of females staying single. Through a study of such economic and social processes in the outskirts of Hanoi, I aim to contribute to a better understanding of Vietnam’s transformation from a rural society to an urban society.

References


Processes of Urbanisation and Transformation
in Nam Dinh City, Vietnam
Angelica Wehrli

Within this paper I will explore the ongoing processes of urbanisation and transformation in Nam Dinh City, Vietnam. I will do so by first listing some facts concerning Vietnam. Then I will outline my research interest, and describe the location of my field research. To conclude, I will give two examples that highlight the actual transformation process in order to illustrate the variety of ways in which values and ideals are subject to change. Conflicts resulting from diverse ideals as well as first reflections on change came up during my explorative field visit, which I undertook in April and Mai 2004 to prepare my PhD research.¹

A Historic Transition

Various studies about Vietnam have pointed out that there is a gap in employment opportunities and living standards between urban and rural areas on the one hand, and between southern and northern Vietnam on the other hand. Reasons for the latter can be found in history, and manifest themselves, amongst others, in considerable economic differences. These differences were even enhanced by the doi moi (renovation) policy, which had not the same impact on the predominantly rural areas as it had on the cities. The launching of doi moi by the Vietnamese Communist Party and the Vietnamese government in 1986 can be seen as a turning point in the recent history of Vietnam, as it implied major changes from the former centrally planned economy to a ‘market economy with socialist direction’.² Some changes are quite obvious and directly influence the life of the Vietnamese people, while others tend to be more subtle. The impact of the transitional phase does, however, not have the same consequences for all individuals.

Before going into detail about my research location and interest, I will provide some basic characteristics of Vietnam. As can also be observed in other countries in Southeast Asia and in other parts of the world, Vietnam is marked by a transition towards urbanity³ and a rise in the urban population.⁴ The Vietnamese society is currently undergoing a radical change from a rural to an

¹ At this stage of research I am not yet able to draw conclusions from intensive field work and collected data.
² It is amply discussed whether the process of reform was emerging from below rather than being directed top down by the central government (Gainsborough 2003; Fforde and de Vlyder 1996; Kerkvliet 1995).
³ I have not yet found precise definitions for urban or rural areas in Vietnam that could serve as the basis for the statistic mentioned hereafter. Definitions for “urban” are numerous. In order not to exceed the space of this article I refer to Wirth, who names characteristics such as the size of the population, density, and heterogeneity (1938: 1-24).
urban country. Not only is the population growth rate for urban areas much higher than the rate for rural ones, but also do more and more people live in urban areas. In 1990 the population growth rate for urban areas was 2.4% compared to 1.8% for rural areas. This tendency intensified even more in the last decade as in 2003 the urban population increased with an average of 4.2% corresponding to 0.5% for rural areas. Although the estimates for the anticipated dimension of increase vary according to sources, there is no doubt that the rise will be a significant one, and thus represents a historic transition. Within my PhD research, I want to explore the consequences of this transition on individuals living in Nam Dinh City.

Research Location and Interest
Nam Dinh City with its 232’000 citizens represents an average, middle-sized Vietnamese city. Although considered to be an urban place because of its high population rate and high density, it would make no sense to draw a sharp line between urban and rural areas. Nam Dinh City is situated in the Red River Delta about 90 km southeast of Ha Noi and is, unlike other places in the area, by no means a tourist site. In the past Nam Dinh City used to be the centre of Vietnam’s textile industry and was called the Manchester of ancient Indochina (Vu Can 1966: 204). Today most of the people in Nam Dinh province work in agriculture, forestry and fishery (44,7%), followed by commerce and service (36,5%), industry (e.g. textile, garment, food processing, mechanical companies) (10,7%), and construction works (8.2%). The unemployment rate for the urban area of the Red River Delta is officially 6.4% and hence slightly higher than the national average of 5.8%. The rate in Nam Dinh City is – according to (official) sources – around 2-7%, but unofficial sources claim it to be as high as 20% (personal communication Mai 2004).

During my latest visit to the Red River Delta I conducted an explorative field visit in order to prepare my PhD research. I observed an obvious contrast between the former way of life, and the actual hustle and bustle of a more ‘modern’ urban Vietnam. Despite the ongoing changes in every corner, continuity remains equally part of everyday life. The sometimes apparent contradiction, the merging of what seem to be two worlds getting in touch with each other, motivated me to acquire an in-depth understanding of the processes of socio-economic transformation.

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5 According to official statistics Vietnam had about 81 million inhabitants in 2003, whereof 21 million were living in urban, 60 million in rural areas. The data of 1990 illustrate the demographic shift; at that time the population was about 66 million: 53 million were living in rural and 13 million in urban areas. (Average population by sex and by urban, rural. In: GSO (ed.) 2005: Population and Employment). <http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=467&idmid=3&ItemID=1523>. 11.05.2005


7 The data base corresponds to the time span between 1991 and 1995. (Nam Dinh Provincial People’s Committee. Nam Dinh Provincial Department of Industry (ed.) 1999: Plan on Industrial Development of Nam Dinh Province by the year of 2010). At the moment I lack actual statistic material, but I will obtain it during the field research.

In order to find out more about these processes, I will conduct fieldwork in Nam Dinh City from September 2005 to March 2006 and from June to September 2006. The working title of my PhD study is “Household Livelihood Strategies in the Context of Socio-Economic Transformation in Nam Dinh City, Vietnam.” I am interested in analysing the livelihood of the inhabitants of Nam Dinh City, thereby I will attach equal importance to men and women. A gender-sensitive approach is fundamental to my research, as not only women’s but also men’s actions and ways of behaviour are subject to prevailing norms, traditions and new possibilities of ways of living. I will furthermore pay attention to migration transactions to and from Nam Dinh City. Related to this interest in migration patterns are the strategies of individuals embedded in households to secure their livelihood (in legal and/or illegal ways) in Nam Dinh City.

Impressions during my field explorative visit to Nam Dinh City, based on numerous informal conversations, information broadcasted by mass media in Vietnam as well as further reading, have given rise to controversial reflections. In the following I will illustrate this by means of two examples: The first one deals with the prestige of trade, the second one concerns Confucian’s believes and resulting conflicts.

1st Example: The Prestige of Trade

Vietnam’s post doi moi policy and inherent ideological changes undoubtedly affected the outlook of Vietnamese society. But how do new evolving values become apparent, for example, in the way people make their living? Is it true that ideals – that are said to have been fundamental and characteristic for Vietnam’s society – have changed radically in the last two decades? Can the processes of socio-economic transformation lead to the evolving of new ideals reflected in the prestige of occupations?

Prestige and symbolic values which are ascribed to a certain profession are by no means stable, but dependent of time and context. Vietnam was an agrarian society for centuries, and thus the job of a farmer was highly valued. There were traditionally three classes in Vietnam, the scholars (sĩ), farmers (nông) and craftsmen (công). Outside of this social hierarchy were the traders (thượng) who were not granted high social prestige. In practice trade was left to the Chinese and almost all Vietnamese favoured a non-trade employment. This reinforced the cycle of ascribing low prestige to trade. Yet, it is interesting to see that since doi moi the state and even the Communist party have given trade a positive mention. The encouragement is public; the praise of trade is diffused widely by mass media. Especially younger entrepreneurs are being extolled for their initiative and ability to build up private businesses or simply for being successful traders. In my opinion, this promotion of a positive connotation between trade and prestige should be related to both the supra local and the individual level. One reason on the supra-local level might

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9 In my sample I will include both long term Nam Dinh citizens (i.e. people who have lived in Nam Dinh City for more than ten years as well as people who arrived less than ten years ago and either live or just work in Nam Dinh City). The aim of this sampling is to get insights into processes of migration and the dynamics of “city” development.

10 At that time I was limited to reading Vietnamese newspapers in English due to my insufficient knowledge of the Vietnamese language.
be the government’s post *doi moi* policy which aims, among other things, at rapid economic growth. Moreover there is an increase in the population, which means that jobs for millions have to be provided. All these factors encourage a promotion of private business, and a new set of professions in the domain of trade. On the local or individual level, the higher income of people working in private business compared to salaries of state employees enhances the attractiveness of trade or of having one’s own business. This example from the realm of trade suggests that ideological changes and corresponding occupational consequences mutually reinforce each other.

**2nd Example: Confucian’s Believes and Resulting Conflicts**

The second example I want to present here is related to religious values. In official statistics the majority of people stated that they do not belong to a religion, which is insofar of interest, as attributes referring to one or another religious practice can not be overlooked in daily life. This raises questions: Are some believes or daily performed rituals not considered as part of religion? Or is there no interest in pointing out one’s own religious believes? Is this attitude a relict of prevailing atheism, a product of former socialist state ideology?

Furthermore, official statistics do not mention Confucian believes, but summarize these practises under “Buddhism”. This category however is not evident, as practices and believes of Buddhism vary not only between countries, but also between regions within a country. Despite this controversial information, for which I still lack an explanation, it cannot be denied that, especially in North-Vietnam, Confucianism has exerted influence upon numerous individuals for centuries. To this day, Confucianism structures society as it virtually includes every member by placing him or her into a hierarchical web of mutual rights and duties. Therefore, it seems to me that Confucianism is not only a mirror of the moral order, but also of social integration. In spite of the ongoing changes on both the supra local and the local level in Nam Dinh City, traditional ideas and believes tend to be present and influence various aspects of daily life. Regardless of the ongoing processes ancestor worship, for example, is still practised in literally every Confucian household I visited during my field visit. The ornamenting of small ‘temples’, regular offerings and prayers are by no means limited to private houses, but can equally be found in hotels, restaurants, private shops or in a small internet café along a narrow street. Besides this obvious presence of ‘old’ Confucianist practices and values, many Vietnamese do now see themselves confronted with possibilities to live their lives in a very different way. Let me illustrate how the presence of Confucian ideology and new policy ideals can result in conflicts.

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11 Gainsborough for example notes that private firms are becoming more important, although the state’s business interest still predominates (2004: 50).

12 According to statistics 1.4 million people out of the total 1.9 million living in Nam Dinh province, stated not to belong to a religion, while about 509’000 belong to a religion (382’000 people are Catholics, 126’000 Buddhists, 580 Protestants, 10 Muslims, and 2 Hoa Hoa). (Population as of 1st April 1999 by province and by religion. In: GSO (ed.) 2005: Population and Employment. Population and Housing Census Vietnam 1999).

Due to the enormous population growth during the last years, the Vietnamese authorities proclaimed a new family policy calling for only one or two children. The present family ideal is in sharp contrast to the former – characterised in the predominant rural Vietnam by the dictum ‘the more children the better’ – which remained unchanged for decades. For parents striving to fulfil the Confucian ideal of having at least one son, a conflicting situation develops in case the first two children are girls. According to the new family ideal promoted and advertised throughout the country, they are meant to refrain from having another child. But according to Confucianism, their duty has not yet been accomplished since a son is required for the ancestor worship (Gammeltoft 1999: 70ff; Pham Van Bich 1999: 219ff). It is therefore interesting to look more closely at how the new family policy, also labelled in the official discourse as “happy family”, interacts with Confucians believes, and how parents deal with divergent demands. Throughout the country large colourful advertisement highlight the differences between small and “happy families” by contrasting them with “unhappy families” raising many children. Still, one can wonder whether official propaganda is valued more than Confucian tradition and the corresponding demand to have at least one son. This leads to the question raised in the literature, to what extent this confrontation of ideals emerges into conflicts (Gammeltoft 1999: 61ff) and how these are related to gender.

To finish, I would like to give one personal anecdote of how it appeared to me that – despite ongoing changes – internalised Confucian tradition still dominates everyday life as some Vietnamese continue considering a boy as being indispensable for the so called “family happiness”. One afternoon in May 2004 I had a lively conversation with a woman whom I had met for the first time. After having gone through the Vietnamese procedure of ‘entering questions’ (about my age, civil status and children) myself, Lan introduced herself as being thirty-four years old, married but unfortunately childless. After a while her desperate wish to give birth to a son in order to be recognised by friends and relatives as “a real woman” became evident. She connected this aspired shift in status with more respect increasing the quality of living. The dialogue continued until she suddenly sighed, cheered up and started to talk about her two daughters whom she formerly had not mentioned, because they were girls!

The two examples relating to the prestige of trade and the differing family values emblematise how the interdependence of ongoing processes of urbanisation and transformation can result in dilemmas on both the society’s and the individual’s level. Vietnam is in a transitional phase which will shape and change the lives of many people. Former values and ideologies are still strongly carried on in everyday life.

13 Gammeltoft emphasises that the situation of Vietnam can by no means be compared to the Chinese ‘one-child-policy’. Nevertheless, she judges the propaganda of the Vietnamese government and the pressure mostly exercised on women to use contraceptive as considerably (Gammeltoft 1999: 57ff).

14 In order to address a person properly and politely one has to know the age of the conversation partner because the Vietnamese language places every person into a virtual net of kinship relations. Although the birth of a son is ascribed high importance, this does not imply that girls are not valued. In fact the ideal – according to Confucianism – consists in a girl as the first born child (in order to help the mother in household task’s and with following children), and as I was told by informants, at least one son (personal communication April, May 2004).
forming part of daily life, but controversial values are evolving. In which way values will change, and how former and actual ideals will merge to create new ones will provide fascinating topics to analyse.

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Internet


List of contributors

Anna Bally
Anna Bally is a member of the ‘Swiss Graduate School Gender Studies’. She is also a psychoanalytic therapist in a private practice in Berne. Anna Bally is presently working at her Ph.D. thesis on an ethnological research project with Indonesian women living in Switzerland. In her research she follows a transdisciplinary perspective on marriage-migration, foregrounding fantasies, identifications and emotional meaning without losing sight of social, cultural and economic processes. Anna Bally has published several articles on the practice of ethno-psychoanalytical research and on female traders struggle for survival in South-Sumatra.

Romana Buechel
Romana Buechel graduated in 2000 at the University of Berne, in the fields of Social Anthropology, Biology and Comparative Religious Studies. Currently she is working as a scientific assistant at the Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Berne, teaching introductory courses of general anthropology, as well as language courses of Bahasa Indonesia. Her regional foci lie on Indonesia and Northern Italy; and her main thematic interests are Medical Anthropology, Religious Studies, Symbolic Anthropology and Development Studies. Presently she is writing up the Ph.D. dissertation on the subject: ‘Managing Disbalances: Strategies of Keeping Illness Away’ – one of the three sub-projects of the research project „Securing a Livelihood in Rural Central Flores (NTT)“. Romana Buechel has conducted anthropological field researches in Haiti, Bénin (1997), in Northern Italy (1998) as well as in Central Flores / Eastern Indonesia (2001-2002 / 2003, 2005). Among her publications are her M.A. thesis on local perceptions and livelihood strategies of Piemontese rice cultivators (co-author with Sue Thueler), and two co-edited volumes entitled ‘Pfefferland’ (2002) and ‘Fremde Freunde’ (forthcoming).

Annuska Derks
Annuska Derks is a research associate at the Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Berne. She has taught undergraduate courses on Cambodia, general anthropology, anthropological theory, the anthropology of genocide at the University of Berne, and on female migration at the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich, Germany. In 2005 she received her Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Annuska Derks has since 1995 been involved in various research projects in and relating to Cambodia, for the Center for Advanced Study in Phnom Penh and various international and non-governmental organizations working on trafficking and sex work in Cambodia, as well as for her Ph.D. thesis entitled ‘Khmer women on the Move: Migration and Urban Experiences in Cambodia’ (2005). She has published, among others, on trafficking, prostitution and factory work in Cambodia and Southeast Asia.

Peter van Eeuwijk
Peter van Eeuwijk is an anthropologist, historian and graduate in development cooperation. He works as a senior researcher at the Institute of Social Anthropology at University of Basel and as a senior lecturer at the Institute of Social Anthropology at the University of Zürich and at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau. His main scientific field is Medical Anthropology and his principal research areas are Southeast Asia (Indonesia) and East Africa (Tanzania). He has conducted several field studies in Medical Anthropology in Indonesia (mainly in Eastern Indonesia). His current research projects are on elderly people, chronic illnesses, care and old-age vulnerability.
Willemijn de Jong
Willemijn de Jong is Associate Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Zurich. She published on work, marriage and gender relationships as well as on rituals and social identity in Indonesia, and on social (in)security in India. Her most recent book as a co-author is entitled ‘Ageing in Insecurity. Vieillir dans l’insécurité. Case Studies on Social Security and Gender in India and Burkina Faso. Sécurité sociale et genre en Inde et au Burkina Faso. Études de cas’ and deals with the limits of family support.

Antoine Kernen
Antoine Kernen earned his doctorate from the Institute of Political Studies in Paris. He presently works and teaches at the Faculty of Social Science at Lausanne University and at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies in Geneva. His research focuses on privatisation processes within the Chinese economy and their social consequences. In earlier works Kernen paid particular attention to small private entrepreneurs. Within his current research he pursues an economic sociology with an analysis of State Owned Enterprises. He recently published (in French) ‘China toward Market Economy: The Privatisations in Shenyang’ (2004).

Sandra Kuerten
Sandra Kuerten is currently working for the German Development Service in Vietnam. She studied Southeast Asian Studies and Economics at the University of Bonn, Germany, and obtained her M.A. degree in 2004. Her M.A. thesis deals with the implications of the transformation process on the lives of the residents of Hanoi.

Susanne Loosli
Susanne Loosli, social anthropologist, is currently working on her doctoral thesis on ‘Local Perceptions and Strategies of Agricultural Production’ in rural Central Flores (Eastern Indonesia), with a special focus on land management, social organisation of work and household strategies. She has conducted anthropological field research in Madagascar (1999) and in Indonesia (2001-2002, 2003). Presently she works for the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in the field of counter-trafficking.

Gerben Nooteboom
Gerben Nooteboom is a lecturer and postdoc researcher at the Departments of Anthropology and Development Studies at Nijmegen University, the Netherlands, teaching courses on livelihood, social security, and fieldwork methodology. He did fieldwork in East Java and East Kalimantan ( Indonesian Borneo) on social security, livelihood, and interpretations of violence among Madurese migrants and currently edits a book on ‘Experiences of Crisis in Indonesia’ with Prof. Ben White (Institute of Social Studies, The Hague). His next research project will be on livelihood change and local interpretations of radical environmental change in water-dependent communities in East Kalimantan. His Ph.D. dissertation is entitled ‘A Matter of Style: Social Security and Livelihood in Upland East Java’ (2003). Furthermore, he has published extensively on social security, livelihood and the winners and losers of the economic crisis in Java.

Nadja Ottiger
Nadja Ottiger, social anthropologist, has been working as assistant and lecturer with a focus on economy and ecology, gender, ethnography and anthropological theory at the Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Zurich, since September 1999. In May 2005 she got the degree for her Ph.D. thesis ‘Peasant Strategies and Forest Politics: Natural Resource Management in Two Tribal Villages of Orissa, India’ from the University of Zurich. From 1996 to 1998 she was assistant at the Chair of Forest Policy and Forest Economics, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
(ETH), Zurich, and coordinator of an international research network on "Local Management of Forests as Determined by Environmental Perception and Traditional Knowledge in the Wider Himalayan Context" with partners of India, Nepal and Bhutan. For her Ph.D. thesis, she conducted field research in two tribal villages of Orissa (1998-1999, 2003). Previous field research, for her M.A. thesis, was conducted in the Cameroonian Grassfields on economic and political relations between men and women in the context of a female farming system.

**Sue Thueler**

Sue Thueler received her M.A. degree in Social Anthropology at the University of Berne in 2001. She has conducted field research in Northern Italy (1998) and, for her Ph.D. dissertation, in Central Flores, Eastern Indonesia (2002, 2003, 2005). Sue Thueler is currently working as a scientific assistant at the Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Berne, where she is teaching undergraduate courses on general anthropology and Eastern Indonesia. The thematic focus of her Ph.D. thesis is on local concepts of the house, household management and networks of exchange. She has published on local perceptions and livelihood strategies of Piemontese rice cultivators (co-author with Romana Buechel) and on the scientific debate on the household.

**Wening Udasmoro**

Wening Udasmoro is a lecturer in Faculty of Cultural Sciences, Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia. She is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Doctorate School of Gender Studies at the University of Geneva. Her Ph.D. research concerns ‘Abortion Policy and Politics of Sexuality in Indonesia’. Her latest publication ‘Nationalism Concept and Women’s Reproductive Rights: Gender Analysis on Indonesian Family Planning Program’ (in Indonesian language) appeared in 2004 in Humaniora Journal. Her main research interests are: abortion policy and state, culture, religion and women, and gender in French, Javanese and Indonesian literature.

**Angelica Wehrli**

Angelica Wehrli is currently working as a scientific assistant at the Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Berne. She has been teaching undergraduate courses on general anthropology and on Cuba. Her main interest is on (post)-socialist societies, processes of social transformation and gender. In Havana, Cuba, she did field research for her M.A. thesis entitled ‘De traidores a trae-dólares” – von Verrätern zu ‘Geldbringen’” (to be published in the LIT-Verlag). She has furthermore published on racism and conducted contracted studies for the Swiss Red Cross (SRK) and the ‘Eidgenössische Kommission gegen Rassismus’ (EKR).

**Vasoontara Yiengprugsawan**

Vasoontara Yiengprugsawan received her B.A. degree in Economics from the Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. She subsequently got her M.A. degree in International Relations from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Vasoontara Yiengprugsawan worked as Associate Migration Policy Officer within the Migration Policy and Research Programme of the International Organization for Migration (2002-2005). She published on partnering and managing migration, migration statistics, and diaspora support to migration and development. Currently, she is working on her Ph.D. thesis entitled ‘Thai Health-Risk Transition: National Cohort Study’ at the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.